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ETHICS AND REVELATION



ETHICS AND REVELATION

BY

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"The lecturer shall be appointed annually in the month of May, or as soon thereafter as can conveniently be done, by the persons who for the time being shall hold the offices of Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese in which is the Church of the Holy Trinity; the Rector of said Church, the Professor of Biblical Learning, the Professor of Systematic Divinity, and the Professor of Ecclesiastical History, in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia.

"In case either of said offices are vacant, the others may nominate the lecturer."

PHILADELPHIA, ADVENT, 1882.

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ETHICS AND REVELATION

LECTURE I

ETHICS AND RELIGION

THE aim of these lectures is to show that the Bible marks out the road along which conscience must travel, if it would treat our life on earth with abiding seriousness. Both on the side of history and on the side of our religion the conditions seem to be ripe for thought of this kind. On the side of history, it is plain that our experience is soon to reach, if it has not already reached, a point where we must lay anew the foundations of the conviction that universal history has a moral end. When we reflect that humanity is rapidly acquiring for the first time a single nervous organism, so that the things which happened yesterday in the remotest quarters of the globe are forced upon our attention to-day; when we consider how the mental map, upon which the average man follows the objects that interest him, has broadened; and when we think of the way in which comparative study is making more or less real

to us the things that are or have been real to every branch of our race, — we may say, without conceit, that the extent of experience within the reach of the average man of former days, when put beside the experience possible to the same man in our own time, looks provincial.

But it is not only in point of extent that the experience open to a fairly educated mind is much greater to-day than ever before. In potential depth and intensity also it is greater. Psychology is furnishing the individual with the materials of a completer self-knowledge. Sociology is doing a similar work for society. The organized common consciousness of humanity is beginning to know itself to a degree far beyond the social self-knowledge attained by our forefathers. So, on the one hand, the area of human life that comes within the horizon of average intelligence is broader, and, on the other, the knowledge of the facts of our social being and the condition of social well-being is deeper. Therefore history, the recorded experience of the race, as interpreted in the light of our own experience, presses upon our knowledge and our conscience with increasing force. The supreme question for every man and woman of our time who would achieve deep thought and a commanding purpose, the question of the Sphinx, which we must answer if we would not be devoured, is, How must I interpret the uni-

verse, if I am to take history, not as a drama that has the irony of the universe behind it, but as a real drama into which the heart of the universe puts itself? How shall I conceive history to have a moral end?

Self-consciousness is born and grows in society. We cannot learn to think except in relation with the thought of the past as embodied and preserved in language. We cannot become deeply aware of ourselves except in communion with the experience of society as embodied and recorded in history. In the long run, then, the depth of self-consciousness is sure to be in some sort of proportion to the bulk of social experience with which history brings us into contact. And since history is now confronting the individual with a bulk unheard of hitherto, it should follow that the individual cannot, unless he would flee from the life on earth, escape the labors and pains of a self-consciousness deeper than that of his forefathers. Now self-consciousness, when permeated with a feeling of responsibility and obligation, manifests itself as conscience. Hence, by the same law that entails a deeper self-knowledge in the average man of the coming time, it follows that the average conscience will also take a wider range. The field of conscience is determined by the strength and reach of the imagination. We can feel no obligation toward nor responsibility for beings who are not real for us.

But the vast increase in the volume of social experience, which history and sociology are beginning to open before us, greatly increases the reach of our imagination, and so broadens the area of social reality. The field of conscience is proportionately enlarged.

It also follows that the religious need of the average man must become keener and more imperious. For religion is that form of experience and feeling wherein man insures himself in the belief that he can meet all the obligations issuing from his relation to reality, and discharge in full the debts that conscience declares to be binding. Religion, in its essence, is the sense of fellowship and partnership with God. And God, however variously the thought of different times and places conceives Him, is always, for feeling, the solid and abiding reality, the permanent element in a world of change. Self-consciousness deepens as social experience broadens; and, by the same process, conscience gains a keener edge and wider scope. But hereby the distance between the man's spiritual desire and his deeds becomes greater. What he does grows less, in proportion as what he ought to do grows large. The equation of existence is destroyed. The balance between spiritual demand and spiritual supply is shattered.

This means that man loses his self-respect.

For self-respect is bottomed upon the ability to become what one desires to be, and if the ability steadily falls short of the task, the springs of self-respect dry up; the motives of happy and heroic action wither. In this crisis of his inner life, science, art, and generous civic life come to man's rescue. Science renews his self-respect by opening to him the springs of wonder and admiration for the mighty world wherein his tent is pitched. Art cleanses and absolves him; lifting him, by the power of beauty, into a world that is free from fractions and from waste. The State ennobles him, by taking him into partnership with a purpose so much deeper than individual aims, that, by spending existence in its service, men may enrich and eternize themselves. In each one of these forms of the larger life, the individual exalts himself above the dust into which his body descends. In each, he regains the self-respect which the loss of equation between desire and deed had taken from him. Yet no one of them by itself, nor all of them together, can perfectly and finally do the work of insuring man's self-respect against the accidents inseparable from a widening and deepening experience. Furthermore, no small part of the success which they actually achieve is due to the unconsciously religious nature of the feelings which they draw upon and encourage. The toils

of the scientist are glorified by an admiration of nature that possesses almost every attribute of religion save the name. The delight in beauty, if it is anything better than self-indulgence, cultivates a worshipful temper that is of the very essence of religion. The deepest springs of patriotism lie hidden in a feeling that renders the State in some part a Church, and gives to the love of native land the color of a sacramental relationship with God.

Religion alone—explicit and acknowledged religion—can effectively do the work of maintaining humanity's self-respect, and to do that work has been the object of all religions. The earliest histories were religious genealogies whereby the kings and rulers of primitive states set forth and authenticated their connection with the gods. And, seeing that the king was the State, through these genealogies the State traced its right to be and to continue to be, home to its source in the divine nature. Our own religion claims no exemption from the rule that the aim and the test of religion is its success in maintaining or creating in humanity a masterful and abiding self-respect. Its entire body of doctrines—Creation, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Trinity—moves toward this end. Saving faith in God is the faith whereby man takes fast hold on God's faith in humanity. To be believed in

is the deepest necessity of our nature, and the conviction that God believes in humanity and puts His whole being and purpose at the back of His belief is the very marrow of Christianity. Our religion bases its claim to be the world's rightful religion upon its ability to put beyond all question the self-respect of the man who is to shoulder all humanity's debts to history without staggering, and face the most hostile circumstances without blenching.

So our religion finds its opportunity in the state of things that now confronts the conscience. Universal history is not merely a fact. As the record of personal and social experience, it becomes for the reason a problem, for the will a task. How shall history be taken, not with cosmic irony, but with cosmic seriousness? is the problem. How shall we widen and deepen our obligations so as to meet the larger and clearer knowledge of society that is being given to us? And how shall we do that work without feeling the least desire to leave society, to retreat from history, and, betaking ourselves to the monastery, find heart's-ease and peace? that is the task. How shall we be whole-hearted and efficient citizens of the vast world now opening before us?

Christianity, by reason of its native bent and bias, must answer the challenge in the very mood

in which the higher reason of the world will eventually put it. For Christianity is an historical religion. And when we say that, we do not merely mean that it has a history; for everything that shares the fortunes of the earth has a history. What we mean is that it has a genius for history; that it commends itself as the interpretation of the historical life of our race. And this is true, because the pith of our religion is a history. The Bible begins with the story of the building of a nation, and ends with the story of a divine life lived in the open air of history, among the sons of men. It is the book of witness to the outgoing of God's life into man's life, as that life is conditioned by time and space. It is not, in its primary sense, a book of philosophy, nor even of mystic visions of individual duty. It is rather the record of God's doings on the earth. Its first absolutely authentic fact is the Exodus. Its main fact is the story of Jesus of Nazareth, son of the carpenter and Son of God. From the march of Israel out of Egypt to the Incarnation, there is a steadily growing body of witness to the conclusion that God takes human history with the fullest seriousness; and that He puts in play all the resources of His being, in order that history may be carried forward to a moral end.

Criticism has opened the eyes of the Church

to see the Bible in the light of history. Criticism has many sins to answer for,—some of them heavy. A considerable part of it has been characterized by an intellectual imperiousness wholly unbecoming the patient seriousness of scholarship dealing with a noble subject. Many a critic has been as a pope without jurisdiction, possessing the kind of infallibility that is able to hear the grass growing in Palestine two thousand years ago. Criticism has often been grossly irreverent. The Bible deserves to be handled by every one with the deepest respect. It has been taken to the heart of the whole Occident. It has blent with all that is most tender and holy in the eyes of the masterful peoples of the world. It is enshrined in the affections of those nations into whose keeping history has given her main interests. Yet many critics have treated the Bible as if it were the private property of the men of the chair. And sometimes there has entered into criticism the motive that stirred up Erostratus to burn down the Temple of Diana.

These things, however, are not the substance of criticism, but its accidents,—the anarchic results that inevitably followed the downfall of the intellectual absolutism of the old theology. The soul of criticism is something far different. It is that historical spirit whose vital breath is a reverent

though fearless piety toward the past. The mainspring of the historical spirit is identical with the mainspring of the higher morality. Just as the latter finds its motive in reverence for the individuality of one's neighbors, and thus the supreme rule of conduct becomes, Treat your neighbor always as a person, as an end in himself!—even so, the historical spirit finds its motive in reverence for the individuality of the past. To give the past the right of suffrage, not to allow the voice of the live dog to cry down the story of the dead lion, not to enslave past facts to the real or imaginary needs of the present, not to fight with past facts in the interest of existing dogmas, but to listen with reverent and untiring attention until the past shall have told its story in its own tongue,—this, nothing else, is the soul of the nobler historical study of our day. And this, and nothing else, is the soul of true criticism.

In our day, thanks to criticism, the Bible, for the first time in its history as a canonic total, is out in the open. The Old Testament did not find in the Jewish Church the right of free speech. The written law was sheltered behind, and at the same time ruled by, the unwritten law, or tradition. Tradition dominated the sacred text, while aiming to interpret it. With the birth of Christianity there came into the world a new prophecy, to which the

prophets of the old dispensation might speak their native language. But with the fixing of the Christian canon of the two Testaments in the fourth century, the fortune that had befallen the Old Testament in the Jewish Church now befell the whole Bible in the Catholic Church. The Bible withdrew from history to be sheltered and sanctified and hidden behind the mighty barriers of a sacred and infallible tradition.

It has been the work of criticism to bring the Bible out from behind the barriers of tradition and leave it in the open field of history. The Bible has been liberated. Henceforth it is to be itself, to have the right of free speech. The order of the day is that the Christian Scriptures, drawing aloof from dogma, shall be patiently and reverently listened to by the Christian Church, to the end that they may tell us God's love story just as it was first told. Ignatius says to Polycarp: The times call for thee as the winds call for the pilot. Even so do the times call to the spirit of reverent, fearless scholarship within the Church. The Bible is out in the open, a history upon the field of universal history. It has been set free. The work we have to do is to show that the reasons which led the spiritual experience of the Occident, as embodied in and speaking through the Catholic Church, to canonize the Scriptures, are

reasons that still live. All books that are classic and timeless have the secret of their safety within their own keeping. This is supremely the case with the Bible. It was not canonized without solid reason. The vital experience of the Occident canonized it because, at a time when universal history was taking a momentous turn, when the fortunes of humanity were about to enter a new career, the Bible alone met the deepest needs of the race. Now, the inherent life of our Scriptures has not been weakened. Their power to impress their own value upon conscience is not palsied. The Bible is able to recanonize itself. Universal history is beginning to take another turn, quite as momentous, fully as pregnant with mighty consequences, as the one it took in the Mediterranean world. Humanity is entering upon a new experience. We must put the Bible face to face with that experience. We are to set aside, for the time being, all those theories of inspiration and canonicity which the Church has conceived to be the Bible's safeguards. With unanxious confidence in our Scriptures, we are to permit them to recanonize themselves by giving saving unity and ennobling hope to the deepest experience of mankind in our day.

The emancipation of the Bible keeps pace in the Church's life with her emphatic disowning of her old claims to infallibility. She must acquire a new

habit of mind. Too long has she been blinded by supremacy. After the fourth century the dogma of ecclesiastical infallibility was in full possession of the Church's mind. Even since the Reformation, in those branches of the Church that have disowned the dogma of ecclesiastical infallibility, the mental habits begotten and bred by the dogma still survive. No wonder! Men are born to exercise infallibility as the sparks are to fly upwards. The unconscious assumption of infallibility is the mental aspect of the practical struggle for existence, of the right which, in one form or another, is the base and foundation of all our rights,—the right to be. Every profession has its own form of infallibility. Every political party exercises it. Every student, who would fain see the truth with clear, unclouded gaze, knows in his heart that his own tendency to infallibility is the deadly foe of the intellectual life. It is one of the most deep-set of human habits. But in the case of the Church that habit has been exalted into partnership with the holiest things and made the guardian of the dearest interests of the race.

In spite of its naturalness, and, under certain historical conditions, its inevitableness, infallibility is the Church's curse, under present conditions. It carries with it an incapacity to see and interpret facts of a larger measure or of a different

order from those already under the hand. In dealing with new and critical opportunities it is tantamount to conventionalism. Now, conventionalism is not made less fatal by being ordained. In all its forms, it entails a certain intellectual snobbery, a make of mind that cannot open itself to new facts upon their own level; but, if it touches them at all, does so with mental condescension. No fact, however, not even the humblest, will ever open its heart to him who condescends to it. It must be served with a lowly mind. It gives itself only to the reverent wooer. And facts of the highest order, for him who condescends to them, are as a landscape to a blind man's eye.

Every form of conventionalism has its attendant frivolity; and the infallible Church has sometimes carried frivolity, the lack of mental seriousness in the presence of grave problems, to a high pitch. The Church cannot escape the law that holds good of the individual reasoner who is unable to attain mental purity except in relation with great problems. Philosophy begins in wonder, in a deep sense of mental difficulties, accompanied by a joyous confidence in the truth that lies behind them. And philosophy must ever and again take a new birth of wonder, unless it is to become unreal and impure. The Church must submit to the same law. The Christian reason, taken away from

the cleansing presence of difficulties, given a false air of finality, becomes frivolous and unclean. The Church's mind must be purged through problems, through the consciousness of those great new facts in the social and historical order of things which she has hitherto seen only from afar. Thus shall she be freed from some of the devout customs that lie upon her "with a weight heavy as frost and deep almost as life." Thus shall new springs of admiration for God's work in history be opened in her heart. And thus shall her mental habits come to correspond with the task which history is now challenging Christianity to meet.

From this new disposition of affairs and from the new habit of thought that answers to it, there must result, for the Church, a change in the proportion between apologetics and dogmatics. Without discussing the constitutional relationship between these two aspects of the reasoned Christian view of life, it is safe to say that they vary in relative bulk and significance according as the attention is directed either to that need of self-consistency which is inherent in a mind born and bred in the Christian view of life, or to the arguments which shall hit the feeling of men who stand more or less outside that view. Of course, dogmatics and apologetics cannot be separated. It may be fairly questioned whether

they should even be distinguished, whether the term apologetics would not better be disused. But, taking the terms as they have been given to us, it is certain that the dogmatic turn of thought will predominate when emphasis falls upon the inner needs of a Christianity which is permitted to take itself as spiritually established in the world, as having a plain right of way in history; and that the apologetic turn of thought will prevail when Christianity has its fortune to make in the world, when there is a vigorous outside reason which looks with keen and suspicious eyes upon Christianity's claim to be the world's religion, and when the bulk of people, who have either never come within the Christian interpretation of the universe or have been alienated from it, is so considerable that Christianity is pushed to the exercise of all its powers of reason and life, in order to make its fortune.

Thus, in the period between the sixth and the fifteenth centuries there could not well be any serious or thorough apologetic. For Christianity was then an imperial establishment in spiritual affairs. The Church's authority was so supreme that no great effort of reason was necessary, when Christianity was doubted. If the doubt was pronounced and aggressive, it was put out of the way by the aid of the secular arm. And,

within the schools, the Church's practical infallibility was so much a matter of course as to have passed into a postulate both of feeling and reason. It was not possible to take seriously the rational difficulties in the way of belief. With the best intention in the world, the mature Christian reason of the time passed over doubts with an ease of motion that seemed to betoken intellectual frivolity. That, however, is not true. The truth is that the intellectual leaders of the Church were constitutionally incapable of realizing the difficulties. It was impossible, under the circumstances, to take doubt seriously. All the mental strength of the time went into the systematic elaboration of the doctrines which tradition imposed upon the reason. The things outside the Church's own circle of truths could not make any serious impression. Hence, to write an apologetic treatise was, in effect, to fight, like Commodus, against gladiators armed with wooden swords.

The look of things in our time is very different. Christianity has been disestablished. I do not refer to political disestablishment, the separation of Church and State, but to disestablishment in terms of reason. "It is come, I know not how," writes Bishop Butler, "to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject

of inquiry ; but that it is now, at length, discovered to be fictitious. . . . On the contrary, this much, at least, will be here found, not taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in it." Here we see both the apologetic need and the apologetic reason at work upon it. Butler's "Analogy," like Origen's "De Principiis," marks an epoch. The appearance of Origen's book showed that the Christian view of things had come to the point of intellectual maturity where it was driven by the need of system to seek full and coherent self-expression. The appearance of the "Analogy" showed that the Christian interpretation of life had been disestablished before reason ; that Christianity was no longer a postulate ; that doubt might no longer be first clubbed into insensibility by authority and afterward sprinkled with holy water ; but that, henceforth, difficulties must be seriously taken and weighed ; and that the Church must regain her lost ground by fair and patient reasoning. It does not matter whether we speak of dogmatics and apologetics as distinct aspects of the reasoned Christian view of the world, or whether we think that the term dogmatics is sufficient for all purposes. The only material consideration is that our dogmatics must have an apologetic bias ; and that

the bias must be deep-set. For as we reason out our view of things, we are fully aware, at every point, that a great body of men, whose intellectual respectability we do not dream of denying or impugning, is in deep variance from us. The Christian view of things is no longer the spiritual establishment of the Occident.

This state of things works wholly for the good of dogmatics. It means that the eighteenth century began a period wherein our faith is forced, for the first time, to apply to its own foundation an unsparing criticism. The right to pay any serious attention at all to dogmatics is implicitly denied by a widespread tendency to agnosticism. The interest in dogmatics is slack and lifeless in the breast of many believers. The times, therefore, are favorable to vital dogmatics. Theology will surely be less of an academic pursuit, more a matter of life; because the strong and hostile reason of our generation forces the Christian reason to know itself more thoroughly, to take account of stock more carefully, and to distinguish more exactly and more fearlessly between the dogmatic elements that are merely traditional and those that are really vital.

There is also a practical consideration that has great weight. A marked feature of our time is the rise of the laity. This brings with it a certain impatience regarding elaborate systems of theology.

The laity are somewhat disposed to tax theology as a luxury, and not altogether without cause. For our inherited body of divinity was produced in no small measure by a leisured class. The men who thought our dogmas out sat at ease concerning the problems and the issues that enter into the political life of humanity. The Nicene theologians felt little or no vital concern for the existence and welfare of the State. The political frame and constitution had been shaped by men whose views of life and whose conceptions of duty differed widely from theirs. Sheltered within a State which the hands of the heathen had builded, the leaders of the Christian movement gave their leisure to the production of theology. I am not in the least disposed to fault them for this. There are diversities of gifts; and the Nicene theologians wrought with strong hands upon the work assigned to them by God and the logic of history. I am simply stating a fact. The fact is that our inherited body of divinity, issuing from the one creative period in the life of the Church at large,—the period that stamped and birthmarked all the dogmas which the various branches of the Church still hold in common,—was produced by a body of men who, as regards the imperious practical necessities that build and develop the State, were men of leisure.

In the Middle Ages things were different. The

Church and the State were inseparable. Piety and patriotism were vitally connected. Yet, as far as dogma is concerned, the conditions were similar. The main interests of the mind went into the analysis and elaboration of the traditional theology. The cardinal fact of the State attracted little attention. Aquinas wrote upon it with great ability. But the chief, although not the exclusive, reason for his writing is found in his relation to Aristotle. Aristotle was his master in thinking; and he felt bound to follow his master all over the field of experience and speculation. He could not, however, put into the question of the State the interest Aristotle gave to it. For the Greek thinker Church and State were one. Consequently he looked upon the well-being of the State as the single condition of the higher life. But Aquinas was a churchman by profession, a statesman only by the way. He was one member of a vast clerical establishment. The Church was for him the sole steward of the truths and the goods that make for the higher life. His system of thought was the companion piece of Hildebrand's ecclesiology. Aristotle speculated upon the State as the men of Marathon fought for it, knowing that the issues of life and death were before him, and feeling that a supreme necessity was behind him. History made it impossible for Aquinas to even come near the Greek in

this matter. As regards the fact and meaning of the State he sat nearly as much at ease as the Nicene theologians.

It should be plain that our body of divinity, shaped and perpetuated under such conditions, cannot easily rid itself of the consequences resulting from the momentous fact that it is the product, in the main, of a class of men who—so far as the layman as a layman, in distinction from the layman considered as the possessor of an immortal soul, is concerned—were men of leisure. Naturally, then, the rise of the laity entails a certain impatience touching elaborate systems of theology, and the impatience has its rights. It is not due simply to the average layman's ignorance of theology backed by the self-confidence derived from his successful management of the world's economic affairs. That is a part of the total cause; for, in churches which are not blessed or cursed with a strong hierarchical constitution, the banker sometimes takes the place of the pope. But that is not the total cause. Neither is the explanation to be found in the widespread suspicion regarding the ability of reason to know about the mysteries of the divine being anything that is worth saying out loud. That also is a part of the total cause, but by no means the whole of it. The total cause includes the layman's well-founded conviction that

the theologians have not come to close quarters with the imperious questions which gather about the existence of the State—that frame and constitution of life, without which theology itself were no better than the after-dinner meditations of a Digger Indian, and which it is the layman's special task to create and guarantee. Hence, at a time when other conditions have conspired to weaken the authority of theology, he is naturally disposed to tax theology as a luxury. The layman does well to feel that a theology which does not take full account of the whole commerce of life is not worth the while of serious men. He does well to insist that theology shall be brought to the bar of vital experience. Now the vital experience of our day is not covered by those questions about the layman's soul, which were the main staple of Nicene and mediæval theology. The layman insists upon his right to take with him into the redeemed life the obligations and relationships that interknit to compose the organism of social and political obligations for whose being and well-being he, as a layman, is primarily responsible.

An apologetic treatment of the Christian view of the world differs from a purely dogmatic treatment, in that it considers the wants of the man who is outside the Church rather than the wants of the man who is within. Its aim is to satisfy not so

much the need of system as the need of a working certitude. It seeks to find the man of the day, and to convince him on his own ground. It takes the field with a small amount of baggage. In a large way it is practical. In a large way; for, as an endeavor after clear thought, it would dishonor itself if it paid any regard to that narrow and ungenerous construction of the practical which makes it the foe of all deep and wide speculation. When apologetics addresses itself to the practical side of things, it takes a generous view of the practical,—meaning thereby a great-hearted and hopeful commerce of life. The objective of the practical, so conceived, is, indeed, a humanity seeking to live in time and space; but it is also a humanity that seeks to live nobly, and would fain lift all mankind to the level of its own best things.

And so the apologetic treatment of the Bible, the attempt to commend the organism of ideas and the body of facts, attested by our Scriptures, to the reason and the conscience of the man who is intellectually outside the Christian interpretation of things, must first find the centre of gravity in that man's own world. It must make clear to itself what his treasures are and where his heart is. It must know what are the questions that command him, and what are the interests that clothe his existence with the meaning and beauty of life.

And, having made this clear, it must then try to commend to him the Biblical interpretation of the universe as the only view that can make him at home with himself. How shall we find this centre of spiritual gravity in the representative man of our day? How shall we discover the point toward which the deepest feeling of the coming age is to set, the object upon which imagination is to be spent? History, like nature, puts us far from her choicest secrets. The incapacity of men, living on the edge of a critical period, to foresee or even guess at what is before them, has passed into a proverb. When we touch the question of the spirit of humanity and its ways, we touch a thing so complex, so difficult to gauge and forecast, that we may well suspect ourselves of knowing too much, when we suppose ourselves to have found the centre of spiritual gravity in the period on whose edge we live. Nothing is easier, considering the narrow range of our vision, than to mistake some strong eddy near the shore for the deep current in the midstream of history.

Yet we are not cut off from all hope of a knowledge that may rise to a high degree of probability. If our survey be broad enough, if our command of data be fairly wide and exact, we may, without presumption, venture to foretell the main motion of history. And it seems to me safe to

found our forecast upon a comparison between the Mediterranean world wherein our religion first established itself and the world now opening around us. There are so many broad resemblances between the two periods, and, at the same time, so many deep differences, that we may build a reasonable trust upon the conclusions drawn from the comparison.

A general likeness between the two periods is found in the spaciousness of social and political experience peculiar to both. The Mediterranean world, when organized into the Roman Empire, went far beyond all the other states of antiquity in the number of peoples included within its bounds and forced into intimate relation with one another. Although the glory of Greek thought and art had passed from the earth, the Empire afforded a sweep of experience, a field of common feeling, with which the classic Greek age could not compare. Men are largely the subjects of space. The deeper movements of feeling are always connected with the broader horizons of history. Thus Greek philosophy was in close relation with that splendid colonial movement of the Greeks which gave them outposts and points of observation all round the Mediterranean. Thus, again, the expansion of the monotheism of Israel, its passage out of provincialism into universalism, was set by

God in the most intimate connection with those movements of imperial forces which gave to the prophets a broad field of vision.

The Roman Empire gave to feeling and imagination political and social horizons that stretched out far beyond the previous experience of the race. Compared with the body of common experience which it offered to contemplation, and with the vast bulk of common feeling which it rendered possible, all the states that came before it except the empire of Alexander were more or less provincial. Everybody knows that without the Empire the Catholic Church could not have come into existence. Everybody knows that the Empire gave the world the best roads and postal facilities it ever knew, until our own century; and that this fact is typical of the deeper fact that, in the profoundest sense, the Empire was the road-maker of modernity. In it antiquity reached its climax. Out of it have the main issues of modernity proceeded. In this respect the likeness between the Mediterranean world and our own is most striking. Of course, our world is vastly greater. Yet, with that world it stands in close parallel, and it finds no other parallel in the entire field of history. Thanks to modern inventions, we are becoming fellow-citizens in space with the men on the other side of the globe. The things that happened in

China yesterday become real for us to-day. War and trade, travels and missions,—all the mixed causes that drive the spiritual purist to despair,—are rapidly making the whole earth a common inheritance of space for all nations.

In the case of the Roman Empire, there resulted an expansive consciousness that gave to broad interpretations of life a generous and inspiring opportunity. No petty or provincial religion could go far in such a field. Religions that aimed at universality here found a career open to them. Necessarily, too, there went along with the tendency to universalism, a pronounced tendency to syncretism. The only way in which religions can be kept from influencing or infecting each other is to isolate them. Let them once become tenants of a common field of space, and their primitive character is imperilled. Syncretism, the process of religious fusion, becomes inevitable. That process went on in the Empire on a vast scale. On a still vaster scale it is beginning to display itself in our own world; and nowhere, perhaps, so much as in America, which, by reason of its intense democratic feeling, the attendant good humor and close contact, and the lack of strongholds wherein the prejudices of the past might defend themselves, is the land most favorable to experiments in religion.

Into the Mediterranean world our religion entered. Within the social and political structure of the Empire, it built the Catholic Church. Influencing and influenced by that vast life, it created the forms of church government which still give unity and common action to much the larger part of modern Christianity. In contact with the Empire's mental life, it shaped the creeds that have been the rallying points of common Christian feeling. By universal consent, the age of the Fathers is the most creative age in the history of Christian dogma and institutions. Almost everything that now passes as a common coin through all the churches was minted there.

The parallel at this point must not be pressed. The Church of our time is not to strip herself of her institutions and her creeds, in order to make a fresh start. The great deeds of history are not wrought by the men who disown their past. The Church conquers the world by means of a life that ever renews itself while preserving its continuity. So our task is not to mould a new set of liturgies, to shape a new set of institutions, to formulate new creeds. None the less, there is a strong analogy between our case and the case of Christianity in the Mediterranean world. We have not, indeed, broken with our past, yet we stand toward it in an attitude of reverent freedom. The liturgies are not

immutable, the creeds are not infallible, the episcopate has no lasting sacredness save such as is given it by a successful appeal to large and abiding usefulness. Abroad, Christianity is entering a mission-field where it can achieve final success only by leaving behind it a considerable part of its dogmatic baggage. At home, Christianity is being fiercely challenged, both by the scientist and by the laborer — men who, if once they act together, should make a most formidable fighting force. There is a restlessness in the air that pervades even the religious life. All Christian bodies are being forced, by a logic of history which they cannot resist, to come into neighborly relations. The great debate called "Christian Unity" is just beginning. It could not really begin until all the churches, compelled to keep the peace, were thereby led into an effort to understand and interpret one another. The great debate called "Comparative Religions" is also just beginning. Christianity must take its stand on the ground held by all religions in common, and reason it out there.

When, besides this, we consider, on the one hand, the results of Biblical criticism, and, on the other, the tendencies of the social question, there is no rashness in thinking that the Church is on the edge of a period which, in point of momentousness, may well be compared with her career in the Mediterranean world. Therefore the parallel, kept

within reasonable bounds, is a true one. Let us then, having suggested the resemblances, observe the differences, in order that, taking the risks of error, we may venture to draw a conclusion regarding the main trend of feeling and imagination in the coming age. We are to search for the typical man in the Mediterranean period, the representative man amongst those who either came just before or stood outside the Christian Church. Then we shall search for the corresponding type in our own time. The contrast of types should direct our minds toward the path which a successful apologetic will walk in.

Two men, one a Jew, the other a Gentile, standing out boldly in the spiritual history of the first three centuries, seen from far and near by all students of the period, command our attention. The first is Philo. His life had few events. His whole significance is for thought and feeling. And all his thought, all his feeling, went into the philosophy of religion. His home was in Alexandria,—the clearing-house of ideas in the Mediterranean world. The problem that taxed his powers and drew forth his prayers was the reconciliation of Greek philosophy with the Old Testament. As well in his relation to the past experience of Israel as in his relation to the Christian speculation that was to continue his work, he was a thoroughly significant

and representative figure. His system of interpretation, while it merely developed tendencies that were deep-seated both in Hellenism and Judaism, just because it was an elaborate system, gave method and color to the main body of patristic exegesis. His theory of knowledge,—the marrow of his philosophy of religion,—expressed the main mood and motives of religious speculation for the next thousand years.

The Gentile, who keeps company with Philo, is Plotinus. He, too, got his breeding in Alexandria. The deepest mind Greek philosophy knew after the time of Aristotle, he undertook to satisfy that sore need of authority in religious affairs which was felt or acknowledged by the serious men of the Empire. He led the Neoplatonists in their efforts to so organize the religious feeling and thought of heathendom that it might compete with Christianity. He embodied the deepest tendencies in his world. Now, the point that here concerns us is that his theory of knowledge, in its primary aim and object, was identical with Philo's. Without question influenced by him, equally without question a man of great original genius, the main matter is that he, the greatest Gentile of his time, was in essential agreement with the greatest of the liberal Jews. Truth is not a quantity or bulk. It is a relationship between reason and its objects.

In the last analysis, it is a relationship between reason and its sovereign object, God. How, then, is the relation between reason and its final object viewed? By what road shall the mind enter into a deep and intimate knowledge of God? That is the decisive question. Plotinus the Gentile and Philo the Jew are at one in their answer. The reason must rise above reasoning. It must pass into a state that is half a swoon and half an ecstasy, before it can truly know God. Philo gave up, for the sake of his theory, the position of the prophets. Plotinus, for the same theory, forsook the position of Plato and Aristotle. The prophets conceived the inmost essence of things, the being and will of God, as a creative and redemptive force that guided and revealed itself through the career of a great national community. Plato and Aristotle conceived the essence of life as a labor of reason; and, for them, the labors of reason found their sufficient refreshment and inspiration in those moments of clear synthesis which are the reward of patient analysis. Revelation came to the prophet through his experience of history. To the philosopher it came through hard and steady thinking. But Philo and Plotinus together declared these roads to be no thoroughfares. The Greek and the Jew met on the common ground of a mysticism that sacrificed the needs of sober reason

and the needs of the nation to the necessities of the monk.

These two men, moving from the most antagonistic positions of the spiritual world and coming together in the philosophy of religion, may be safely taken as guides, to lead us into a reasonably trustworthy conclusion regarding the centre of spiritual gravity in that Mediterranean world wherein Christianity established itself. The conclusion is borne out by the apologetics of the second century. It is confirmed by Origen, by Athanasius, by Augustine, and by the Pseudo-Dionysius. The typical man to whom Christianity appealed, and for whom its ideals carried light and conviction, was not, in any fundamental sense, a citizen of time and space. The knowledge of science meant very little to him. The real things, the things of God, had, to his thinking, little grip upon the earth. He gave almost no attention to politics and history.

Herein, at the outset, the type of man to whom the apologetics of the first century appealed is radically unlike the corresponding type in our own period. The chief mental characteristic of our time is a vast increase in the bulk and enthusiasm of the knowledge that delights to find itself in time and space. The modern man has made two great discoveries. He has discovered the uni-

verse. He has also discovered his own past. The infinitude of visible nature—sometimes exalting us, sometimes disheartening, and even terrifying us, now that space seems for the moment barren and cold and empty of God; but, whether exalting or disheartening us, steadily pressing in resistlessly upon consciousness—sets our period apart from all other periods in human experience. The discovery by man of his own past is not a whit less impressive or commanding. Assyria, breaking the bars of the tomb, and coming forth out of dust and darkness to challenge our attention, is the symbol of what is happening over the whole field of attention. Never has the sincere reason, the reason that would fain see life in its unity and will gladly abandon all its possessions in order to win the vision,—never, I say, has the sincere reason been bound to the earth by so many and so mighty bands.

Would we know just how deep and broad is the mental difference between the kind of man for whom the apologetics of the early centuries spent its thought and prayer, and the man upon whom apologetics must labor in the days to come, we cannot do better than contrast the heresies of the second century with those of our own time. All the significant heresies of our generation are born of an almost impassioned faith in cosmic evolu-

tion. But the heresies of the second century were colored to the core by dualism. Now, the widespread appearance of dualism meant that a large part of the visible world came before the spiritual reason, only to be thrown into bankruptcy. To the gnostics the bulk of terrestrial being was hardly better than slag about the mouth of a furnace. To the man of our time, on the contrary, there is no slag at all. The conception of law has conferred upon the lowliest things the nobility of meaning and worth.

And that is so because this vast extension of knowledge does not result in throwing blind facts against the mind. If that were the case, the consequence would be either mental paralysis or mental dyspepsia, and either form of mental ill-health would bring the victims of it, sooner or later, into the monastery. But these enormously multiplied facts are not blind facts. Evolution gives them all an indispensable function in the universe. They are coherent and significant. Each of them has a several right, all of them together have a resistless right, to claim our purest and most strenuous attention. In brief, our homely earth has either won, or is soon to win, a mighty grip on the imagination of her children. Now, where the imagination is, there must the will be. For the imagination is the æsthetic aspect of the will. It is the poetry

of the will, passing easily into its religion; and this, because it is the interpretation of the materials of sensation in the language of our motives and our desires. The history of the imagination is the history of the objects that have called out the admiration of the serious portion of mankind. If, then, the earth is getting a new hold upon the imagination of her children, it means that she is acquiring the right and power to be spiritually interesting.

And all these things go into the single assertion, that the idea of the State has been born again. That idea was practically thrown into bankruptcy by the deep-minded men of the early centuries, — heathens as well as Christians. The State, of course, existed, and policed the world with a fair measure of efficiency. But a society, even if it continues to exist, becomes spiritually bankrupt the moment it ceases to carry within its being and history the ideals that command the souls of men. Put to this test, the State, terrestrial society, was a bankrupt before conscience in the Nicene age, — the age in which our body of divinity took form. But the main feature of our own age is that the State has been born again. The dignity of nature, the intrinsic worth of past fact, the ennobling of terrestrial existence through the conception of law, the deepening hold of the earth on the

imagination,—all these things forebode and prophesy an increasing power on the part of the State to tax and employ the spiritual energies of mankind. Would the Christian apologete see things as they are,—and unless he does, his arguments are no better than a broken bow,—he must draw clearly the contrast between the first four centuries and our own. And he will surely infer that this question of political and social obligation, which was then altogether secondary, is rapidly becoming altogether primary; and that a sound apologetics should change its tactics accordingly.

In sum, whereas the typical outsider in the first centuries was a philosopher with a decided bias toward monastic mysticism, the typical outsider of our own time is the scientist. Not, of course, the scientist regarded as a man whose whole stake is naked science, a knowledge of nature that is untouched by human hopes and fears. With such a man apologetics can have no debate. The minds of the disputants cannot meet. To have a real debate between them were as difficult, to use Newman's illustration, as to arrange a duel between a dog and a fish. The science that has not gone as far as the interests of humanity is raw science, a form of knowledge that has not yet put itself to the trouble of examining its own foundation. The typical outsider,

who is to occupy the attention of the apologete, is the scientist who has made, in a measure, the transition from natural history to human history. Such a man cannot go far in his study of society without discovering that the things he holds dear—the love of knowledge for knowledge's sake, the disinterested admiration of the universe, the loyal service of truth—are not to be found, in the long run, unless they are found within a commonwealth where dwells an impassioned faith in justice and an austere reverence for the common interest. The scientist, whose knowledge is not contracted and illiberal, but expansive and generous, will not long be able to conceal from himself the fact that for science the supreme law is the salvation of the republic. He will perceive that the scientific mind loses its right to be, unless it takes for its standing-ground the existence and well-being of a society that finds its end and aim in justice, in a law of righteousness and fair play which fastens upon history with a grip not to be shaken off, and holds up before contemporary society an ideal that gives birth and breeding to great-hearted citizens of time and space.

There are some eddies in the feeling of our period so strong that one or another of them may easily be mistaken, by the observer who is in it or close to it, for the main current. For example,

we are all aware of a strong tendency to materialism, due to the unprecedented increase of wealth. But the spiritual goods of our race have always attached themselves to the material goods. And already the enormous accumulation of the means of existence and enjoyment, by forcing the question of economic distribution to the front, has proved itself to be a splendid spur to thought and prayer. Materialism is not the main drift of our day.

Again, with a certain class of people, not relatively numerous, but by reason of their strength of purpose carrying considerable weight, the pursuit of culture is made an end in itself. And nowhere is the importance of culture more likely to be insisted on than in America. On the one hand, our stores of culture are scanty. On the other hand, we have made, as a nation, the greatest fortune known to history. This draws after it widespread opportunities of leisure. The eager appetite for the culture which leisure makes possible, in the presence of our forceful yet crude national existence, will multiply in America the people who make culture a substitute for both religion and love of country. Yet the pursuit of culture cannot long withdraw the mind from the decisive question, namely, that regarding the well-being of society. For the very possibility of fruit-

ful leisure is bound up with the existence and the thrift of the State. A culture that does not, sooner or later, recognize and live by this fact, will fall into mental dyspepsia and so destroy itself.

Again, in some circles, scepticism touching our right to take the purposes of humanity with full seriousness in the sight of the universe is rife. The downfall or disrepair of the framework of inherited dogma, the revolt against metaphysics, the bewildering effect produced by the newly discovered infinitude of the visible universe, account for this. Yet it is a passing mood. Agnosticism will continue to exist, we may trust, as an element in our total mental attitude, breeding modesty in the exercise of judgment and bridling the instinctive disposition to claim or exercise the gift of infallibility. But it cannot permanently check or harass the mighty social will. The life of our race, bearing us on toward its unseen goal, has needs so imperious that no theory can long deny their right of way. Our race must keep house. The conscience of the race will insist, with growing weight and authority, that we keep house nobly. Against a force made up of an imperious need and a strenuous conscience, scepticism regarding humanity's right to take itself seriously, in the sight of the universe, cannot make a stand.

Finally, the monastic life is gaining ground in unlooked-for places. No doubt it will continue to gain ground. Souls that look no farther than the individual's need are carried that way by the recoil from materialism and excessive luxury. There is a well-beaten track leading from places like Newport to the monastery. Just as the horrors of intemperance beget the intensity of prohibition, even so surely do the pompous worldliness and gilded vanities, which such places encourage, build and people the monasteries and the nunneries. But this, again, is not the main line of spiritual motion. The tendencies referred to, and others connected with them, are eddies after all. The true current is farther out and deeper down. The magnitude and splendor of the universe, the fascination of scientific and historical study, the possibilities and problems of the Free State, own the future. The task of history is not to be misunderstood. We must unleash a fatal scepticism upon all that is dearest to modernity, in order to doubt it. We must turn back the clock of history two thousand years, if we are to deny it. The future belongs to none of these tendencies. The task imposed by history upon the modern man is to ennoble terrestrial existence.

The preliminary work of apologetics consists in pressing home upon the scientific student of the

social problem two things, both of them common-places, yet neither of them always put to its full use. The first is that he is barred out, by his own principles, from treating the social conscience, with its postulates and corollaries, as an illusion. Crude, dogmatic unbelief has used that word "illusion" with great freedom. But a mature scientist will describe such use of terms as being either boyishness or frivolity. For, since the days of the Greek atomists, the postulate of all professedly scientific reasoning about the universe has been — *Ex nihilo nihil!* It has been used both in a positive way, — as a foundation for the conviction that the visible universe is a universe of fixed relations and unalterable laws; and in a negative way, as a defence against the sallies of supernaturalism. And the scientist, by his belief in it, bars himself out from using the term "illusion" to any serious purpose; because, if he does so use it, he exposes himself to the charge of destructive inconsistency. What has the honest scientist to do in that closet of "illusion"? To apply the term to the social consciousness and conscience would be equivalent to supposing that humanity has done what God is denied the right and power to do, has created something out of nothing!

Every article of the scientist's faith has its root in the deep conviction that the necessities of the

universe rule and overrule the business of mankind. Human feeling, human thought, and human will do not work and play in a cosmic land of Goshen, where the laws of the universe do not run. On the contrary, they are open, on every side, to the laws and necessities of the universe on whose lap they lie. Therefore, the history of human consciousness is as legitimate a part of the universe as the tides and the stars. Its constitutional right to be taken seriously is at least as strong as theirs.

The second commonplace to be kept in mind is that science cannot enjoy the privileges of a society that makes disinterested leisure and free thought possible, without paying taxes; and, since science banishes or disuses the supernatural, the tax laid upon it—a tax which a decent regard for its own self-consistency should lead it eagerly to pay—is to discover the ground and principle of social obligation. In other words, it must take that idea of law which is the very life of the State, and found it upon cosmic law. It must show how the law of the universe underlies and opens into the law of conscience; and, be it observed, the doctrine of the unknowable has not the slightest application in this field, even in the eyes of him who is an agnostic, if not by dogmatic profession, yet in feeling. For we are not

speaking about God, but about the universe; and what is more, about that visible universe to whose interpretation the scientist has nobly dedicated himself. Self-consistency and honesty impose upon him the task of grounding and bottoming that principle of obligation which is the life of the Free State. He has disowned the supernatural because of its alleged interference with the sane and thorough interpretation of the visible universe. He must likewise disown the unknowable. In truth, the unknowable is one with the supernatural as he conceives the supernatural. Neither of them has any bearing upon the earlier stages of the debate between the Christian apologete and the scientific student of society. The whole contention of the apologete is that the student must ground and bottom the principle of obligation. The student frankly concedes the point. The supreme question, he admits, is: How do the necessities of this visible universe—whose children we are and whose laws, with or without our will, exercise over us a sovereign control—bear upon the main needs of society?

It cannot be denied that science, in its earlier days, did enjoy the privileges of the progressive states of the Occident, without paying taxes. It was entirely natural that this should be so. When the eighteenth century broke away from all connec-

tion with ecclesiastical tradition, in order to clear a space where free thought might draw a deep breath, the need of creating a social conscience could not be felt, for the simple reason that no such need existed. Science inherited a social structure which had been built by men who had no thought of science. It was, perhaps, rudely built. None the less, it stood firm against political wind and social weather. To accept the social framework as a matter of fact and then to bend every faculty upon the study of the universe was the inevitable course for science to take. But youthful enthusiasm is no longer a defence. Nor is it put forward as a defence. Science does not now accept social law as a gift from the past, an inherited capital that supports a disinterested leisure. The number of books, bearing upon matters more or less closely connected with the questions of social law, that have issued of late from scientific sources, puts beyond the reach of doubt the statement that science is beginning to devote strenuous attention to the task of grounding and bottoming the principle of obligation.

Serious scientific thought is being led, by its own inherent logic, not indeed out of, yet surely up from, "Natural History" into "History." The law of evolution refuses the scientist permission to live forever with our country cousins, the frogs

and the mice. He must come back to the centre of consciousness, the great human city, bringing with him the noble conception of law which the universe has given him. The history of human consciousness is bound to become for him the most pregnant part of the visible universe. Changing Kant's famous words concerning the being and destiny of the individual man, we can imagine that the spirit of history, personified and embodied in the Free State, will say to science with increasing insistence and authority, What am I? whence came I? what may I hope for?

Now this question, thrust upon the scientist by his own universe,—on whose sincerity he builds a perfect trust,—makes ethics the main concern of the scientist himself. Not, of course, ethics in the narrow individual sense; but ethics as the study of the whole commerce of life—the life of the nation, the life of the race. How shall those nobler purposes,—or, if the word “purpose” be disliked,—how shall those better tendencies, that seem to be implicit in and are partly manifested by history, be given fuller play? How shall the best endeavors of humanity be continued with high hopes and compelling motives? How shall we give force and lustre to our existence in time and space? That question is the pith and marrow of ethics.

The scientist, our typical outsider, does not say

to himself: What shall I do to be saved? But he cannot help saying,—unless he would deny himself: What shall I do to the end that I may become a sound and productive member of this society wherein I find myself? Through communion with its language I have been bred into the power of clear thought. Its trust in its own social law is the single defence and stronghold of a rational and progressive common life. Within its borders and nowhere else is the leisure that makes me a high priest of the visible universe permanently possible. What then shall I do, in order that I may contribute my full share to its health and strength? The divine right, that is to say, the cosmic right, of human society to be and to go forward in well-being, is bound up with my own right to be and to think. My ethics cannot be the ethics of pure contemplation. To take that line were to bring up, at the last, in ascetic mysticism. My ethics must give me a conception of duty that shall go to the bottom of the visible universe, and at the same time shall make me intimate with the common life of the great bulk of mankind. Systematic mysticism has always developed in connection with an organized body of spiritual specialists, whose right to be is bound up with a belief in the insignificance of the terrestrial order of things. Therefore, the ethics

of mysticism — of pure, quietistic contemplation — are outside the pale of science. In the first place, I believe in the spiritual primacy of the visible universe. In the second place, I conceive the universe in terms of forthgoing energy. And, in the third place, I take the historical career of my race with the utmost seriousness. The individual who is the unit of my thought and feeling is not, and cannot become, the isolated individual of Crusoe's island or the hermit's cell. He exists solely in relations. Hence scientific ethics must build upon a doctrine of the will. The good must be expressed in terms of the will. The only good, in the ultimate sense, is a good will, — a will that takes fast hold on the historical development of the race, a will forceful enough and masterful enough to enable the individual to send forth his best thought into the common speech, his deepest resources of being into society. I must take society in its length and breadth and depth, in its past history, in its present conditions, in its future. The narrowness of caste or clique is to me a thing intellectually unclean. In my capacity as a scientist, no less than in my capacity as a student of ethics, I must take society as a whole. How, then, shall I be in society, thus conceived, with my whole heart? How shall I stay there, to the end, joyously adding my little to society's means

of self-betterment? Thus runs the scientist's confession.

Ethics, followed along this interior line, leads without fail into religion. To keep the will steady and its temper true, to keep one's footing in the very thick of a society whose heavy mortgage of brutehood and incapacity we are forced by the broad and careful knowledge of our day to take clear cognizance of, is a task that cannot be discharged in full, except by the aid of religion. For nothing save a sense of deep and intimate connection with the solid core of things, nothing save a settled and fervid conviction that the universe is on the side of the will in its struggle for that whole-hearted devotion to the welfare of the race, without which morality is an affair of shreds and patches, can give to the will the force and edge suitable to the difficult work it has to do. But this sense of kinship with what is deepest and most abiding in the universe—what else is meant by pure religion?

Every religion, with one or another degree of success, has stirred up man to an act of faith whereby he set what was deepest in his own being, the most significant of his desires, in sympathy with what was thought to be deepest in the total of being, in order that he might receive back a gift or pledge from God whereby the man

attained the great assurance that what was deepest in the total of being, as he viewed it, was in quick and eager sympathy with his own highest purpose. This holds true of every religion the world has known, from the petty tribal religions of primitive times down to the great religions that have striven for the mastery of the world. That selfsame act of faith is the very essence of all vital religion.

The scientist who has the progressive betterment of society at heart lies peculiarly open to the call of religion, when once religion has been cleansed, to a reasonable degree, from its impurities, and science has become reasonably free from its old prejudices. For, on the one side, his science affords him splendid opportunities for the training of the imagination. And imagination, in all its higher forms, is akin to true religion; because religion in its purity is just the art, exercised by man's inner life, of seeing things as a totality, after the simple unities of the child life have been destroyed. The equation between desire and deed, the integrity of the will, the oneness of the heart's world—upon these things vital religion spends its force. Now, the nobler forms of imagination are akin to religion thus viewed. The end and aim of the constructive imagination is to take life in its unity, and to carry that unity forth into nature, into the materials of terrestrial experience. The scientific imagination,

superbly trained and tutored by its constant intimacy with the infinitude, the boundless resources of the universe, has or will acquire an aptitude for seeing things largely and as a whole. This on the one side.

On the other side, the scientist, knowing well the tremendous difficulties that have beset the ascent of the race out of brutehood, and that still beset humanity in its endeavor to come fully up to the possibilities of its own nature, will feel in a peculiar degree the need of sanctifying and halloving the higher purposes of history by viewing them in the light of their solidarity with the deepest being. That light is religion. So, the scientific consciousness, giving its interest and aims into the keeping of its belief in the unity of Nature, needs but to be touched by a sense of social need so imperious and controlling that all the energies of the man's personal life are mustered into its service, and lo! it will blossom into a superb religious feeling, the feeling that somehow the marvellous train of events that constitute the history of the visible universe favors man's struggle against the brute, that somehow the stars in their courses fight for the social conscience.

LECTURE II

THE SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREE STATE

WE have seen that apologetics, being the tactics of the missionary reason of the Church, must find the typical outsider of its time and then frame its arguments to his needs. We have also seen that the central point in the history of apologetics is the striking contrast between the conditions under which the apologete worked in the Mediterranean world and those under which he works to-day; and that the pith of that contrast is found in the fact that in the one case the State passed into spiritual bankruptcy, while, in the other case, the State is fast regaining its spiritual meaning and dignity. And, finally, we have seen that the typical individual upon whose mind and needs we are to fix our attention is the scientist. Not, indeed, the scientist as a mere scientist, a hermit who has by some chance fallen in love with the visible universe and makes his life a long wooing of truth for its own sake. The scientist, if he knows himself, knows well that the genius of science, that spirit of cleansing and ennobling curiosity which carries the

understanding outside itself into a pure and disinterested love of the objective order of things, cannot permanently exist except within the borders of a free society. Man is an organism, not an aggregation of tendencies. He moves all together, if he moves at all. Mind and will must act in unison. The disinterested love of the visible order of things and of the truth it keeps in store is impossible, in the long run, outside a society wherein the will of the citizen is trained to carry him outside his individual interests into devotion to a great ideal of law that makes all its subjects free.

The scientist must seek religion in order to save society. It is not an accident that the deeper forms of social feeling are so apt to pass into religion. Thus it was with the Messianic idea of the Old Testament, and thus it is with the purer forms of patriotism in every age, and the contemporary enthusiasm for humanity. There is a reason for it, deep-set in the nature of things. Strong and ardent social feeling makes the will servant to a community whose interests include the individual's immediate interests, yet go far beyond them both in space and time. Such a service on the part of the will presupposes a love-match between the imagination and the object which exercises upon the will a power so persuading and so compelling. But imagination cannot, without degrading itself, enter into a left-handed marriage.

It cannot look down on its object. It must look up. And that may not be, unless the object to which imagination weds itself is a true total, befriended by, indeed next of kin to, the total life, so far as that life is known by and is real to the consciousness of the day. Therefore, the power of society to call the individual outside himself, to persuade him to spend existence to the uttermost in the service of social ends, turns out, when we examine it deeply, to be bound up with the right of society to take itself with enduring seriousness. The universe legitimates society and its ends. Now, every form of feeling that legitimates a human end by allying it to the universal life is in fact religious by nature, whether the word religion be used or no. But the scientific method does not tolerate the unconscious in its laboratory. The unconscious exists. It exists, however, so far as science is concerned, only to be understood. The scientific consciousness, then, would deny itself, did it content itself with a merely implicit religion. To drift into religion is not enough. To enter religion by the back door is not scientifically respectable. Religion must be sought for, consciously and deliberately, because, without religion, society cannot be kept sane and hopeful, and because, if society lose its integrity, the scientific reason must needs die of atrophy. And when the scientist shall have deliberately set himself to

search for a religion, he will find that his need of religion is peculiarly pressing, just because, being a scientist, he knows society both in the breadth of its history and in the weight of its problems.

Accordingly, the scientific student of ethics is driven into religion by his own life and logic. Howbeit, the question which he takes with him is not: What shall I, as an individual, possessing a soul, do to be saved? but: How shall I ground my conception of society? The only individual that science recognizes is an individual made up of relationships, every one of which strikes its root deep into history. It is with history, then, with history as the autobiography of society, that the scientist primarily concerns himself. The immortality of the soul—if he is to regain his belief in it—must come to him as a necessary corollary from the primary fact that there is a social ideal befriended by the universe, and drawing its sap from a source as deep as the fundamental being. He refuses to detach his personal existence and aims from the existence and aims of the historical society within which he lives and thinks. Perhaps he may find that he cannot ground his conception of society without so interpreting the unseen resources of the visible universe that the belief in personal immortality shall turn out to be a belief commended to him by the universe itself. However, personal

immortality is not his premise. It is not his main concern. In principle the scientist, once at his ease with religion, will occupy a position similar to that of the prophets of Israel in the eighth century before Christ. His decisive question is: How shall I ground and bottom my conception of a society wherein the disinterested action of the will and reason shall be permanently possible? Upon that question, as upon a pivot, all his thoughts turn.

Nor may he allow himself to entertain the speculation that there is no bottom for his conception of society except in human convention. The Greek Sophists might say so, because they lived in a time that could forgive naïve thought regarding the most pressing and exacting subjects. In our time, however, no forgiveness awaits the scientist who should thus reason. It is not possible for him to say with the Sophists that the State is founded upon convention. It is not possible for him to call the State a mere creation of men. Such an affirmation would amount, in his eyes, to a flat denial of cosmic law. Society, as regards its frame, its motives, and its tendencies, is as truly subject to sovereign and unitary law as the communities of the ants and the bees.

No more can the scientist help himself by using the distinction between the "Natural" and the "Positive." The term "Nature" has long been a nest of ambiguities and fallacies; and science has made the

most of some of them. As regards this particular ambiguity, however, the scientist is safe. He disowns from the start the distinction between the Positive and the Natural. The so-called Positive is simply a human variety of the Natural. Nature is the all-inclusive term. The human and political and social agency, called the State, is a fact within the natural order of things, not outside it. And when the scientist has once passed from the branch of Natural History officially described by that title, to the other equally legitimate branch of Natural History officially called History, he recognizes the State not only as a fact, but as the most significant of all facts. In truth, it is the prerogative fact. At the same time, it is wholly within "Nature." Hence, "Nature" must open to take in the State and its needs. Nature herself commands the scientist to interpret her in the light of those needs.

Again, the scientist cannot permit his will to be puzzled by the illimitable vastness of the universe. No matter how great may be the magnitude and the mystery of the things that encompass us, so long as we know that they are vast, their vastness dignifies us, does not belittle us. Our knowledge makes us the lawful heirs of the universe. For a time the vastness of the world puzzles the will, partly because it is both so new and so amazing that it startles us out of our self-possession; and

partly because our feeling about the vastness of things is temporarily entangled with a totally different feeling,—namely, the feeling of the unknowable. This latter feeling has no rightful place in the scientific consciousness. The dogma of the unknowable was a good weapon against a theology that conceived itself to be infallible. Indeed, the scientific dogma of the unknowable is the necessary recoil from the ecclesiastical dogma of infallibility. But the two dogmas may be permitted to fight it out together. Each, slaying the other, shall itself be slain, leaving the ground clear for the reverent interpretation of all the facts of life, internal as well as external. The dogma of the unknowable has lost all intellectual credit. But the feeling of the unknowable remains. And it must be ousted from scientific consciousness. For we are not dealing with “God,” but with “Nature.” Nature herself puts the scientific student of ethics under bonds to give full heed to the question of social obligation. The term “Nature” must open to take in the fact and needs of the Free State. The feeling of the unknowable must not be allowed to enter at this point. It is an intruder, at home in a bygone controversy, but having no right of speech in the present debate. Nature is intelligible. Without a deep and lively faith in her intelligibility, the scientific spirit were as an engine

without steam, a mere machinery of knowledge without the inspiration of knowledge. Nature is intelligible. Nature is knowable. And, however elastic the term "Nature" may be, although many fallacies may be wrapped up in it, even though the term "God" lies in ambush behind it, the part of the scientist's reason is plain. He must interpret "Nature," soberly, reverently, trustfully, in the light of his prerogative fact,—the State.

That splendid act of untiring attention to the visible order of things, which is the soul of true science, is—to use the saying of Malebranche about attention at large—a kind of natural prayer. It involves a belief in the possibility of an answer, because it springs from a lively faith in the sincerity of the universe. The scientific reason is not contemplative but active; and all its action goes to the making of a love-match between the mind and Nature. When, therefore, it begins to be deeply concerned over the well-being of society; when it outgrows the habit, inherited from the eighteenth century, of living upon the spiritual patrimony bequeathed by a Christian ancestry; when it looks upon the leisure that makes science possible as mental malingering, unless it joyously contributes to the betterment of society, then the scientist will not allow himself to doubt that Nature has within her borders a reserve of being and energy sufficient

to meet the real and abiding needs of the State. The peace of reason is not to be enjoyed apart from the peace bestowed upon society by a well-grounded and well-guarded social law.

The particular frame and temper of the State is by no means a matter of indifference to science. It is, of course, true that any kind of political organization, provided it possess stability, may furnish, against social storms, a shelter that shall enable the reason to do some sort of disinterested work. The social rigidity of the caste system in India, going along with a system of political absolutism, permitted a fruitful exercise of the mind. It was in Chaldea and Egypt,—lands which had not the first inkling of political freedom,—that the beginnings of astronomy and geometry were made. The noble work of Alexandria, laying the foundations of modern science, was fostered by the Ptolemies and the Cæsars. Many a tyrant has been a generous patron of knowledge as well as of art.

For all that, the frame and temper of the State becomes a matter of life and death to science, when, on the one hand, we look to the long run, and when, on the other, we distinguish between science as a body of data and science as a temper and frame of mind. The glory of science is neither its data, however imposing, nor its views, how-

ever impressive. The data, compared with the incalculable bulk of unknown data, are not more than enough to give us firm footing within a universe that is patiently awaiting our study. The views, at least the great majority of them, are valuable solely as working hypotheses. The glory of science is to be found neither in its data nor its views, but in its attitude of free and fearless attention. The knowledge of Alexandria kept aloof, sometimes with effort, from the affairs of State. The metaphysics of India had no need to put forth effort, in order to keep out of politics, for their inherent bent toward asceticism and its attendant mysticism rendered effort needless. The thing was done extempore. The science of Chaldea and Egypt is a beginning, that is all. It can teach us nothing about the task, the occasion, and the rewards of the science of our time. Of science, as we know it, one part is a boundless opportunity of knowledge which acts as a splendid spur to the desire to know. The other part is a sense of kinship with an illimitable truth; and this lays upon the spirit the obligation of that sincerity which is the piety of reason. Seeing that the opportunities of truth cannot be numbered, seeing that the truthful understanding must always be on the watch for new opportunities, there is no single thing in the visible universe that does not deserve

and may not some day demand the devotion of a lifetime of study. For the same cause, there is nothing in the make and constitution of the universe that can hope to escape an unsparing criticism. History must come before the bar even as Nature comes. Now the political and legal constitution of society are part and parcel of history. They must, therefore, submit to a fearless criticism, or else the scientific spirit has but one wing to fly with. This puts out of evidence the entire absolutistic view of political relations. The scientific spirit can permanently thrive nowhere save in a free State, a self-governing society wherein nothing is so sacred that it dares refuse to submit itself to the test of reason and use, and where the possibility of orderly change in the political and social constitution is taken to be as fundamental as the constitution itself. The divine right of free inquiry—the vital breath of science—is inseparable, in the long run, from the divine right of calling government to account, of auditing the books of society. Now, this latter right is the fundamental law of the free State.

So, when the scientist, who has been, intellectually, if not emotionally, outside Christianity, seriously faces the question: How shall I ground and bottom my conception of society? how shall I find a permanent foothold for the sense of obliga-

tion? it is not any and every form of society that he has in mind. On the contrary, his mind dwells upon a fairly precise and particular form of that principle. There may, of course, be broad differences of constitutional method within the range of the Free State. But the Free State, in one form or another, stands before the scientific consciousness as the central fact within the natural order of things. And, since the State, being a constitutional part of Nature, has a clear right to take itself as legitimate in the sight of the universe, it follows that the scientist, driven into religion in order to save the State, must demand a religion that shall do full justice to this legitimacy of the Free State, and thereby give him the aid he needs in his endeavor to make himself a great-hearted citizen within the commonwealth.

Great-heartedness in the discharge of his duties as a citizen is his cardinal virtue. The necessity of self-preservation makes it so. The scientifically true is inseparable from the socially good. And the good expresses itself under color of the ideals that create and safeguard the Free State. Into that State the scientist must enter with his whole heart, unless he would seek salvation by hiding his head in the sand. Within the precincts of self-knowledge he finds nothing good save the will that makes his reason and his being servants to

society as well as to the truth. So, under peril of losing all he holds dear, he must view the ideals of the Free State in the light of a conception that shall bring them into deep and ultimate relation with the fundamental life of the universe.

We conceive, then, our typical man, outsider to every dogmatic interpretation of the unseen universe, to have set about the work of building himself a house in history. To save his own science, he must save society. For it is from a coherent social structure that the scientific reason goes forth to interpret Nature. A piece of work like Darwin's study of earth-worms would not be possible, unless some fairly efficient social and political structure had first been framed. The organized society of the Occident is the historical condition of the free reason. That reason, accordingly, feeling to the full its obligation either to create or re-create the social structure, sets its hand to the labor of building for itself a house in history.

How, then, shall our representative man ground his conception of society? The society must be of a kind that is able to muster into its service all the energies of the typical man. To have a society to which one pays his taxes with a reasonable amount of grumbling, will not serve the turn. It must be a society that, in the critical times both of peace and war, calls forth an enthusiastic ser-

vice. For without enthusiasm there is no real power. Enthusiasm is the unfailing sign of personal and social energy. The scientist, entering society, and seeking religion in order to cleanse and invigorate society, must find himself in conditions that make it possible for him to live up to the level of all his powers, while imparting to the exercise of every one of those powers a social aim. There must be full play for his reason and his will. There can be no stint or bound to the measure of his self-expression in society. In other words, since self-expression in relation to other lives recognized as equally sacred with one's own is what we mean by sacrifice, there is to be no stint or bound to the measure of his sacrifice for society. If the scientist is to ground society, the work must be so thoroughly done that, having discovered afresh and for himself the foundations of social obligation in the deep of the universe and in the deep of his own heart, the common law of the community shall have so complete a sway over his spirit that his inmost energy and his highest purpose shall spend themselves, without reserve or constraint, in social service. His work of re-creating society is, at best, half done, if there remains the slightest possibility of a flaw in his will to be and to be only in society. Find such a flaw, be it ever so slight, and you shall have

found "the little rift within the lute, that by and by will make its music mute." The scientist's will must grip the social, the historical, life of his people and his race with all its might. Else, some day, he shall spring upon himself the grand surprise of a new monasticism.

This means that the ideals of life, taken in its full scope and reach, are content and glad to travel a road that leads straight into the social being and well-being of the race. The roads of an easy-living cosmopolitanism and of a deep-minded asceticism are to the scientist alike in this, that they are the byways of history, not its highway. The ideals of life, as consistent scientific ethics view them, must take the road that leads into the common social life, the life of the family and the nation. They must be full-born and high-bred citizens of the visible commonwealth. The ideals may vary indefinitely in their details, in keeping with the different bents and the varied occasions of individual men. They may assume almost any shape or color. One man shall take the earthworm for his intellectual parish; another, philosophy; another, prison-reform; another, the cleaning of streets. The ideals are manifold. They are also mortal, one definite ideal passing by and another succeeding it. But in them all, revealing itself through them all, is the eternal ideal. And that is: that there

shall be ideals,—authoritative interpretations of life and nature that inspire the reason and command the will. Let the Ideal that creates ideals be once given, and then almost anything may serve the turn. It needs but to be consecrated by the touch of the one Ideal, and lo! it passes from common to holy uses, disowning the company of the vulgar interests that perish with the day, and claiming kinship with the things eternal. But that sole and sovereign Ideal must first be found. To find it is the scientist's task. His aim is to so conceive society that it shall become the steward and keeper of the Ideal. He seeks a social principle possessing final authority and exercising undisputed sway.

There can be no rational and coherent order of social life, no steady and efficient social construction, unless there be certitude, and certitude solid and imperious at that. If, in the affairs of the individual, probability is taken as the guide of life, the force underlying the probability and making it a real guide is the conviction that human life in itself is rational and worthful. That conviction given, the faintest probability may, as Bishop Butler says, bind the conscience with an absolute obligation. The probability derives the quality of absoluteness from the conviction into whose service it has been taken. Social action and behavior stand on the selfsame footing with

individual behavior. Certitude there must be. The scientist can find it nowhere, unless in the conviction that the social and historical life of humanity is by nature rational and worthful. That conviction gained, any programme of common feeling and action, though it shall have on its side a bare probability of good, may touch the social will with the authority of a perfect obligation.

An attempt may be made to bring the argument to a stand by urging the distinction between Church and State, to the effect that the bottom thing in the Church is love, whereas the bottom thing in the State is force. But this will not stand the fire of the Christian reason, still less of the scientific reason. The scientist may, for a while, occupy himself with the notion,—as old as the Sophists, and given new life by Hobbes,—that social right is simply social power, resting ultimately upon superiority of force, although the force is disguised by custom, softened by tradition, and lifted to the level of sentiment by its marriage with enduring associations. This notion will not last long. Of course, society rests, in some sense, upon force. But the bare, brute force of Thrasymachus and Hobbes is a pure abstraction. Force is legitimated by its marriage with custom and association. Not force as such, but force wedded to deep sentiment founds an enduring dynasty of persons or ideas. It is an heiress

of the true royal house who, by her marriage with force, makes force legitimate. The belief or illusion of right covers over the naked exercise of power, even as Nature spreads over the clay heap her mantle of green.

Now, the scientist, if true to himself, cannot treat the belief in right as an illusion. He must handle the term "illusion" with great care, lest it explode in his hands, destroying his conception of reality. His only workable test of a real thought or feeling as distinguished from an unreal one, is made up of coherence and permanence in consciousness. But the belief or sentiment of right has been an essential element, nay, the essential element, in every frame and constitution of society that has had the power to call men away from inthrallment to the needs of the moment, and has given to them, at least in feeling, the ability to eternize themselves. And so far as coherence is concerned, not only is the belief in right coherent in itself, but without it there can be no abiding coherence or efficiency of social structure. If the scientist rejects on principle the dogma of creation out of nothing, he must accept the belief in right as real in the sight of the universe; he must believe that it has come into consciousness out of the resources of the universe.

Indeed, the scientist is more open than most men to the conclusion that the belief in right is funda-

mental. He has put aside the supernatural. Nothing is real to him unless it works through and under the laws of the visible universe. But he has discovered that a rational and coherent society is the prime necessity of science itself. He has discovered also that, no matter how large a part brute force plays in the founding and manipulating of society, it invariably allies itself with the sense of right in order to maintain its conquests. Since, then, there can be nothing in consciousness that is snatched out of the air, since everything in it has been put there by the energies of the universe, it follows that this sense of right is part and parcel of the total force of the universe. It is given to man by the universe itself. It comes upon consciousness with the prestige of the universe behind it. In this conviction alone can the scientist find his source of certitude. Here and here alone does his social ideal, whatever may be its particular form and purpose, discover the secret of authority and sway. The prestige of the universe goes with the scientific reason; it goes equally with the social will.

Put in other words, this amounts to saying that social law is part and parcel of cosmic law, drawing upon it for authority, for the right to command the motives of men, and to muster the hidden energies of human nature into the service of the social ideal. The scientist does not attempt to keep the

law that rules society apart from the law that sways the universe. No more should he attempt to construe the universe as holding aloof from, and being indifferent to, the law of society. Here, then, is the place where he makes his confession of religion. Let him call it what he will,—cosmic feeling or enthusiasm for the universe,—it matters not. His confession is a confession of religion; his act is an act of faith. And thereby he invests the tendency, that carries him toward putting his mind and will into the service of society, with the dignity and beauty of law.

Without a social law, endowed with persuasive and compelling power, no coherence either rational or social is possible. Our knowledge, unless it is organized by some great conception,—and unless, furthermore, that conception be thought of as in quick and eager relation with reality,—becomes a mass of blind facts vainly jostling one another. Even so, our social morality, unless it derives integrity from some organizing concept, is no better than a handful of moralizing maxims and broken fragments of stale custom. Proverbs, no matter how solid and pithy they be, are not such stuff as the home of the human will and imagination is built of. Nor can custom, stale and suspected, give to the struggling purpose of mankind a view of the world that shall bring it into quickening contact with a

tendency or purpose larger and stronger than its own. If nothing were needed save to stop a hole here and there against the weather, a proverb might serve. But when it comes to the work on which our scientist is to expend his labors, proverbs and maxims will not do at all. To build or to rebuild the home of the happy and heroic will, of the noble and ennobling imagination, nothing short of a mighty, self-renewing enthusiasm will suffice.

Law means unity of tendency and integrity of being. There is no law except in a world that is, in the deepest sense, one with itself. The scientist's conviction that there is a social law, although mental caution may hold him back from concluding that he knows what the concrete content of the law is, nevertheless derives its dignity from, and bases its authority upon, the unity and integrity and sincerity of the universe. This conviction must be capable of deepening into a settled and solid enthusiasm, if it is to frame the mood of the scientist to the needs of society and temper his will to his obligations. Utilitarianism will not breed and equip the kind of man who shall carry in his heart the promise and potency of a binding law, unless utilitarianism disguises itself as a religion of humanity; because there can be no talk of an average goodness. The task is not simply

to keep the roads of society in decent repair, after society has been created and its principles rooted and grounded. The task is to root and ground the social principle itself. An average goodness may keep house decently, after heroic goodness has built the house. But nothing short of the heroism of goodness can do the work which the thoroughgoing student of scientific ethics acknowledges as his very own.

Our typical outsider, then, seeking religion in order to become and remain a thoroughly sociable creature, to the end that he may summon all his energies and capacities into sincere relationship and earnest conversation with the present and past and future of history, carries with him into the field of religion, as the touchstone whereby the various religions of the world are to be tested, the fact and problem of the Free State. Like all great facts, his canonic and prerogative fact is of complex make; and in a prolonged discussion of the matter, it is certain that there are many elements which would deserve consideration. It is certain, also, that history is not framed and moved in the interest of pure logic. We must, accordingly, take pains not to think that we can put history and the State into a nutshell. Yet, while the Free State is a complex fact, it has one main quality and attribute which not only may be, but must be,

isolated and emphasized by apologetics. In the actual experience of life, men are moved out of hostility or indifference to Christianity into friendliness or belief by thoughts and emotions that come from diverse sources and appeal to varied motives. But apologetics does not pretend to be a substitute for life. It is an effort of reason exerted by the Christian consciousness, in the desire to remove or lessen certain mental difficulties which, so long as they hold their ground, put it out of the question for the outsider to give free course to the tendencies which life at large might start in him.

Now, at the present time, the representative outsider is a man whose unit of thought is the human individual as made up of and exhausted by relationships with history. He differs deeply and decisively from the representative outsider to whom apologetics appealed in the first stage of its career. In the Mediterranean world, the typical heathen who had high thoughts, and at the same time frankly acknowledged deep religious needs, was a man like Plotinus, a philosophical idealist; or, perhaps, better still, like Proclus, the last of the Neoplatonists. For Proclus, brain-sick as well as heart-sick, exhausted by the labors of harmonizing heathen religion with philosophy, and wearied by the multitude of books, expressed the wish that no books had come down to him out of the past save

the Oracles and the "Phædo." The latter part of his wish discloses the secret desire of the later Mediterranean world. The "Phædo" is antiquity's noblest meditation on the problem of personal immortality. Its unit of thought is the individual in and by himself. And to this individual, living within a vast political order—the Roman Empire—yet putting little or no heart into his relationships with that order, and setting himself at ease concerning his immediate responsibility for it, apologetics addressed its main appeal. But the outsider of our own day refuses to start with the question of personal immortality. Not the individual as he is in himself, but the individual as made up of and exhausted by relationships with the historical life of the Race,—the life in time and space—is his unit. And a wise apologetics will seek to meet him on his own ground. Apologetics, then, will affirm with him that the supreme question,—the answer to which is to set the mind in motion, in one direction or another,—concerns the building and perfecting of society. Moreover, it is a particular and positive kind of society which both the outsider and the apologete have in mind; namely, the Free State. Hence they must agree upon the main quality and attitude which distinguishes that form of human society from all other forms. It is, therefore, both proper and necessary, in a brief

study, to neglect many things in order to isolate and emphasize the main thing. Upon this both parties in the debate are agreed.

At first sight, it might appear that to the question — What is the significant and distinguishing quality of the Free State? there could be but one answer; the fact of freedom or the belief in the possibility of the fact. That seems to go almost without saying. Second thoughts, however, give to the answer a slightly different color. The Free State, as it exists in England and America, is not a creation out of nothing, but the conclusion of a long and toilsome political process which has lasted nearly fifteen centuries already and yet has just reached, perhaps, its critical stage. It were ill-advised, on merely tactical grounds, to start with a description of the Free State which more or less cuts it off from its ancestry. And besides, on the higher ground of political theory, there is a term more fundamental than freedom, and that is justice. Justice is the primary thing, freedom the derivative. Justice is the end to be reached. Freedom is the means to reach it. Every State which has bound the fragments of humanity into a political order that triumphed, in some measure, over the opposition of space and time, has commanded the interest and loyalty of its subjects by the law within it; a law which in some way, however rough,

put each individual in his place and made him fairly content with his place. The soul of every form of real political order has been the passion for justice. And the great lawyers of the Mediterranean world spoke the word that antiquity had been waiting for when they described justice as the soul of the State, and then went on to define it as the steadfast purpose, on the part of the State, of giving to every individual all that belonged to him. With freedom and liberty by themselves history at large will have little patience. The Free State can succeed only by proving that it is the legitimate heir to the labors and successes and problems of all other forms of political and social order. Once more, then, it may be said, and said with finality, that freedom is the means and justice the end.

What then is involved in the belief in justice? History and science both say that it is the principle of individuality. History says it; because, wherever a State has gone far enough in political wisdom to reach a theory of politics, a system of law, the individual citizen, as at Athens and at Rome, has been made the unit of thought and legislation, being set up as the one thing which in the view of the State had a value of its own. Science says it; because, in the scientific interpretation of the world it lies in the very nature of things that the individual should be the unit of theory. The realism of

science compels the universal to dwell within the particular. No law is true law unless it conceals itself in and tells its story through the individual thing. Hence when the scientist takes upon his conscience the problem of the State's existence and well-being, he must of necessity find the significance of the State in the fact that it liberates the principle of individuality, opening to it a broad and generous career. Modifying Aristotle's words, he will say that the State came into being to make a fairly peaceable human existence possible; but it continues to be in order to make individuality possible. All the things that are dear to his science,—the right to think in his own way, the right to criticise, the right to refuse to believe, the right to will to believe, in a word, the right to take a free look at the universe,—is bound up with the principle of individuality. The preservation, then, and the development of individuality is for the scientist the end of justice. And justice is the soul, the spiritual principle within the State. The individual comes to truly know himself through patient, steady study of his whole self as it stands before him in the present and lives behind him in memory. Thus he becomes a person, a self-conscious and coherent unity within the body of the details of material existence. Even so the State comes to know itself. Clear political theory, ad-

dressing itself to the present, and at the same time communing and conversing with the past, teaches the State to know itself. And the gist of its self-knowledge is that it exists to maintain and develop individuality, to make each of its citizens count for one.

Thus the State becomes the individual's larger self. Binding together men widely separated in space and generations widely separated in time, breaking down the barriers that prevent common feeling and action, it offers to the individual citizen the opportunity of a splendid expansion of feeling and purpose which carries him outside the narrow bounds of private and parochial interests, making it possible for him to triumph over the day, to eternize himself. But the State is the citizen's larger self only because its soul is justice, and because the whole desire and aim of justice is that he should be an individual indeed, carrying within himself the one and sole thing that has its value in its own keeping.

When we call the State an ethical organism, using terms that are very widely used and abused, all we mean is, that, for our outsider, seeking to ground the conception of society, the State is a prime necessity of the higher life, a main condition of all those things which go with the victory of manhood over bruteness. The State is ethical,

because it is indispensable to disinterested humanity. The joy of clear and continuous thought cannot be attained save in it and through it. The glory of deep self-knowledge and self-mastery cannot be had except through that communion between distant generations which the State renders possible. The State is ethical. And in the eyes of the State, when once it has come to clearly know itself, there is nothing good but individuality. All other goods are secondary and auxiliary. There is nothing good but individuality. Other goods are the bare material of goodness.

The aim of true law, the end of education, the object of all the manifold energies of society in so far as they are anything better than blind streams of tendency, is to get together the conditions for the existence of a larger and still larger number of citizens who shall be truly and thoroughly individual. Wherever the State finds such a citizen, it finds a subject who is at the same time a ruler, a citizen who is the law embodied, in whom and through whom the law executes itself. And unless the universe provides the wherewithal for the making of such citizens in larger and larger numbers, society must break periodically into fragments, to be welded together again by a military despotism, which in due season shall entail revolution by dynamite, in order that for a time, after the smoke has

cleared away, men may cherish the illusion that political self-government is the ideal ordained by history. But then the issue is in failure, the illusion breaking itself against the hard fact of human incapacity. And so, the illusion gone, another despotism follows, and humanity enters once more into the tragic marriage between hope and incompetence.

Moreover it is to be carefully considered and remembered by our outsider that the art of dreaming is likely to become one of the world's lost arts. For no one can retain the art of dreaming when once he has lost faith in his dreams. In the youth of political theory it was easy to dream, to have illusions. But the science and criticism of history are making it more and more difficult. We shall lose our capacity for dreaming the brave dreams that make us attempt the impossible. At any rate, the illusions will come with far harder labor to the birth and be far more likely to die still-born. The oscillation between fits of political enthusiasm and periods of political inertia and despair will become more and more violent, until the higher humanity, heart-sick and brain-sick, subsides into chronic monasticism,—belief in self-government and belief in science perishing together. All this will surely be included within the scientist's forecast of the future of historical society, unless he can thoroughly ground his conception of society by giving to the principle

of individuality a root as deep as the being of the universe, and quite as enduring.

The belief in liberty derives its authority from the belief in justice. It is secondary to it, but secondary in the logical sense, and in that sense alone. It is secondary to justice, as any effect is secondary to any cause. But while, in logic, the effect is secondary to the cause, in the actual train of events it is coessential with it. There is no effect without a cause. But neither can there be any cause without its effect. And the cause would be gainsaid and undone if it did not have its full effect. Even so stands it with the relation between the belief in justice and the belief in liberty. The latter is the necessary, the inevitable, consequence of the former when it is clearly conceived and resolutely enforced.

This follows in the logic of political theory. The unit of legal thought, when the life and temper of the State have so far ripened that deep reflection and coherent system take the place of unreflecting customs and conflicting traditions, is necessarily the individual. The pursuit of justice, the moment justice rises before political theory as an ideal and an authority, finds in the individual the only thing that has value in itself. Justice, then, conceived deeply and carried out resolutely, opens into liberty. For, since the individual carries within himself the higher

values, — the ethical goods of the State, — the ideal of justice cannot be deliberately pursued to any length unless a growing emphasis falls upon the individual's right to himself. With that thought the belief in justice reaches its full effect, namely, the belief in liberty.

This has also followed in practice, wherever practice has risen above the political rule of thumb prevailing in petty primitive politics, without at the same time falling into the hands of a purely military imperialism. Every State that has labored long and self-consciously at the higher tasks of history, has seen, at some time or other, the ideal of liberty born of its own deepest desires, and claiming, by the divine right of political consistency, authority and dominion within the realm of its law.

The passion for liberty, which has already so deeply colored the later political history of the Occident, is no mere youthful enthusiasm. It has indeed had its youthful excesses. It has known its calf-loves and calf-hates. Taken mainly on its negative side, it has run amuck through institutions into which humanity has put so much labor and time that history will not let them die. None the less, it is the very bloom and glory of occidental history. To cultivate the ground about its roots come all the nobler forces that characterize the Occident and separate it from the Orient; and they

come with strong hands. To mature its fruit, the nobler genius of Greece and Rome, the native temper of our ruling races, and the spirit of Christianity, forgetting all their differences, enter into solemn league and covenant. If the passion for liberty is a passing passion, then the sooner we take the back track toward the Orient, the less violently shall we be victimized by the irony of the universe.

The light of freedom is a holy light, because in that light, and there alone, may history see her deepest problems and confront her inevitable task. The holy is the integral, the thorough, the coherent. Nothing is more unholy than persistent incoherence, nothing more defiling and degrading than stubborn servitude to a half-truth. Freedom's light is holy because it is the light that radiates from humanity's clear and deep self-knowledge. In the presence of that self-knowledge, the State is unethical unless, sooner or later, it comes to recognize in individuality the one good thing that is intrinsically good, the one good thing that has its value in its own keeping. But the belief in liberty is as necessary to the belief in individuality as sap is to trees, or blood to men. The belief in justice becomes a make-believe,—or worse, an unholy half-truth,—unless it is followed home to its seat and source in the right of the individual to himself, his right to clearer self-knowledge and growing self-

masterhood, in the political and social experience of the race. So the belief in justice must wither and die unless it reaches self-knowledge through the belief in liberty. Without the passion for liberty the State must end by becoming a *mésalliance* between conscience and brute force.

Thus the Free State becomes, for the scientist who enters with serious purpose into the great debate called comparative religion, the supremely significant fact of history, the one fact which religion and the philosophy of religion must take care of and provide for. With any existing form of the Free State, fault in plenty may be found. It is guilty in more ways than one. Like many an idealist, it is sometimes made an inebriate by its enjoyment of its own theory, and cannot recognize and adapt itself to actual conditions. Its noble faith in itself, sometimes unreasoned and impatient, leads it to sanctify many a gross injustice. But the scientist who has dealt out to Nature millions of years will not begrudge history a few thousands. He will have self-restraint and magnanimity. For he will know that the Free State, as it has begun to be in England and America, is the one form of government which, by its own creed and constitution, can be successfully brought to account for inconsistency and injustice; because it is the one form that consciously and deliberately adopts the development of

individuality as its aim and goal, and consequently is bound in self-consistency to extend the area of true individuality until it become coextensive with humanity.

Whether democracy, vigorously conceived and carried out, can be looked for on any great scale, taking the world as it now is, is not the question. We Americans believe in democracy with all our hearts. We believe that there is a divine right deeper and more enduring than that of kings, the right of our common humanity to be the medium through which the law for Humanity, coming from the unseen source of law, is to be published. We know that the only safe bottom on which the real law of a people, the law that touches and vitalizes common action as an efficient social conscience, that law which trains and tutors the individual to come outside himself in order to live in the larger self and so eternize himself,—we know, I say, that the only safe bottom on which this law may be put is the growing capacity of the average man to govern himself. And we are sure that, sooner or later, history will have it so and order it so for all peoples. But whether our ideals have a free career before them in the contemporary world is a question upon which students of history and existing conditions, all believing heartily in the sacredness of individuality, may honestly and widely differ. That,

however, is not to the point in our debate with the scientist. The question of time cannot enter into a question of pure logic, nor should the argument at this point be turned from its course by an appeal to what looks immediately possible over the whole field of the world's political experience.

The main question concerns the way in which the sincere lover and student of the visible world, who at the same time would fain make for himself citizenship of a noble sort, is to insure his view of the universe. The centre of all his values is the principle of individuality. This is the seat and source of spirituality — if he permits himself to use the word. And why should he not? The spiritual means, when everything subordinate and auxiliary has been put to one side, that which interests man in ways distinct from merely private and material ends. The hero story that has power to draw the boy's mind out of his body is spiritual. The ballad that sounds like a trumpet in a man's heart is spiritual. The love of Fatherland, making existence cheap and purpose clear, is spiritual. The frame and temper of the true scientist, attentive to the meanings of the universe, is thoroughly spiritual: for "the wonder and bloom of the world" lies in his free and reverent look at the order of things about him. Individuality, then, is the one truly spiritual thing. The abiding spirituality and worth-

while of the visible universe are at stake in the insurance of individuality. So, the scientific student of ethics will resolutely insist upon his right and duty to interpret the unseen resources of the universe in the light of the principle of individuality.

It is certain, too, that this principle of individuality is identified with the development of the Free State. Science is the fruit of leisure. Leisure is the creation of the State. The uses to which the scientist puts his leisure are permanently possible only within the Free State. Consequently, the movement which leads him to identify his lot and fortunes with those of the Free State is not to be for a moment stalled, his will is not for a moment to be puzzled, by questions touching the possibility of instituting free government all over the world at the present stage of history. That is a question for prudence to deal with. But the present question, the life and death question, is one of principle. On the grounds of principle it must be settled.

The knowledge the scientist holds dear is not of the kind that calls for a caste or a close corporation to safeguard and subjugate it. Such a corporation either starts with or ends in a kind of knowledge in whose sight this visible order of things is "such stuff as dreams are made of." A knowledge of that sort calls for specialists who shall take themselves far away from any first-hand interest in the

world's affairs. The temper of mind befitting its cultivation inevitably produces a fashion of life in keeping with it, namely, the ascetic, the monastic life. If circumstances favor, that life is ultimately organized into a vast sacerdotal society, with imperial methods and aims. The layman has no primary responsibility for it. He, therefore, has no primary right to it. It is the affair of the priesthood. It is not published in a language apprehended by the people.

But the scientist's specialty compels him to take the common life as his standing-ground. Unless that is sacred, his own profession is unholy, unspiritual, and its claim of spirituality is an impertinence, if not a blasphemy. The birth of geometry from the needs of a society bottomed on farming, illustrates the relation of his knowledge to the common knowledge. His science, broadly as it may differ from the peasant's knowledge in scope and depth, is one with it in aim. Its object is the visible world; and in the language of that world all its discoveries are published. Science demands a lay establishment of learning. It demands the public school and the free university. Its principles of education make the layman a teacher by divine right.

To save the State, to insure the possibility of a noble citizenship that shall count everything cheap

and vulgar, however brave its air and fine its manners, unless it helps to guarantee the spiritual significance of the State, the scientist seeks a religion. Now every form of religion, in one way or another, endeavors to furnish its followers with a view of the universe wherein feeling may find itself at home and so equip the will for a successful struggle with the difficulties which the world puts in its path. The scientist's whole will goes forth into the service of the Free State in order to safeguard and strengthen the principle of individuality. The difficulties he must strive to overcome are the difficulties put by custom and circumstance in the path of that principle. Accordingly, no religion will serve his turn unless it grounds and insures the principle of individuality. The task of history is there. And the sincerity of the universe is behind history. So, then, the typical outsider of our day requires a religion which, sounding the depths of the universe, shall bring up the principle of individuality as the deepest thing in it.

LECTURE III

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY

WE are entering upon the most significant debate the world has ever known. It calls itself comparative religion. Once before, in the Mediterranean world, there was such a debate. But neither in respect of its scope nor for intensity can it be put beside the debate that is now upon us. The religions that contended for a right to insure and guide the hopes and fears of men came from the Orient. On the home field there grew no religion that could for a moment contest the ground with them, for the native religions of Greece and Rome had either been driven out of consciousness by philosophy, or, when taken away from the restraints and supports provided by their local and provisional character, and carried forth into the broad field of the Empire, had gone to the ground of their own weight. The Empire fell an easy prey to the religions that came from the East.

Moreover, the mental life of the Mediterranean world had gone some distance in decline before the

debate began. At its best, the scientific, above all, the historic, spirit of the Greeks was vastly inferior to the spirit of our own day, as well in breadth and patience of purpose as in the apparatus it could control. But at the time when the struggle of religions was well advanced, the Greek spirit had fallen far below its own highest level. The mental life of the Empire was not intense enough to put the invading religions to a severe strain.

The intellectual vigor of our own time is incomparably higher and has a vastly wider spread. The scientific study of the universe, the historical study of the human past, have but just begun, yet already they have begotten a mental passion which, by reason of its intensity and purity, may well be called what Ranke calls the historical spirit, a new kind of piety. And this mental life is not a luxury at the command of a few. It has within itself a motive, made up of reverent admiration for the universe and a consecrated desire to serve humanity, that renders it, not a luxury, but a true privilege; a privilege so intrenched in its rightful dignity and worth that it will not give ground to any religion, however potent an appeal it may make to the feelings, unless a strong appeal is also made to the sober reason. And in addition to this inherent value that gives it standing-ground and staying-power, the scientific and historical spirit is gaining wide vogue and spread.

Hosts of people, who have neither the time nor the opportunities of specialists, take from the specialists their mental tone and color. The religion that is to successfully appeal to them must bring forth out of its treasures the things that are richest and best.

Again, owing to the fact that all parts of the world are now near neighbors, the various religions of the world will have to take exact account of each other. The phrase "comparative religion" implies that there are more religions than one; that each of them has within it something, more or less, of the truly religious quality, and that, accordingly, since they all belong in some sort to a single family, each must give to the other a patient hearing. But the history of our own religion shows how little such a hearing could be looked for in the past. Christianity having been for near a thousand years the established religion of the Occident, it came to pass in the thirteenth century, through the influence of Aristotle and the Mohammedans, that a kind of religion, distinct from Christianity yet possessing a religious quality, had to be recognized. Christian thinkers call it "Natural Religion." But when it came to the heat of debate, they gave it, as a rule, scant hearing and a short shrift.

How could it be otherwise? It is necessary to a comparison that both of the two sets of views and

ideals to be compared shall be apprehended as real. Now to apprehend our neighbor's thoughts as real, in case they differ broadly from our own, is of all things most difficult. The instinctive and the inbred tendency, is to name them indeed, but to name them x , an almost lifeless something or other that does not, when struck, strike back hard, and which, on the point of receiving the mortal stroke, gives only enough resistance to glorify the parade of a finishing blow. To the sinless humanity of our Lord, the thoughts and motives of His neighbor were as real as they were to the immediate owner of them; a spiritual sympathy, unchecked by egotism, unhampered by spiritual inertia, brought what was near His fellow-man home to Him. But with the common man the case is not so. Space is his tutor and master. The things beyond the mountains are unreal. They must come this side the mountains so that the influence of immediate contact may be brought to bear, before the thoughts which are very different from his own and yet, for all that, control the minds of others, can seem honestly real to him. Now, in the thirteenth century, any religion other than Christianity must needs be an x , an algebraic symbol, used in the schools and indicating a possible reality; a reality, however, which was not apprehended as truly real. Other religions were beyond the mountains. They had no right to exist.

On Christian soil their right to exist would have been assailed with the sword and the stake. Hence their existence was nominal, not real. There could, therefore, be no actual comparison of religions.

But in our day the whole earth is one. All races and all religions are becoming tenants of a world all of whose parts are closely connected. By a logic which they cannot withstand, the logic of life within a common space, they must needs seek closer acquaintance with one another. Along with the mental life that makes the comparative study of religion possible, come the practical conditions that make it inevitable. Each religion, if it sets up any claims to universality, is touched to the quick by the bare fact that another religion exists alongside it in the same space. No kindly mountains make the task of apologetics easy by putting our rivals far outside the possibility of realization. India and America are neighbors. The books of the memories and purposes of all religions are now being opened in the one school of free and reverent inquiry. The great debate is on. If any form of existing religion is to win the right to shelter and guide the world's conscience, it must be prepared to enter the debate of comparative religions and contend, on equal terms, before the world's reason. Into this debate enters our typical outsider. He does not come as a mere individual. In every part

of him he is representative. He brings with him all that is most significant and lasting in the spiritual history of the Occident during the past twenty-five hundred years. He speaks for the science in whose eyes the visible universe shines with the beauty of law. He speaks for the Free State, in whose eyes history is a purposeful, a sacred process. He is the mark at which sound apologetics must aim. His are the mind and heart toward which the religion that seeks to permanently master the world must direct its attention.

He does not speak and he cannot speak the language of Varro and the men like him, who faced the problem of the relation between religion and the State in the Roman Empire. It is impossible for him to separate himself from the multitude, as Varro did, and, while standing footloose himself in regard to religion, insist upon it as something indispensable for the government of the rabble. He will indeed say with Varro that religion is expedient, but his expedience is not a mere political trick or sleight of hand. The need of religion is a personal need. If he should forget, even for a moment, the modern world he lives in, and use that outgrown language about the rabble, he will remember straightway that his own need of religion is not less but greater than the need of the so-called rabble. For he is bound, by every principle he holds dear, to

make of himself an uncrowned king, an embodied and self-executing law. He must with his own hands lay afresh the foundations of society.

A founder and establisher of the social principle he cannot become, unless he so views the universe and its resources that the will within him which holds his mind in an attitude of attention to the universe and bends his energies upon the needs of society shall have entire command of his inner being. His attention must be untiring, growing strong through the very problems which Nature puts to him. His social purpose must be equally untiring, deriving a mightier force and a keener edge from the very difficulties which beset the future of the Free State. He does not deceive himself concerning the seriousness of those difficulties. He has no theology which might permit him, with pious inertness, to let the burden of them roll off upon some unknown "other world." Here upon earth, in the world of time and space, he must fight the battle out. And in order to keep his heart whole and his will masterful, he becomes religious. He seeks a coherent world of feeling wherein he shall be at home with himself. The visible universe would indeed be sufficient for him, if he could sound it to the bottom and bring back the certainty that nowhere within it lurked the possibility of an unrelated somewhat, a Fate, which might at some future

stage in the earth's history reduce the scientific consciousness to "permanent intellectual confusion" and make the social conscience of the Free State a mere tenant at will. It were quite enough for his needs if he could thus know and register the possibilities of the visible universe.

But he has not thus fathomed the visible universe. As its possibilities of sound are to the narrow scope of his ear and its possibilities of color to the scope of his eye, so are the resources of the universe at large to his present knowledge. He cannot sound the universe save by an act of faith, outgoing both his science and his social law, yet necessary to their sanity and integrity. His faith, however, is not an obligation laid upon his will by an infallible Church. The necessity of faith is not sprung upon him from without but grows upon him from within. It is the will of the universe itself—if he can permit himself to use that kind of language—which bids him believe. For what becomes of the dignity and worth of the universe unless the principle of individuality be thoroughly insured? In the name of that principle are all his gains from the universe registered; and, unless the principle be thoroughly grounded and bottomed in the universe itself, the deadly blight of illusion falls upon his mind and will. The glory passes from the earth. So he cannot enter the great debate with a mind

detached and unconcerned. He has a deep desire to believe.

This desire to believe is a very different thing from the will to believe commended by Newman as the bridge over which a man shall pass into the communion of the Papal Church. Newman's version of the will to believe goes along with the mediæval dualism between the Natural and the Supernatural, and with that monastic organization of the Church which inevitably issues from it. It is at home with the conception of revelation as an impersonal deposit of truth under the charge of a Church wherein the priesthood has supreme authority. It belongs to the Hildebrandian view of things whereby the Church, meaning the Papacy, is set up as the sun, and the State is described as the moon. It is of a piece with the conception of truth as twofold, a truth of reason apart from the truth of revelation, and a truth of revelation apart from reason. And finally it goes with that division of virtues into the ordinary virtues and the virtues of perfection, whereby, in effect, the civic life is robbed of its primary connection with the life of God, just as, by the cognate conception of truth, reason is robbed of its primary connection with the mind of God, and so deflowered and degraded. The will to believe in this case is essentially a will to obey an imperial sacerdotal authority.

The desire to believe which our outsider brings with him into the discussions of comparative religion has a radically different make and tendency. The man who feels the desire, and with all honesty yields himself to it, is a man who has seen the traditions, the dogmas, the institutions of a once sacred past either levelled to the ground by his reason, or so shattered, as he thinks, that wind and rain have won free entry. He has a conscience. In the first place, a superb conscience of reason, spurring his mind to the most strenuous study and compelling him to regard a careless piece of work as a stain upon his mental honor. In the second place, he has a civic conscience—bound up with the conscience of reason—that compels him to betake himself to the town-hall and doom himself to freely assume the most sweeping obligations and responsibilities. Yet his conscience stands naked. The old institutions and traditions which handed down, as the gift of the sacred Past to the toiling Present, a coherent framework of life and mind, are either bankrupt or under suspicion. His conscience stands naked and unclothed, confronting a visible universe which, in the days of his gallant but unreflecting youth, he called physical.

Wherewithal shall he clothe his conscience? He, too, must have a coherent frame and constitution of things, else his conscience shall be as a swimmer

who has lost his head, his labor choking his art. But where lies the seat and source of coherence? The visible universe no longer tolerates the name "physical." When the scientist used that term to fight the old supernaturalism with, he was in fact using a conception shaped by supernaturalism itself. Now that he understands himself, he abandons the word. The visible universe is a spiritual universe. For the spiritual is that which is set apart from the vulgar uses of the narrow self, and the visible universe is for the scientist a thing set apart. The majesty and terror of its law rise before him with commanding beauty. Admiration for it is his strongest mental habit. The visible universe is so infinitely spiritual, so infinitely worthy of his unselfish interest and service, that he is willing and able to devote a lifetime to so small a mental parish as a family of humming-birds or a variety of beetles. George Herbert, serving his little rural parish with body and soul, is not more spiritually-minded in principle than is our scientist. The visible universe is spiritual. His own interest in the universe, an interest that cleanses him from vanity and fear, is part and parcel of the universe. His own interest in the universe is therefore a primary reality, to deny which were to throw the universe itself into the fatal shadow of a vast illusion.

He clothes his conscience by an act of faith. He desires to believe that what is most real for him and in him is most real in the universe and for the universe. He coquetted with the unknowable in his sophomore days, when the unknowable was supposed to be a useful maiden, convenient for getting rid of an old love of humanity called theology. But now that he has come to close quarters with the terrible questions concerning reality, he finds that the time for flirtation has passed. The visible universe, being thoroughly intelligible, endlessly knowable, exhaustlessly interesting, has no dealings with the unknowable. Its servant and worshipper, the scientist, desires to believe that this is so, and his desire is both scientific and ethical. Not to feel the desire, or, feeling it, not to yield to it, were sin. The scientific resistance to the interference of common desires with reason does not apply to this desire to believe. That resistance, on the contrary, is the noblest idealism in disguise. It is the supreme desire to know, putting the vulgar desires of an inert or cowardly humanity under foot. But the desire to believe in the thorough spirituality of the visible universe, to believe that nowhere in it from top to bottom is anything that refuses sympathy and conversation with the reverent and attentive reason, is so far from being vulgar and

common that it is the only spiritual thing the scientist knows at first hand. He must, then, think that this main desire of his is given to him by the universe as the dearest thing it owns. With all honesty, then, he yields himself to it. It makes him no man's servant; on the contrary, it makes him free. It sets up no imperial authority over the lay reason; on the contrary, it insures the infinite and endless progress of the lay reason in the discovery of truth. The act of faith which the desire to believe calls for, is altogether scientific, since without it the permanent possibility of science could not be given.

The desire to believe has another aspect equally fundamental. That free look at the universe which is the essence of science cannot find permanent footing outside the Free State. The scientist, just because he is a scientist, must be a citizen of noble make. The duty of knowledge is inseparable from the duty of being in society. The man who denies his responsibilities for truth is outside the moral order of things. Likewise the man who denies his responsibility for society is outside the moral order of things. He is not to be treated as a lawful debater, standing on even ground with the man who feels a responsibility for truth and society, but as a man with something amiss in him. Our outsider desires to be altogether social,

even as he desires to be altogether truthful. If he uses the word sin at all, he will apply it to every form of absent-mindedness concerning social obligations. The man who refuses to enter heartily into the social order, paying in full his debts to history, is a sinner. The man who builds himself a palace of art is a sinner. The cosmopolitan, who will not take root anywhere lest social and political obligations may interfere with his ease or his self-culture, is a sinner. The rich man who refuses to acknowledge the responsibility of wealth is a sinner. The women who ride in chariots and shine at presentations and are deeply in earnest with the wish to make themselves unlike the common people are vulgar. The men of letters who deny themselves the time or strength to keep near the heart of their nation are a rabble.

The desire to be in society is as deep as the desire to know, and the two desires, joining their forces, make the desire to believe in the permanent possibility of a free thought and a free society the deepest and most essential thing in the representative modern. Without it he cannot be whole-hearted, either in his science or in his citizenship. It is with a good conscience, then, that he enters the debate of comparative religion, not detached and unconcerned, but with a profound desire to believe in the religion that shall make him at home with himself.

He is not, however, to be carried off his feet by an appeal to his feelings. He knows his own mind. He has taken careful account of the things he believes to be spiritual and worthful. He knows what he wants. His view of the universe is built on the sand unless the principle of individuality be fundamental in the universe. This, then, is the touchstone by which he tries the quality of the various religions of the world. This is his guide in the classification of religions.

Neglecting the inferior forms of religion and dealing only with those that appear when historical development has advanced a considerable distance, we first notice the classification into National and Universal religions. Kuenen gave it vogue. It has decided value; for it covers a large number of facts. The religions which the dawn of history discovers to us were tribal religions. It was the time of private property in gods. Each tribe had its own god. Just so many as were the tribes at war with one another, just so many were the gods. No man of one tribe had any sort of relation to the god of another tribe. There was no missionary impulse impelling a man of one tribe to introduce a man of another tribe to his own religion. On the contrary, it was considered blasphemy for a tribesman to make his god known to the outsider. As tribe clashed with tribe, and the weaker tribe went to the wall, and as the earliest

States were formed, a tendency towards syncretism arose, carrying the mind into a sort of monotheism; and as the base of the State broadened out, as a larger number of political and economic and social interests came within the horizon of a single State, the movement away from tribal and parochial religions gained strength. Finally, when the mind had been bred up, as in India and in the Mediterranean world, to broad political and social horizons, religions were born that were essentially missionary, claiming universal sway and application, and laying upon the conscience of every adherent the obligation to communicate to all outsiders its interpretation of life.

The worth of Kuenen's classification, however, is seriously impaired when it is made exhaustive. As a subordinate principle of division it is valuable, but when it is used as the governing principle, it betrays radical defects. In the first place, it covers up differences quite as deep as the likenesses on which it bases its classification. Thus, Buddhism and Christianity are put together as world-religions, universal in their aim and missionary in their methods. Now, from the outside, they do indeed look strikingly alike. But studied from within they manifest great differences. Christianity affirms the objective reality, the spiritual value, of the historical order of things; for to this conclusion the Messianic Idea, the doctrine of

the Kingdom of God, and the belief in the second Coming of Christ, irresistibly carry the mind. Buddhism, on the contrary, assesses the historical order of things in terms of illusion. Again, Christianity is essentially a doctrine of the will. Quietism has played a great part in the culture of Christian virtues, and has still its part to play. But the main bent and bias of Christian ethics is imparted to it by its conception of God as holy and creative will. This gives shape and color to the redeemed man's inner life. His will, like God's will, must go forth and conquer the earth. Christianity has a fundamental set toward social construction. Of Buddhism, on the other hand, quietism is the very core and essence. The pith of virtue is disengagement from the visible world. Again, Buddhism is thoroughly pessimistic, and its genius shows itself in a deep and beautiful resignation ; while Christianity is optimistic, and has a genius for creating Puritans.

Surely a classification which neglects such deep and decisive differences for the sake of unity gives us a false unity, because it is a unity that does not take fair account of the phenomena to be examined. The scientist who enters the debate as arbiter cannot accept it. His stake in the visible universe is the principle of individuality. In the light of that principle, Kuenen's division is seen to be too much an affair of statistics and description, dealing too little

in close analysis. It is quantitative rather than qualitative. The representative modern is not to be put off with a universal religion which attains its universality by selling for a song most of what goes to the making of Occidental civilization. A religion that is to be truly universal, in his view of things, must not merely claim universality in terms of space and the census, but must prove itself to have an interior universalism as well, — so that it shall be able to take full account of, and to provide a coherent world of feeling for, the man whose deepest desire is to believe in the spirituality, the dignity, and the worth of that order of things within which the citizen and the scientist live and move. Whatever Christianity may or may not do, Buddhism does not do this. It is not, therefore, a universal religion in the scientist's sense, since it wipes off the board, before his face, an essential part of the problem that is to be solved.

Another classification which has won favor is that into monotheistic and polytheistic religions. The wide acceptance it gained was prepared for it by the pedigree of our own religion. Bound up as Christianity is with the Old Testament, the division of religions into those recognizing one God, and those recognizing many, seems to us to be a natural principle of division; and, without question, it is a serviceable principle. Putting aside our

prejudice in favor of Christianity we can readily use the classification to handle the later forms of religious feeling. When once religion had outgrown ancestor-worship, whenever it reached a level of experience whence it saw in its gods the representatives and supporters of broader causes than the primitive family religion could register or decide,—in other words, as soon as distinctly national gods appeared, exercising sway over considerable stretches of territory, and tying up their fortunes with political movements of real magnitude,—the tendency toward some form of monotheism set in.

All that was needed was a certain breadth of political view, a certain growth of industrial life, making possible a certain amount of leisure and supporting a class of specialists—whether lay or sacerdotal—to use that leisure, and then a distinct monotheistic movement was inevitable. The common life of a State of some magnitude required it. In antiquity every form of relationship acknowledged by men was compelled, if it would be thought respectable, to express itself under the form of religion. The life and purpose of the State was obliged to express itself in that way; and thus the need of the State called for a kind of monotheism supposed to underlie all the tribal religions included within the State, and manifesting itself through each one of them. Moreover, the enlargement of

view given by extended military operations, and by outreaching trade and travel, threw the smaller deities into the shade. They could only continue to exist by paying tribute to the larger conception demanded by the broader experience of the State. And finally, the inbred need of consciousness for unity made some form of religious synthesis inevitable. So long as each tribe lived at war with every other tribe, gods were as numerous as tribes. But when once they had been gathered within a common political fold, the reason demanded that all the gods should invest their gains in the conception of one underlying and supporting deity. Wherever large masses of men have been held long together, sooner or later a tendency toward monotheism has resulted.

So the distinction between monotheistic and polytheistic religions successfully handles a large body of facts. And it would even appear to be in sympathy with the process of universal history. For, as our race pushes farther out its political and commercial horizons, parochial and provincial religions must needs wither and perish in the heat of a larger day. Such was the course of things in the Roman Empire. All the religions that struggled for the spiritual precedence within its borders, had a pronounced monotheistic tendency; and it is plain as day that the polytheistic religions of the earth that still

survive are bound to die of themselves in the vast world which modern invention and trade and war are building up. Philosophic critics, no less than the missionaries of monotheistic religions, will find the polytheistic enemy thrown almost helpless at their feet. The practical needs of a vast common life settle the debate. History proceeds resistlessly from polytheism toward monotheism. Therefore, the classification under discussion would appear to be in keeping with the main tendencies of history.

Deeper study, however, brings to light radical defects. In the first place, the classification neglects distinctions between different kinds of monotheism that are quite as vital as the distinctions between monotheism and polytheism. The differences between the prophetic monotheism of Israel, and the pantheistic monotheism of Egypt, put an absolute veto upon a common classification. Pantheistic monotheism is close akin, both in feeling and in logic, to polytheism. They have never been long at war with each other. When Xenophanes desired to have Homer whipped, it was not because Homer was a polytheist, but because he told immoral stories about the gods. The universal rule is that pantheistic monotheism is kindly and genial toward popular polytheism, conforming to its ritual, as did the Stoics and the Neoplatonists, and depending upon allegorical interpretation to prove that conformity is

not inconsistent with philosophical orthodoxy. Pantheistic monotheism does not breed Puritans.

The difference between polytheism and pantheistic monotheism is a purely quantitative one. When various tribes, under the grip of military power, cohere into a single political organization, the many gods put their rights into the keeping of a greater deity. This is a necessary movement, and is apparent in every considerable State of antiquity. When a vast State like the Roman Empire comes on the field, the movement becomes strong and impressive. But the relationship between deity and humanity does not necessarily change. In the beginnings of ancient history each tribe had its own gods. In the maturity of antiquity many tribes acknowledged a common god. But the character of the relationship between deity and humanity was not thereby altered. On the contrary, it remained essentially the same. The distinction between the polytheists of heathendom and its monotheists was mainly quantitative.

The category, the dominating concept of theology, was not seriously affected by the step that took heathendom into a pantheistic monotheism. In the provincial period of ethnic theology God and man were of one piece, part and parcel of a common substance. Thus in Homer, God and man are of the same nature, the main difference be-

tween them being the quantity of existence possessed by each. This relationship is not logically altered in Plotinus. The coloring of the thought is very different. The practical ideals are far more spiritual. The scope of thought is vastly superior. But the dominating concept is essentially the same. God and man are still of one piece. The essential man within each man is of one substance with deity. Man is a little infinite, a portion of deity shut up within certain limits of time and space. He differs from God only as a small quantity of perfect being differs from a vast quantity of the same being.

When religious practice was put to the severest test; when, under the pressure of social and political tendencies that stripped the citizen's life of its glory and honor men of high mind turned toward asceticism, the fatal flaw in the underlying theology revealed itself. Man, being a lesser portion of deity, had no foothold for his own separate being and individuality in deity itself. Inasmuch as he conceived himself to be a little infinite, of one substance with the vast infinite, when once he came to the supreme point of emotional unity with the Deity, he found the foothold of his individuality failing him. He gave up citizenship in time and space in order to be one with God. He surrendered the principle of individuality in order to attain solidarity with the infinite.

Now, this is a step which our representative modern flatly refuses to take. To think of taking it were to put in deadly peril all he holds dear. He seeks religion, not to save his soul in the technical religious sense, not to insure his individual immortality, but to ground and bottom that principle of individuality in whose name science and free society have invested all their gains. If he is forced to choose between his supreme thought and religion, he will give up religion. But religion cannot be given up. The alternative is impossible. Therefore, if he cannot find a religion to serve his needs he will make a new religion; or, since the thought of man's making a religion is shut out by the very nature of religion, he will ask the universe to reveal a new religion. The new religion will surely be some form of the worship of humanity. The scientist, desiring to fulfil his citizenship, will apotheosize humanity. He will live by communion with the great individuals of our race, the men through whom humanity has reached clearer self-knowledge, a more masterful and specific direction of conduct. This he will do rather than give up or imperil the principle of individuality.

Accordingly, the classification of religions into monotheistic and polytheistic cannot stand a close examination at his hands. It neglects the thing

that is most fundamental in his view. He has no inherited affection for either monotheism or polytheism. He feels no passionate interest even in the question of idolatry. Abstract monotheism does not deeply concern him. As a matter of course, he thoroughly believes in the unitary character of the universe; and if he believes in God, he will believe in the unity of the Godhead. But, as a bare point of theory, he will have no *a priori* objection to an hypothesis resembling that of the Stoics and the Neoplatonists, who managed, to their own satisfaction, to reconcile a deep belief in the divine unity with the popular polytheism that prevailed in their time. But with no form of monotheism will he have anything to do, unless it renders full justice to his governing idea. And therefore in his opinion the classification under discussion breaks down at the critical point.

A third classification, at present widely used, is that of Tiele, who divides religions into the Natural and the Ethical. On its face this has more to commend it than the two already discussed: for it recognizes the relation between religion and ethics as fundamental. It is clear that, in any scheme which is to satisfy the scientific reason and the social will, the principle of division must plainly recognize that relationship as basal. The supreme problem is the existence and welfare of a rational and progressive

social organization. The scientist, passing through the world of time and space, has made up his mind that, whatever be the chances or probabilities of a life beyond the grave, he will bend all his thoughts upon the question of a noble common life on this side. Therefore human conduct, the keeping of the heart, the moulding of the will into efficient, un-wasteful labor upon sane and righteous historical ends, is the standard by which he would have the world's religions judged and classified. Tiele's scheme appears to go far toward satisfying him. The term "natural" describes the religions that prevail in the earliest stages of human development, when man is largely the child or victim of Nature, lying well-nigh passive under natural tendencies and impulses, possessing no broad aims, mainly the victim of whim and circumstance. At this stage religion is largely an affair of magic, a system of spells, a means of getting the better of human enemies and barring out the actions of malevolent spirits. The term "ethical," on the other hand, describes the religions that appear at a later stage. Civilization, taken broadly, is a vast system of insurance against wind and weather, a system of mutual protection whereby men are lifted beyond the reach of changes and accidents which, in a lower stage of development, are likely to be fatal to continuous human welfare. The ethical religions,

appearing at a time when a civilization has travelled a considerable distance, discard magic and spells; and looking to the deeper and nobler needs of the race, adopt morality as the test of loyalty to the good.

But when the scheme is worked out by Tiele, and he assigns specific places and values to the religions of the world, grave faults are committed. Thus the Greek religion is put in the "natural" class and Buddhism is valued as "ethical." Surely this is to use the term "natural" in a loose way, and the term "ethical" in a narrow way. The primitive Greek religion was undoubtedly raw and barbaric in many things. Like all primitive religions it exalted levitical virtues and neglected inner virtues. Yet that self-same religion was the religion of a people who gave the world its ideals of thought and a majority of its timeless books. However we may emphasize the breach with the Greek past into which Greek philosophy carried the Greek mind, we are too firmly grounded in our conception of evolution to suppose that the Greek mind and art came out of nothing. And even if it be argued that the primitive Greek religion at its best was no better than that religion of the Vedas out of which Buddhism came, still it may be said in reply that a broad survey of the tendencies and issues of history throws serious doubt

upon our right to roundly call the Vedic religion a "natural" religion and Buddhism an "ethical" one.

In truth, the main trouble lies in a narrow use of the term "ethical." It is taken to describe religions that concentrate motives and wishes upon conduct, upon morality. But what sort of conduct? what kind of morality? The question is not impertinent. It matters much,—indeed, for our purpose it matters everything,—whether the morality is that of a monk or of a citizen. What is the unit of thought and feeling? The naked individual, stripped bare of relationships, standing alone, certain of no reality save his own self-consciousness, impugning the spiritual dignity, the interest, and the worth of the social and political order of things? A religion that does in fact take this as its unit of thought and feeling, cannot be permitted by the scientist to appropriate the term "ethical," unless the term shall have been subjected to a heavy discount. Granted that Buddhism throws a splendid emphasis upon the keeping of the heart, granted that it cultivates to a very high degree the moralities and graces of quietism, granted that it is a school for saints of profound tenderness and charm. All this does not go far enough, in the scientist's view, to justify Buddhism's full and self-confident appropriation of the term "ethical."

And the reason is that the end and aim of all his thought and endeavor is to lay the foundations of the social and historical life of our race deep in the nature and constitution of things. He must needs look upon the breeding of saints, whose one ideal is resignation and the quiet life, as a costly luxury of religion, unless such sanctity contribute in the end to the making of a nobler type of citizenship. A wide knowledge of history teaches him that periods which cultivate the ascetic ideal play a great and necessary part in the promotion of noble and generous life. For so many and so mighty are the bands holding the bulk of humanity close to material needs and contracted interests, that the race needs outbursts of an idealism that, on the one hand, has power to put these things low down in the scale of values, and on the other hand possesses authority to make the world accept, for a time, its assessment; so that, when history summons back the idealist to the work of drawing a straight and deep furrow in the field of civic and social endeavor, he brings with him a capacity for dreaming brave dreams and seeing splendid visions. And this genius for visions, come to close quarters with men, will not permit them to rest content with an average goodness, but puts on them the whip and spur of an ideal that labors without haste and without rest for the betterment of society.

But that purpose devoted to goodness, which Buddhism breeds and fosters, is not ethical in the full sense, unless and until it returns into history and society. The quietistic ideal, made an end in itself, is profoundly religious; fully ethical, however, it cannot be. The modern Occidental who knows what is best in the Occident and is loyal to it, will be ill at ease with any religion, no matter how weighty may be the emphasis it throws upon conduct and morality, so long as the morality in question is that of a soul disengaged from the relationships which constitute the family and the nation. The religion that is to win his allegiance must hold up before his will a view and interpretation of the universe that shall summon forth all his energies into the social life of the race. Even reason must not be an absentee. The test of leisure, as Windelband has well said, is its ability to keep itself from idleness. True leisure differs from the time spent by the day laborer upon his task, not in the smaller quantity of the work done, but in the freedom, the self-directing quality, of the work. The scientist's interpretation of the universe puts him out of sympathy, not only with the Hindoo quietist, but even with a Greek philosopher like Plotinus. His world is a vast body of aggressive energies. The contemporary psychology which has ousted the old metaphysic, heads up in a doctrine of the will. The ethics of evolution go the

same way. Therefore, even the pure reason is not to be an absentee. The highway of history must be kept in repair. The road taxes are heavy. It were an easy and pleasurable thing to build a monastery of science, so far away from the common life that no social jar could disturb the monastic reason's calm and even gaze at the skies. Easy and delightful would it be; but neither ethical nor scientific.

The beatific vision of the quietist is a blur of ecstasy toward which all the lines of clear thought run, and in which they lose themselves. The beatific vision of the scientist is a noble and inclusive conception, reaching wide and running deep, into whose precincts pass a great number of single things, to find law and universality without losing their definiteness. The universe which he knows and serves delights in the definite. To cast in his lot with any form of quietism would be to side-track himself. The virtues of Buddhism, winning as they are, come at too high a price. The ethics of Buddhism get their leverage and motion from the bankruptcy of civic life, from the impossibility of the Free State. The scientific view of the world—it deserves to be said again and again—has no career before it unless it joins fortunes with the Free State. Any religion, therefore, which fails to give footing for the social and political will of humanity by failing to put that will in deep and intimate connection

with the ultimate reality, cannot hope to bear off the name "ethical." Tiele's scheme, accordingly, when it is put to the test of actual classification, breaks down.

The term "ethical," taken in the indiscriminate way that just now is the fashion, can result in nothing but mental confusion, as well as in an unfair interpretation of history. Strictly speaking, there has never been a religion that divorced ethics and religion. To describe the primitive tribal religions as non-ethical is to use words amiss. The virtues they aimed at were indeed levitical and external, not subjective and internal. We have no need, however, to be reminded in these days that there is a mutable and an immutable element in all morality. Duty is one and abiding, but duties come and go with historical situations. The tribal religion had a very real morality. It was not for nothing that such vast weight was given to rules and formulæ which seem to us to be the height of absurdity. By the resistless authority thereby given to custom, men were hammered into an unyielding unity. The tribe was created, and so the first great machine for working and fighting was invented. The tribesman was trained to spend his life lavishly for the sake of the tribe. Now, if the capacity to throw away existence for the sake of life is not ethical, what is? The tribal religion was ethical, but its ethics were not

subjective and individual, nor did they recognize broad and comprehensive duties.

The term ethical must, accordingly, be more strictly used. The whole stake in the great debate is the principle of individuality. The ethics the Occidental cares for are the ethics of individuality; only not the individuality of the monk, except in so far as that is a means to an end. The individual of science is the individual who has no existence apart from his social and historical relationships. It is the individual in whom relationship goes as deep as his own being. The object of religion, according to the scientist's ideas, is to guarantee to that individual the entire and enduring self-respect without which he cannot do his long day's work with a perfect heart. No religion that fails in this can be called truly ethical.

There are other grave defects in Tiele's placing of religions. Brahmanism and Mosaism are strange bedfellows. Christianity and Buddhism are badly yoked. In either case the differences covered up are quite as fundamental as the likenesses brought to light. There is not time, however, to go into a detailed criticism. Nor is there need. It is enough to see that all the defects of the classification come from the primal fault of a loose and hasty use of the term "ethical." Tiele's classification will not do. It fails to take sufficient account of the central thing.

In the matter of religious classification, as in many other things, Hegel was the path-breaker; and his scheme, regarded in the light of its central principle, is still the best. When it came to the applications, to the handling and placing of historical religions, he made some serious slips. His treatment of Buddhism was hasty and shallow. His estimate of the Old Testament was almost absurdly inadequate. His interpretations of history moved at the beck and call of a hard and fast schematism. His estimate of religion in general was marred by an overvaluation of its intellectual, and an undervaluation of its emotional, elements. But his central principle, his coördinating conception, is the true one. He classified all religions in the light of the respect they paid to the principle of individuality.

His first division is the religions of mass; that is, religions wherein the individual is submerged and lost, as a surface attribute is lost in its correlative substance. The second division is religions of individuality; that is, religions in which the individual finds himself as existing in a measure for himself, as carrying his significance and worth in his own heart. The third division is the religion of the spirit, — Christianity, — wherein the individual finds himself as existing altogether for himself and at the same moment discovers that he can draw a

full breath nowhere except in society. He liberates himself altogether from the mass. He becomes a thing in itself. And thereby he becomes, for the first time, a truly historical being, entering with all his power into the historical life of the race, joining in the spiritual commerce and communion that makes the best men of all times contemporary with each other, while keeping a firm foothold within a definite political and social situation.

It were better, perhaps, to replace the phrase "religions of mass" by the older phrase "religions of Nature." Although the term "Nature" is so ambiguous and misleading, yet it is so full of association and suggestion, so workable withal, that it should be retained for popular use. Making that one change, the principle of Hegel's classification still holds. We are to examine and assess the world's religions in the light of the principle of individuality. The goal is the life of the spirit. And by the spirit is meant, in the first instance, that nature of man whereby he becomes permanently interesting to himself, — and that, too, under the conditions of time and space. The spiritual in all its forms is that which is interesting for its own sake. The aim and object of religion is to re-open and dig deeper the springs of interest, when the failures and defeats of existence have

dried them up or caused them to flow feebly. And the religion that is to pass muster in the coming age must so do that work that its loyal adherent shall find in his own being, taken in its relation to the ultimate being, the spring of a joyous and permanent self-interest. At the same time the work must be so done that the individual, when he takes a joyous and sanctifying interest in himself, shall include within his view all the social and political connections that make him a child of the earth.

The representative modern needs at this point to press home his own central principle. Otherwise he may be led, at the place where the ways part, to take the wrong road. The personal equation of our day in religious feeling, in so far as it is not checked and tutored by the Christian creed, is pantheistic. The forces which carry feeling in that direction are so many and strong that the scientific consciousness, as soon as it begins to take a religious color, is wellnigh certain to move toward pantheism. Modern science was birth-marked with a suspicion of final causes; and as it has grown and strengthened, the suspicion has deepened until it is almost instinctive. That is well. It is necessary to the restoration of the visible world to dignity, to the demonstration of its capacity to be permanently interesting, in a word, to be recognized as spiritual. Final causes

were regarded as sallies into science of an alien and disturbing spirit. This is largely true. The theology of the past, could it have had its way, would have rung down the curtain upon the patient scientific investigation of the inner meanings and processes of things, long before scientific interest had played out the first act of its drama. It is essential to that interest, if it is to remain quick and powerful, that the objects to which it devotes itself shall carry within themselves the right to be listened to, until they have told their story in their own way. To allow either the inertia or the timidity or the prejudice or the piety of past ages to disguise themselves as a devout appeal to final causes, would be a surrender, on the part of science, of its right to be.

Now there goes with this insistence upon the dignity and worth of the visible order of things, with this claim that the world of eye and ear shall be heard patiently to the end of its story, a strong tendency to make the visible universe the all in all. What is seen is apt to be taken for the full effect of the unseen. If the category of cause and effect is used on any broad scale, it is pretty sure to be used as Spinoza used it, to the expelling of the potential in favor of the actual. The poetical and imaginative aspects of science, answering to the immensity and infinity of the newly discovered universe and its power to beget an unconsciously reli-

gious feeling in the breast of the scientist, come in to reënforce the presumption arising on the more strictly scientific side. The visible universe is very likely to get itself received as a self-sufficient total. If the term "God" is used it is either to furnish a vent for the feeling within traditional associations or to name the mystery that resides within the visible universe without transcending it. The deism that gave color to the thought of the eighteenth century is dead. Pantheism is the instinctive, the universal tendency. The scientific consciousness, when once it shall have become deliberately and conscientiously religious, is sure to lean strongly in that direction.

Accordingly, it behooves our representative man to be on guard against his own personal equation. He will not fail to remember that it was the desire to guarantee the principle of individuality, by viewing it as kith and kin to ultimate being, that sent him upon the search after a religion. He will remember, also, that the sanctity of the principle of individuality entails the sanctity and primacy of the relationships which constitute society. To ground and bottom the social conscience,—that eager and vigorous sense of obligation which is the inbred law of a living commonwealth,—is his supreme end, his controlling aim. When once he clearly faces this task he finds that the question of final causes returns upon him with a force and

power of appeal that cannot be withstood. No longer are final causes the inroads of a purely transcendental view of life, destroying the harvests which the reason behind the human eye and ear has looked forward to reaping. Final causes are born anew, born of the bosom interests and needs of the visible and human commonwealth wherewith the scientist has cast in his lot. The unity of law, the absolute intelligibility of nature, the growing freedom of clear thought and its ennobling joys, are not things which may be set forth in a mathematical form. They are the life-giving ideals, the regulative and creative concepts, which go before and inspire his thinking. And the social law that overcomes space and time, laying upon the will of man a spell that forces it to outgrow itself and become undying, may not be expressed or described save as an ideal, rising upon society out of its own heart, and bidding it, with an authority not to be doubted or belittled, to be steadily and forever enlarging its own life and aims.

But pantheism does not deal seriously with the principle of individuality. The categories of its philosophy reduce in every case to the categories of identity. It always conceives the ultimate either as self-identical being, or as a substance that devours all distinctions and differences even as Chronos devoured his children. It does not har-

monize with science. It does not square with the being and perpetuity of the Free State. The needs of the human commonwealth will sooner or later force the reason to go up out of every form of pantheism and to look toward the conception of the ultimate being as personal. The personality of God is a concept beset by difficulties. But difficulties become rational, a part of the salvation of reason, when they are necessary difficulties. The nobility of science is not given by its easy answers, but by its mighty problems. When the scientist, who is at the same time a hearty and loyal citizen of the Free State, draws near the verge of things, and looks into the gulf of things unseen; when, in the service of his science and his commonwealth, he seeks through religion to assess the unseen resources of his own universe, he must view the principle of individuality as striking its root deep down into the fundamental being. The conception of the ultimate being as personal, in its main intent, goes to this and no other conclusion. Whatever vulgar uses it has been put to in the past, whatever difficulties beset it in the present, this is the pith and marrow of it. The personality of God means that the substantial, the eternal goods of the universe, are at the service of the principle of individuality; and that the universe does not keep in store for us a tragic disillusionment. The only good thing

we know is our capacity for self-knowledge, for self-mastery, and for the social existence wherein alone self-knowledge and self-mastery can find expression. To believe in the personality of God, the supreme good, is simply to believe that the deepest interests of the universe are in the keeping of a sane and progressive and masterful society.

In the light, therefore, of the problem of free and common knowledge, of a free and common political and social life, the pilgrimage to India upon which some earnest souls are now setting out, becomes pathetic. It is entirely intelligible. Perhaps it is not without reason that the pilgrimage is most in fashion with Americans. For, in an age of nervous bustle and hurry and noise, America, beyond all question, is the noisiest and most nervous of countries. Here, too, more than anywhere else, the individual has become footloose, being allowed, nay compelled, to make his own fortune in spiritual, no less than in material, things. Here, more than anywhere else, the burdens and responsibilities of living press upon the individual conscience. It may be, then, that an explanation of the pilgrimage from America to India is easily found. The noise of the Occident is distracting. The need of quietism is imperious. The inherited Protestant repugnance to Roman Catholic monasticism and quietism, and the scientific discredit thrown

upon the Roman Catholic doctrine of infallibility, make it unnatural for the nervously exhausted soul to enter quietism by that door. So India looks inviting and restful.

Howbeit, inevitable as this flow of religious feeling is, it is a mere eddy in the stream of contemporary feeling. It is to be looked upon with respectful interest. None the less it is to be regarded as a part of the pathos inherent in a generation that finds the times spiritually out of joint. It is not by going to India that the efficient and heroic will is to be armed for its battle with the dangers that beset the Free State.

Indeed, India has never risen to the level where the questions inherent in the constitution of the Free State could be so much as asked. It is idle to speculate upon the course that religious feeling and theory in that country might have taken, had the country entered upon a political career in some measure resembling that of the Occident. It is enough for our purpose that things in the present are what they are. The Occidental, therefore, is not to be drawn away from his true course by the great charm and beauty of Oriental quietism. He knows that pathos is not the order of the day. He is willing and glad that there shall be a home for the weary. But the order of the day is a working will with a force that does not tire and an

edge that does not turn. The peace and quietness demanded by the times are to be found only within a creative, self-renewing purpose. Nothing, therefore, could be farther from the mark than Pfleiderer's prophecy that the recasting of the Christian view of the universe is to take place in India. As regards the main interest at stake, India — apart from what England has given to her — is in the stone age of experience. Her religious practice and her religious theory are flawed to the centre. Her entire religious feeling is shaped and colored by pantheism. But the problem of the Free State drives the mind out of every form of pantheism. The scientist, having outgrown agnosticism, and having resolutely set his reason to sound the unseen depths of the universe, is in no danger of going to India. From a different quarter must come the wealth and strength of that ethical will which is to grip the earth and hold its life fast in the hand of an ennobling purpose.

The purpose must be peculiarly staunch, the will peculiarly strong and tenacious, if the main problem of modern history is not to be retired upon a pension granted to it by monasticism, dividing the field with political absolutism. For the range of social responsibility is wider in our day than in any previous period, and is steadily growing wider. An illustration, partly humorous, per-

haps, yet mainly serious, is the newspaper. It is a strange phenomenon in literature. It is a most significant phenomenon in the experience of our race. The range of human responsibility is determined by the range of interest, and, in the long run, the range of interest is determined by the range of news. The bounds and limits of news are, in the main, the bounds and limits of actual or potential social and political sympathies. Thus the narrow range of foreign news in the French newspapers is rightly put in evidence to show that the French people have a realization of their neighbor's points of view considerably less than that possessed by the English and the Americans. Wherever our curiosity goes, sooner or later our sympathy must follow. Accordingly, the typical English or American newspaper may be fairly taken as an illustration of the vast increase, actual or potential, in the range and scope of social and personal responsibility. Put the wandering merchant or the freebooter or the minstrel of Homer's days, with his budget of lies and news, alongside one of our great dailies, with its budget of lies and news, and, in the vast difference in the range and scope of the news and the lies, you have an apt symbol of the burden which is thrown upon the modern poet's constructive imagination, and upon the ideal citizen's conscience.

The belief in and the passion for freedom, which, in spite of many difficulties and setbacks, are spreading steadily through the world, carry with them an increase in the scope of obligation. No right can long exist unless it frankly and fully recognizes its cognate responsibility. The right to freedom draws after it the responsibility of larger relationships. The social reformer, putting himself to hard labor in the slums, is the type of the free-man, because he knows that only through his neighbor's rights can he secure his own. A true man's chief right, indeed his sole right, the right wherefrom all other rights grow, is the right to full and unhindered self-development and self-expression. The right to self-expression carries with it the right to opportunities. Now the main opportunities of a man are men. Material opportunities are but the threshold to these. A man's main opportunities are his fellows. Through them alone can he express himself. In them alone can he fully find himself. And if he be a sincere believer in freedom,—knowing, too, what that implies,—he must, unless he would deny and unman himself, labor without ceasing to extend the area of right, to create his peers, to multiply the number of those with whom, standing on a level and face to face, he can have argument and communion.

From the point of view of our representative

modern, who enters the debate of religions seeking rest and strength, the chief significance of democracy lies just here. It concerns him even more as a social theory than as a governmental form. It means a vast increase in the area over which full rights are distributed, a vast increase in the number of men who come clearly within the precincts of law, a tremendous multiplication — actual and political — of the men whom a man values as his peers, as those with whom he is to seek communion, and to whom he must seek to impart all his havings and hopings of truth. Universal suffrage, taken as an ideal, if not as a working principle, entails a mighty advance in the depth and scope of duty, a great increase in the tax and strain put upon the will of him who desires to be an embodiment of the purposes that quicken and redeem his commonwealth, and so to become a self-executing law.

There are two things that press upon the mind this intensive aspect of democracy. One is the social question. It means everything or nothing when we come to specific and immediate applications. But taken into the light of theory and principle, it means something which, once stated in the presence of an earnest and consistent democracy, is as clear and simple as it is persuasive and compelling. It means the duty of democracy to enable all men to be men. Each citizen is a

centre of value and interest. As such he must be valued and insured by the laws.

The other thing is the great democratic city, like New York. Here is the place where the decisive battle of democracy is to be fought. It is to become more and more the workshop of opinions, the testing-ground of ideals. Here, then, the permanent purpose of democracy is to be made or marred. The democratic city cannot be governed, as European cities are governed, from the top. It can be governed only by the enlargement of the average capacity for self-government. So the man at the top, the democratic gentleman, must take the place of the policeman by becoming the embodiment of sane and self-renewing interest in the larger life of the community. The ideal citizen in our democracy is he who can face the problems and difficulties of the situation with self-possession and long-mindedness. He must be strong enough to do his increasing duties with a sound heart. If they are done as chores, as a mere matter of bookkeeping, they are not done at all. To be wholly in every duty, to do every duty with full mind, — this, and nothing short of it, constitutes him a true agent of the deeper purpose of history.

The range of the ideal citizen's responsibility goes even further. It includes the belief in the federation of the world. Is that a dream? Woe to the world

that believes in freedom, and yet ceases to dream this dream! The growth of freedom means the spread of the capacity for self-government. And habits of self-government carried to the length of their principle, entail respect for neighboring nations. Antiquity could not conceive of neighboring states of equal dignity dwelling together in peace and amity. There was no alternative between endless war and an all-inclusive empire. But, through the principle of nationality on the one side, and the ideals of self-government on the other, modernity has won the promise of a different ideal. With the acquisition by the world of a single new organism, with the knitting together of the most distant parts of the globe into one small world, every part of which is becoming sensitive to all that happens in every other part, there cannot but be in the future a body and commonwealth of nations. The alternative is a world-embracing empire. And of such an empire history has written a decisive condemnation. In truth, then, when we look to the long run, there is no alternative. So the sum of the matter is, that history is a profane and wasteful process, while the universe possesses no meaning that will stand the test of fearless study, unless the root of individuality goes as deep as the deepest being. What now has Christianity to say to the scientific reason that has won this conviction?

LECTURE IV

THE CHURCH'S CONCEPTION OF REVELATION

THE pivot on which all the thoughts of our representative outsider turn is the principle of individuality and the safeguarding of its future upon the earth ; for without this, history becomes a meaningless succession of struggles between brute passions and brave but pathetic ideals. The time he lives in gives him a widening field of responsibility and duty. The mere fact that the feeling of responsibility exists suggests that the universe contains somewhere within its resources the promise of power to discharge the duty : for, as Bishop Butler says, "moral obligations can extend no further than to natural possibilities." And the scientific modern is not left without witness to the sincerity of the universe touching this matter. To the increased depth and scope of duty corresponds an increasing hold of the earth on the imagination of her children.

The visible universe is being unveiled before the scientist in such majestic beauty that the words of the Psalmist, "The heavens declare the glory of God," come upon him with resistless power. He may not be able to honestly use the name "God," but that the

universe has within it unfathomed meaning, and that this meaning is a real meaning and consequently a meaning free from the risk of inability to fulfil itself, he cannot doubt. And this is the glory or splendor of the universe. The splendor of a thing is the share the eye has in the inner fortune and riches of that thing. Beauty is the eye's heritage of truth. Where beauty is, and so long as it is, there cannot enter the mind the thought that the being which lies within and behind the beauty hides an end or consequence foreign to the being of him whose eyes are the ministers of beauty. The majesty of the visible universe, the ennobling terrors of its infinite spaces, the overpowering unity and prestige of its law, enter the eye through the abounding and multiplying beauties of nature. With them comes the promise of the universe that man's deepest and holiest desire shall be treated by the universe as a sacred thing, and the pledge that the stores of being and energy within the universe contain the wherewithal of an equation between man's desire and his deed. If this be not so, then behind the discoveries of science hides a Satan compared to whom the traditional Devil is as a mischievous boy to a malignant Titan.

"The spirit" cannot long "lay behind the eye," else despair shall come over the modern reason. The main quality of that reason is closeness of relation and eagerness of intellectual sympathy with the

visible order of things, toward which it tends and in which, as its object, it rests. To suppose that the universe is not a total, not a self-sufficing whole, paying to the heart, in the long run, the promises it makes to the eye, were to rob reason of its holiness, making it a profane and vulgar thing. The majestic beauty of the universe is the pledge of its freedom from irony. So the scientist who has once discovered that the welfare of his own reason is inseparable from the success of the free commonwealth cannot doubt the upshot of history. Earth's hold on the imagination of her children is the assurance that the increased depth and scope of duty is not a descent into the hell of an unfulfilled desire. It is the pledge that there shall yet be on earth a rational, coherent, and un-wasteful humanity.

The Greek has come again. It is not alone the hunger for art that betokens his arrival, but all the deepest mental movements of our day. The Greek has come again. Not, however, the Greek as he was. Only for a little while and by way of protest against the monk and the Puritan can the modern citizen of the visible world content himself with the bound and stint of the ancient Greek. He feels a devotion to humanity to which the Stoic ideal made approaches, but far broader and tenderer and more enduring than the Stoic's ideal. With the deeper sense of nature blends a far deeper sense of duty.

Beauty does not tolerate the thought of Fate. Fate closes the thoroughfare of the universe against the struggling will. But beauty, in every one of its forms, calls the mind and will outside the body to claim the entire depth of being as their very own. In the first spring landscape that gladdens the eye, after a long winter and an angry March, the depths of the universe and the surface of the universe are made inseparable. The mechanism and the purpose of life, the means and the ends of being, are set in unison. Even so stands the case with the straining will of the man who takes his duty largely, but has not yet made his peace with religion, and upon whose eye the universe breaks in its majestic beauty. The bottom and the top of things are made to be of a piece. The infinite spaces of the universe do not oppress him as they did Pascal. Filled as they are with the ennobling presence of law, they rather gladden and exalt him. They are not barren, but fruitful. They are the gray and serious background to the splendor of the dawning light.

At the same time, for the modern man, the stars are dead. He may make Kant's ringing words about the starry heavens his own. But the stars are not and cannot be to him what they were to the ancients. The stars are dead. No longer are they the seat and throne of imagination and devotion. The men of old adored them as the unchanging

divine objects exalted above a world of change. And, long after they had lost the right to be worshipped, they continued to be the main objects of the imagination. But they have ceased to be even so much as that. It was finely said about Leonardo that, by breaking down the ancient conception of the stars as unchangeable and incorruptible, he ennobled the earth, making it one of the stars. But we may go further, and say that the stars have become the tributaries of the earth. According to the theory of cosmic evolution, the earth is riper in dignity, further advanced in meaning, than the stars. If imagination is ever again to be masterful and mighty, if the minor notes and swallow-flights of our lesser poets are to be taken up into a triumphal song, then imagination must not mount from the earth to the stars, but from the stars to the earth. Humanity is without any known rival in the visible universe. The stars are dead. The hearth of the visible universe is the mind and heart of man. Imagination must run along the lines of the earth's history.

For the sake of his people and of his race the representative modern consecrates himself to the ideals of freedom in thought and life. If he is to be equal to his duty he must have the help of religion. He seeks to save himself from an enfeebled purpose and a disabled will. At the same time and by the selfsame act he seeks to save society from

splitting in two, the idealists going into the monastery, and the folk unfettered by ideals into marriage and trade. His personal and social salvation is wrought by an act of trust in the sincerity of the universe. Only so can he insure for himself the right of his ideal to be or to become real.

To guarantee to feeling and thought and imagination the sincerity of the universe is the common aim of all religions that have gone outside the parochial bounds of primitive ritual into the broad field of a common human life. Higher polytheism, pantheism, dualism, and monotheism stand together on this ground. They give different bounds to the field of reality, yet the sincerity of the universe, conceived either as an interior or exterior order of things, is the dominant belief of them all. Dualism lops off a large portion of apparent reality, but only to the end that what is left may be conceived as all of a piece. Plato turns a withering fire of criticism upon the supposed reality of the senses, the world of the mere trader and the small politician; but only in order that the true world, the world of the Ideas, the world of the merchants of light, may stand before the inner eye clothed in a robe of beauty that has no seam from top to bottom. Even the most thorough-going religious illusionism has this intention. The entire visible order of things is degraded to the level of a passing show by Hindoo illusionism, but with

the sole purpose of authenticating the inner world of the heart to consciousness and to conscience. When pantheism likens the individual to a bubble born of the sea, it is to the end that he may not allow his folly or his pride to isolate his own petty being, and thus mar or becloud the singleness and simplicity of true being. And when the prophets of Israel say that all the roads of nature and history run toward a Judgment Day, wherein the divine criticism upon injustice shall burn like a consuming fire, the desire which possesses and inflames them is that the divine reality and righteousness may triumphantly assert their right of way through all being.

What the real universe is,—that is a question that has called forth, as answers, many forms of religious feeling and expression. But that the real universe is sincere and wholly of a piece,—upon this they all agree. Indeed, it is the very essence of religion to introduce the struggling will and overburdened purpose of the higher humanity into a world wherein deep breathing is natural; a world wherein the spirit of man, while toiling mightily, works always within its strength.

Put in another form, religion is the art of reconciling the will with its environment. The “environment” is elastic and changeable. As the individual runs his course, the outer world widens, the inner

world deepens. The possibilities and responsibilities of action multiply. In order to continue to be himself, his motives must go deeper, his purposes range wider. At the same time, the difficulties which beset his will grow more numerous and more severe. The outer world denies to his will the right of way, setting up the notice, "No thoroughfare!" His environment is at odds with his will. He is in danger of losing his self-respect. His ability to affirm himself, the success of his will to be, is imperilled. Now, religion is the ultimate and final form of the attempt to maintain man's dignity and self-respect against the threats and attacks of the outer world. If death undertakes to end man's debate with the universe, by "filling his mouth with dust," religion answers the challenge by kindling in him the hope of immortality; or the implicit religion of patriotism and the enthusiasm for humanity lift him beyond the reach of the outer world's attack, by teaching him to eternize himself through devotion to his country and his race.

The environment wherewith the will of the typical modern must be reconciled differs widely from the environment of his forefathers. The universe he knows is incomparably larger. The mechanical view of the universe having, for a time, banished both poetry and religion from his life,

the need of a religion, now coming back upon him, finds him as a man unclothed, stripped bare of the traditions and associations which, in older and simpler days, made religion as much a matter of course as the sky. It also finds him looking out upon a field of obligation whose horizons stretch far and wide. He has taken the free and fearless interpretation of an infinite universe for his function. The homestead of his life lies within the bounds of the Free State. To be high priest of the visible order of things, the embodied law and conscience of a commonwealth which stultifies itself, if all its laws do not aim at bringing the possibility of self-knowledge and self-masterhood to the doors of the humblest man,—this is his duty.

But while his environment differs from that of his forefathers, his need is identical with theirs. Belief in the sincerity of the universe is the underpinning of his plan of life, the mainstay of his programme of ethics. For him, as for all high-minded and forth-putting men, the law holds good that the saving necessity of existence is to find a principle of unity within the ethical manifold. How to find the ethical one without losing the ethical many is his problem. And this he cannot do without a vital, saving knowledge or faith that the purpose which pervades his own being pervades also the

depths of all being. Without that knowledge or faith, his conduct of reason and conscience degenerates into a mere etiquette of morals.

There must be within the manifold of duties, the varied material of ethics, a dominating and authoritative principle of unity. This is the inevitable necessity of any ethical code superior to phariseism. And to safeguard both his own ethics of free thought and the ideals of the free commonwealth, he must put the principle of individuality in enduring league and covenant with the fundamental being. Only so can he hold fast to his belief in the sincerity of the universe. Only so can he attain that "magnificence" of conduct which is "the perfection of all virtues."

The fundamental condition of all noble behavior is to be believed in. The whole mass and body of Christian dogma comes to the conclusion that God believes in humanity. He believes in the stars, else how could they have kept their steadfast ways? He believes in the moon, else how could she draw the seas? He believes in the sun, else how could the sun have kept the fire burning on the hearth of our world? But more deeply still does God believe in the human conscience. That is the simple yet vast conclusion at which the entire body of Christian dogma is aimed. And this is the conclusion to which the student of scientific

ethics must come, by one road or another. He must believe in himself and in his race. And to this end, he must know or believe that the purposes which redeem the history of his race from brutality and vulgarity are taken to heart by the universe. He must believe that he is believed in. Otherwise his ethics are sure to become a bare census and calculus of morals, while his virtue loses all color of magnificence and majesty. The universe whose sincerity is to be guaranteed is the universe within which his eye and ear and hand are loyal citizens. Pantheism cannot guarantee it, because pantheism sacrifices the part to the whole, while science cares for no whole that does not find itself in, and fulfil itself through, the parts. The total of science is an organism. In an organism each part plays the double function of means and ends. Science has often spoken of a law that had no regard for the individual thing, but crushed it under the heel. Such language, however, can be used only in the days when science is eager to pull down man's pride, and to make him know that his little earth goes round the sun. When science passes out of the period of bare denial, and begins to be in the largest sense constructive, seeking a conception that shall include both natural history and human history, without doing hurt to either, then science must cease to use such language.

That is no true law that disregards the individual thing, but either a Fate, if taken realistically, or a mere abstraction, open to all the criticisms that Aristotle passed on Plato's Idea, and open, in addition, to the charge of ethical impertinence. No conduct of a high order is possible unless the agent takes himself seriously. Ethics must give the agent a true ground of pride, after the false ground has been cut from under his feet. Scientific ethics seek the aid of religion in order to gain the possibility of magnificent action, action pervaded with unity and inspired by hope. True law dwells within the part, fulfilling itself in it, revealing itself through it. The universal being, as science views it, is at home in the individual and knows no other home. Pantheism, therefore, in every one of its forms, falls under grave suspicion, as soon as the scientific student of ethics sets himself soberly to the task of so conceiving the personal and social will that they shall not go slack or lame.

The aim of ethics is to find permanent footing for a clear and patient thought that seeks expression in the common tongue, and for an ideal of justice that insures a constantly widening area of privilege. This is the one and sole purpose that renders history a moral process. And to keep it from parting company with the true and essential being of the universe is the motive that must inevitably lead

the scientific student of ethics into the domain of religion. The personal and social will must acquire singleness and intensity of aim. And scientific ethics must so take account of the conditions and possibilities of human behavior that unity shall pervade the heart and enthusiasm possess the will, while the will and heart, keeping their footing in society, run no risk of slipping into a monastic mysticism that degrades the scientific reason and takes the edge off the social conscience. The spiritual man's deepest purpose must be kept from breaking yoke with history. And to bring this to pass in his own case, the scientific student of ethics wills to believe that the universe has the wherewithal to provide for and endow the ethical will. By an act of faith he overcomes the antagonism between the ideal and the real, insuring to the ideal, before his own consciousness and conscience, the right to become real, and thus preserving its authority intact. How to save the ethical will, how to maintain that purpose in man which steadily and unswervingly directs all his resources and bends all his energies toward self-knowledge and self-mastery, and toward self-expression through the history of society,—how to keep the will, which is set up as the supreme good of human life, from going lame,—this is the ethical ideal which the representative modern takes with him into religion.

Facing this representative man of the Occident, and seeking to regain his approval and devotion, the Church finds herself in a situation new and untried. And here she may come to the deeper knowledge of her Lord's mind and thus more truly know herself. The law that governs every form of human reason is the law binding the subject knowing to the object known. The mind is not a mechanical total, which the touch of a hand sets in motion, and whose motion is unaffected by the character of the man behind the hand. It is rather a spirit living within a body of facts, and attaining to the knowledge of itself only in so far as it attains to the knowledge of the body wherein it dwells. This law holds good of the Church. The knowledge of herself which she won when she conquered the Mediterranean world, was won in the struggle with hard and stubborn facts. She must go through the same experience to-day. The knowledge of her Lord's mind which she has brought out of the past is imperfect and halting. The knowledge of herself and her methods which she has brought out of the same past, is partial, and, stubbornly adhered to in the presence of a new situation and a different order of facts, will become morbid and unwholesome. She must face the new and untried situation, realizing that she is the Lord's pupil, and that the school where He tutors her is

the order of facts about her. She cannot withdraw into herself and hope to know herself as the Lord knows her. She must obey the law that sways the experience of the individual reason. She must go forth from herself to reverently and patiently study the new situation.

The supreme problem beginning to press upon the mind and heart of our own generation, and sure to press with even greater insistence and inspiration upon the mind and heart of the generations following us, is the creation of a higher type of terrestrial society. The Church has not as yet directly faced that problem, still less has she put herself under bonds to her Lord to solve it. She won her splendid triumph over the rival religions of the Mediterranean world mainly by answering the question: What is the soul? and what its fortunes in the world to come? The most casual reading of the early Apologetes and the Fathers makes that point as plain as day. The main element in the Church's triumphant appeal to the heathen consciousness was her magnificent certitude concerning the life to come. With it went other splendid things: a fine morality, a superb joy in clean and noble living, an heroic contempt for the small gains of the petty worldly trades when compared with the mighty gains of the merchants of light; and, resulting from all this, an eager, dauntless hope that entered the brain-sick and heart-sick world as the

northwest wind enters a day that has been harassed and disheartened by the heat. But the pith of the Church's power of appeal was found in her magnificent certitude regarding the life beyond the grave.

Of course the work of Christianity in that period is not to be separated from the moralizing and spiritualizing thought and work of the Greeks and Romans. Necessarily Christianity, being the victor in the struggles of religions, fell heir to what was best in the spiritual tendencies and labors of the world it conquered. None the less, Christianity was the informing, creative, coördinating principle within all it borrowed from the heathen world. And the work it did for the regeneration of the social and political world, considered potentially as well as actually, was of the most splendid and imposing sort. Let any man read the Fathers steadily for four or five years. Let him take full and careful notice of the manifold superstitions that dimmed and beclouded their reason. Let him be without mercy in criticising the absurdities of their exegesis. Let him with all frankness expose, as Lecky has done, the mistakes and sometimes perverted direction of their ideals. But then let him remember that while ideals are many and changing, the Ideal is one and unchanging—absolute and unswerving devotion to the best one knows, wedded to an unfaltering faith in the existence of a better than

one's best. Let him keep that fact clearly in mind, and read the Fathers steadily for four or five years, and then let him rise from the reading, if he can and dares, with anything but the most profound esteem and reverence for the superb, the magnificent, ethical spirit that breathes through them. He will have found that, in the history of morals, there is nothing more august or imposing than the vast literature they created. He will not wonder that monastic Christianity conquered the world. He will not wonder that the Fathers got so mighty a hold upon the imagination and conscience of the youthful Occident. They won it because they deserved it. Their contribution to the social and political conscience of modernity is well-nigh incalculable.

But the times have changed. The Church is entering a new period in the hour of her relation to the State. That relationship has been one of the hinges of Occidental history. The distinction between Church and State is peculiar to the Occident, and goes very deep into all its vital interests. Nor has the full history of the distinction been opened. The prophecies of Hegel and Rothe, foretelling the absorption of the Church into the State, are wide of the mark. The State, as we know it, is no less unlikely to absorb the Church than the Church, as we know it, is unlikely to absorb the State. When the Kingdom of God shall have come,

then the State will have absorbed the Church. But, for the clear and logical use of terms now current, it were quite as pertinent to call the result of the fusion the Church triumphant as to call it the State ideal. The distinction between the two is worked into the constitution of the Occident, and, so far as the human eye can see, has still a very long history before it.

We are entering upon a new phase of the relation between the Church and State. The Church has brought large gifts, incalculable strength, to the forces that have shaped and colored our political ideals. The modern State, as regards its deeper differences from the ancient State, in regard to what may be called its spiritual coloring, is mainly the creation of Christianity. The ideals of the great popes and monks of the Middle Ages, the Puritan Revolution, the early days of the French Revolution with their magnificent programme, and many another thing beside, give conclusive evidence upon this point.

Yet the Church has not, hitherto, directly faced the problem either of creating a new social and political order, or of broadening the ideal scope and capacity of the existing order. In the first stage of the relation between Church and State, the Church entered upon a field cleared for her by the Roman State. The Christian view of life was

on the same footing in this respect as the Greek philosophy. The latter was the fruit of leisure made possible by a fairly efficient and developed social and political structure. In comparison with what it had inherited from the political labors of the earlier Greeks, what philosophy gave to the solution of political problems was not very considerable. It gave something, of course. But, relatively, its gift was small. And in relation to the welfare of the wide world this was as it should be. For the function of the Greek mind was to give the world its first free and fearless look at the cosmos. From the point of view of universal history it was of relatively slight importance what Greek philosophy did for the Greek State. Even so is it of relatively little importance, in the light of universal history, what Christianity did or did not do for the political order of the Roman Empire. The Christianity of the first centuries paid in full its debt to humanity when it built up a Catholic Church strong and secure in the right and power to tutor and train modernity into a grand passion for the ideal interests of humanity.

It does not follow, however, because a certain question would have been impertinent in one stage of a relationship, that it is impertinent in a following stage. The Catholic Church of the first centuries entered upon a field made ready for her by

the political order of the Empire. That there could have been no Church without the Empire has passed into a commonplace. And the Church bred quiet and submissive citizens. No question about that. But the Church's direct end and aim touched citizenship only in passing. To create citizens was neither her work nor her aim. Her eyes were fixed fast on heaven, and to lead immortal souls thither by the direct road of the monastic life, or of a secular Church mastered and guided by men who were monks at heart if not in fact, soon became her work and her conscious aim. The question—What does the Church owe to the State?—was not even asked in any explicit way. It could not be asked, by reason of the fact that, because the State was a heathen State, the shadow of a blighting suspicion fell across its claim upon the will and imagination of Christians. And when Christianity became the religion of the Empire, the time for asking and pressing the question had gone by, the reason and conscience of the world being in full flight toward the monastery, and the political order of things having lost the secret of commanding the spirit of humanity.

The consequence of that relationship between a Christian Church and a heathen State, prevailing all through the critical and formative period of Christian theory, has been felt ever since. Augus-

tine put the distinction flatly, almost brutally, in his "City of God." He said that the State is the City of Cain, founded by lust, upheld by force. And Augustine, though he did not say it, yet he might consistently have said what Tertullian said about marriage, namely, that its one justification was that it brought into the world maidens who should never marry. Even so he might consistently have said, regarding the State, that its one justification was that, by putting a bit in the mouth of the brute, it rendered possible the existence of a Church that bred souls into the repose and peace of the monastic life. No modern puts the matter as he put it. Yet the consequences of the situation whose logic he caught and expressed, — the broad separation between a heathen State and a Christian Church, — endure to our day, and show their hand by shaping the statements of Christian theory. For example, their effect may be seen in a book so recent as Bishop Harris's lectures upon Church and State, delivered upon this foundation. The fallacy of identifying the modern Christian State with the "Cæsar" and the "world" of the New Testament still lives on, and is the mother of confusion.

The question that was once impertinent is now the order of the day. The State is no longer a heathen State. The convert to Christianity does

not sever or weaken his connections with it in order to become a Christian. On the contrary, the State, whatever it may be by origin and however largely force may enter into its preservation and maintenance, is none the less an ethical and spiritual agent. It is Christian by name and by its essential nature. And in that State the representative Occidental, who has been alienated from Christianity, and upon whom Christian apologetics masses its arguments, has his whole stake. His main question is not—What is the Soul? and what its fortune in the world to come? but—What is history? What is the spiritual significance, what the ethical worth of the life of our race in time and space? And toward what unknown ends does it move? The question of the soul is with him a secondary question. And it must be put second by apologetics. We throw away our advantage, and blunder rather than march into battle, if we do not make the principle of individuality, as realized in and expressing itself through an ever more and more coherent and unwasteful social life, the ground where the battle is to be fought.

What then does the Church owe to the State? is the pertinent, the compelling question. The conception of the State is entering the most critical stage in its whole career. The element of

freedom has become one of its primary attributes. By the experience of centuries a method of self-government has been attained whereby the want of harmony between freedom and an enduring State covering broad sweeps of territory,—a lack of harmony before which antiquity was helpless,—has been overcome. Along with it the principle of nationality has entered the world's politics. Thereby the necessity of a world-state, imperial in aim and method,—that other end and despair of antiquity,—has also been overcome. Thus the need to recognize and safeguard one's neighbor's rights in order to be sure of one's own, which has entered the domestic politics of the Free State, has also, in a faltering but indisputable fashion, begun to enter foreign politics.

But this conception of the Free State, at the very moment when it would seem to be claiming the earth for its heritage, is brought into grave question. The old dogmatic foundations of belief in a moral order have been, in the opinion of considerable masses of laboring men, rudely shaken, if not destroyed. The views that used to color the motives of men, and, even when not masterful, gave them a certain ideal aspect, have lost standing and authority. The other world looms far less largely than in former days before the eyes of the average Occidental, even in his most seri-

ous moments. The laboring classes are not to be contented with a simple appeal to heaven. They are beginning to refuse to wait for heaven, and to insist that the question of justice and righteousness shall be debated and thought out here. At the same time they are strongly intrenched within the very citadel of the Free State. Self-respect and self-consistency compel the latter to give them an eager and patient hearing. To silence their voices by force would be to sound the death-knell of the Free State itself. That State is committed by its own nature and constitution to a belief in their right of suffrage. The suffrage has been given; it cannot be taken back. The men who insist that our ideals of justice shall go far wider and far deeper, becoming vastly more inclusive and efficient than they now are, have the spirit and conscience of the democratic commonwealth on their side.

Their question is imperious and pressing. Will the democratic ideal stand fire? Is it able to realize itself? or is it a brave dream which takes the air in the early day when, as in America but a little while ago, land so cheap as to be well-nigh free offered rich opportunities to the common individual? and will it, as population thickens and the food question brings the world down to hard pan, fail to stand the fierce heat of the sun at full noon, and

become an historical reminiscence, availing just so far as to embitter toil and give a sharp edge to sarcasm, and sufficing by the way to send the chosen spirits of the race back into the monastery from which they had rashly come?

Our age is a missionary age in every sense of the word. The whole world being one for the first time in its history, every part of it neighbor to every other part, the field thrown open to the Church's work, and appealing quickly and strongly to the imagination, is so vast that every resource must be called out, every energy rallied. Furthermore, Christianity, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has become a missionary to human reason for the first time since its establishment in the Roman Empire. For fifteen hundred years it was firmly seated in the heart of Europe, queen and sovereign both of will and reason, taken for granted, debated, if at all, in a formal, not a vital, way. But now Christianity is disestablished before reason. A strong and self-confident system of knowledge, devoted to the study and admiration of the visible universe, is in the field. It cannot be stampeded by an appeal to the feelings, nor taken off its feet by summoning in the possibilities of a future life, nor put to silence by authority. It must be reverently reasoned with on its own ground. Christianity is a missionary before reason and to reason.

The fundamental necessity is to be believed in. The ethical will, seeking to moralize the life on earth, is driven into religion in order to establish or discover a covenant between man's redemptive purpose and the fundamental being of the universe, to the end that the principle of individuality may be thoroughly grounded. The Greek is again upon the earth, looking at the universe with wide-open and fearless eyes. But his task is unspeakably greater and more difficult than in the old days. The burden of it forces him to seek religion, if he would be saved from bankruptcy. Christianity goes to meet him. He will not give up one jot or tittle of what is precious to him. He will not have a religion that throws suspicion upon the dignity and worth of the visible universe and the historical life of the race. The religion that is to win him must conquer him by helping him to believe in himself.

The source of all permanent power is found in interpretation. Christianity must meet the ethical will on its own ground, and interpret it to itself. Everything that has sat near the hearth of the world's affections has been forced, sooner or later, to invest and insure its gains in the idea of God. The modern Occidental, the new Greek, must do likewise. He must be enabled to believe in himself, with a belief that shall not flinch in the face of all

the difficulties that are sure to beset the work of making individuality coterminous with humanity. He must be interpreted to himself by seeing what is dearest to him supported by the idea of God. The work of Christianity on the home field is not just the same as it was in the age when the Catholic Church established herself as the world's guide and confessor. Then the task was to create saints, who, far withdrawn from the world's trade and politics, lived on their knees in adoration of God's mystical being and beauty. The saints are to be created still, but they are to change their manners and their residence. It is no longer the monastery, but the heart of the masterful political societies of the Occident, where they are to live their deepest life. The Church will not shape political platforms nor formulate economic programmes. But she will bring her thought and her catechism to bear upon the work of so tempering the wills of men that they shall be heroic and great-hearted citizens of the free commonwealth. The monastic saint cannot conquer the low politician nor the vulgar millionaire. He cannot get to close quarters with them. What is needed is the saint in citizen's clothes, to meet the petty politician and the vulgar millionaire on their own ground of politics and trade, to force the fight home, and to keep the fight up without flagging or faltering, showing

that God is on the side of the strongest battalions, because the strongest battalions are of His own recruiting and training. This is the work set before the missionary will and reason of the Church. This is the thing that Christianity must do, in order to carry off from the great debate of comparative religions the prize of the world's allegiance.

In the doing of the work, in living the missionary's life, both in the world at large and before reason, the Church will clear up her own mind and come to the deeper knowledge of her Lord and His ways. The individual reason is saved by problems; philosophy, the coherent intellectual life, is created by wonder. What holds good of the individual reason, holds good also of the collective reason, even when that reason works through the institutions of a Church. The Church's reason is to be purified and saved by problems. The profession and parade of infallibility has long dulled the Christian reason. Infallibility, seriously believed in and practised, makes strenuous knowledge impossible, and puts austere and merciless self-examination out of the question. The Head of the Church is purifying His Church by sending mighty problems against her, problems that beat the drum at her very doors. Christianity must come forth, light-armed and eager, leaving behind, as mere baggage, much that the past held dear, and claiming no authority save that

which inherently belongs to the power to create and inspire manhood.

The Church is to clear her mind in order that she may clearly put to herself the question — What is revelation? It is a question that is thrust upon her by her own constitution. The central and controlling fact in her experience is her relation to the Bible. The relation between Church and Scripture goes to the bottom of Christianity. The formation and fixing of the Canon was an essential condition of the process by which the Catholic Church was founded. There was not, in those days, any antithesis between Church and Bible, just as there had been no such antithesis in the Jewish Church. In both cases tradition and Scripture met upon a common footing and joined forces. The split between Scripture and tradition, the consequent separation between the idea of the Bible and the idea of the Church, was a thing altogether unheard of.

Yet in spite of the fact that the distinction was for so many centuries unemphasized, it is vital to our religion. The Bible is distinct from tradition and sovereign over it. Christianity must frankly confess itself to be a book-religion. The term has disagreeable associations and suggestions. Possibly, it may some time be dislodged and supplanted by a term that expresses the matter in a way that shall be freer from misleading association. Meantime, we must

frankly accept the term. What is meant by it when it is used, not as a reproach, but in a positive way, is, that the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion, its appropriation of the right to become the asylum and citadel of the moral ideals of the world, is bound up with a history possessing a certain distinguishing shape and color. This history is recorded and authenticated by a certain book. And this is what we mean when we say that Christianity is a book-religion.

In apologetics it is well, as a matter of strategy, to forbear that stiff standing out for a precise use of terms which is proper and becoming in dogmatics. It is best to take terms as they come to the hand, rough-hewn though they may be. I repeat, then, that Christianity is a book-religion, meaning thereby that its fortunes are all bound up with the character and career of a certain book called the Bible. The man of the eighteenth century who was wholly unable to make a love-match between the ideal and the historical, used the term as one of reproach. We, however, can appropriate it for our present use without fear; because, to the consistent scientist, the literature that records the thoughts of men is as much a part of the universe as are the stars. A timeless book is a thing built into the very framework of the human mind. And a book like our Bible, with its marvellous span and scope of

human experience in God, its record of a divine revelation through that experience, may go more deeply into permanent consciousness than the beauty of our sunsets, being indeed just as truly a part of Nature, when the elastic constitution of the term "Nature" is considered, as the sun himself.

Christianity, then, is a book-religion. It stakes its hope of world-conquest upon the character and qualities of the Book, wherein it finds a record of revelation. And the Church, seeking to know herself better in trying times, to the end that she may the better know what her Lord would have her do, must seek a deeper knowledge of the Bible, a more intimate understanding of the kind and quality of experience embodied in it, and of the revelation delivered through that experience. So the question—What is revelation? is the central and controlling question.

The question, What is revelation? means just this: What is the nature of the process whereby the heart of all being comes into quickening and creative relationship with the heart of earth, with man's reason and conscience? The divine method and manner, that is to say, the ultimate, the deepest, the most significant method and manner of delivering truth to man, is, in a way, more important than the matter delivered. Of course, strictly speaking, there can be no separation between the method and the matter. Just as in a perfect work of art substance

and form are not to be separated, so with a classical and canonic self-expression of the Godhood. But, taking terms as they are commonly used, it may be said, for purposes of argument, that the divine method of self-communication is more important than the matter imparted. We say, regarding science, that it is not mainly a body of data, however novel and imposing, but a mental attitude, an intellectual habit and disposition. In the same way we would say that the question, What is revelation? is mainly concerned with the divine attitude and bearing toward man. It is life in its quality, not in its quantity, that we are dealing with. How does God bear himself toward man? How does the unseen heart and core of things relate itself to the heart of earth, to history?

Ideals come and go. But the Ideal abides. By its grace and help alone do ideals live, and by its authority they die. It is the Ideal in man, man's kith and kinship to something forever better than his best, that keeps him forever within sound of the trumpet of the spirit. Even so with revelation. Its ideals may change and pass: St. Paul's views about women's veils do not bind us. But the ideal of revelation is eternal. And that ideal, to use current terms in the current sense, concerns the manner of God's communion with man, rather than the matter He imparts. How does God bear Himself toward

history? What price and value does He put upon the things dearest to the ethical spirit? What happens when the human becomes intimate with the divine? What befalls the principle of individuality?

What are the things accounted significant in the sight of the God who makes known His being and His will? What road is taken by the divine energy and purpose as it enters history? The thing we are to be zealous for, in the interest of apologetics, is the safe keeping of the ethical will, the will bent upon the eternal goods, those goods that can be shared by all without diminishing the part enjoyed by each. For that is what is meant, at bottom, by the things eternal. They are the things that may be shared, nay, that must be shared, if they are to be kept. The timeless books, the possessions for all time, are the intellectual goods shared by widely separated places and generations. The higher the good, the more truly liberal the truth, the greater is its inner need to universalize itself. Now, it is the ethical will, the will bent and set upon the goods which belong by right to all men that we are to safeguard when ethics enter into partnership with religion. What, then, is revelation? After what fashion does the divine energy, as it enters history, treat the ethical will? In the interest of that will we are to be jealous of religion itself, looking hard at its claims, at its assumption of authority.

The existence and problems of the Free State force the reason to go outside every form of pantheism. The ideal of justice calls for a breed of men who shall execute the law upon themselves, who shall put themselves and their commonwealth steadily to shame so long as a single one of its members has no true inheritance to dwell in. The conception upon which democracy rests is that each man shall be true fellow and comrade to every other man. In a Free State the cardinal duty is the creation or development of one's peers. How, then, does the divine self-impartation which comes to us through religion, relate itself to the existence and problems of the Free State?

The representative modern seeks religion in order to give saving unity to his ethics. Religious feeling is the one kind of feeling that is or may become truly universal. It is through religion that the ethical will seeks to insure its belief in itself by making or discovering a covenant with the fundamental being of the universe. The divine being is the universal being—whatever that may be. Religion is the form of feeling wherein the individual will finds itself at home and at peace with the universal being. But the pearl of great price, in the sight of the ethical will, is individuality, self-knowledge and self-mastery. So we press the question, What is revelation? How does the uni-

versal being bear itself toward, how does it relate itself to, the principle of individuality?

What, now, was the conception of revelation that took shape in the period when Christianity established itself in the Mediterranean world? If we once know what that is, we can tell offhand what conception has dominated the Church ever since. For that period is the classical period of the Church's experience and reason. In the matter of the Canon, the Creed, Canon Law, and Church government, the foundation work was done then. On that field appeared in clear light the mother-ideas which birth-marked the thought of all succeeding centuries. Knowing what conception of the Bible the Church of the Mediterranean world formed; and knowing what use was then made of the Bible; and seeing, too, how that conception and use answered to the needs and conditions of the period to which the Church then ministered, we shall see clearly why apologetics must change the conception and use of the Bible in order to meet the conditions and needs of our own period.

Every great period is many-sided. A brief treatment of it, whatever the point of view, is sure to seem unfair, if not worse than that, trifling; because lack of space compels the writer to strike the main note of the period and to strike nothing else. But the risk must be taken. Happily, the

danger is not as great as it appears, by reason of the fact that the part played by the period was in every way so critical and decisive. Its relation to antiquity behind it, and to modernity before it, give it a prerogative character, possessed by no other period of church history. Hence, everything about it is characteristic: for a great age is like a great man, whose whole being is deeply tinged with individuality. The thought and feeling of the period run decisively in one direction, free in the main from cross currents.

It is not difficult to find the main current of the period. Its central ideas are those which must dominate in every age of the Church, unless Christianity is to cease to be one of the notes of Catholicity. The Unity of God as the underpinning for the unity and coherence of human life; the dogma of Creation, dislodging dualism from consciousness, and pushing the thought of an untiring and unwasting purpose through the whole material of human life; the belief in the Incarnation, putting down the halting, limping theology of Arius, and opening a thoroughfare for reason and conscience from the centre of things to the outmost edge of things; the concept of the Trinity, aiming to carry the thought of relationship and fellowship into the depths of the divine being, — only the terminology of these ideas can change, the ideas themselves are eternal. But

all of them, as they were then conceived, took their coloring from a period in which citizenship had lost heart; so that the political life of the age no longer possessed primary spiritual meaning. Philosophy had taken the veil in the Neoplatonic theory of intellectual ecstasy. Even gentile ethics had lost footing, and had slipped into an other-worldly religion. The representative man, upon whom apologetics directed its forces, and whose needs gave direction to the inner life of the Church, was a man whose entire essence was summed up in the statement that he had a soul. His main need was an infallible certitude touching the fact of the life beyond the grave.

He was not a citizen in the fundamental sense. In that statement is contained the gist of all that can be said about the conditions under which the traditional conception of the Bible took shape. The State was not interesting in itself, and at first hand; consequently it was not spiritual. Like the Jewish Church before it, the Catholic Church was built up within a great heathen State in which history forbade its taking more than a second-hand interest. The affairs of the State were no part of the main business of the spirit. This was the case when the Empire was in its prime, and when the utmost that was to be expected from the Church in the line of concession to a power that so easily became a per-

secutor was, on the side of theory, the abstract doctrine that the powers that be are ordained of God, and on the side of practice, a passive though loyal obedience. An active share in the affairs of state was, in the very nature of things, well-nigh impossible.

By the time that Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, the Christian view of things had acquired a set toward the monastic ideal so deep and strong that the fact of establishment was unable to alter the trend of feeling. Christians could now take the most active share in the affairs of state. Byzantine theory, so far as there was any, exalted the emperor nearly to the right hand of God. But the interior interests of Christian living had already fixed themselves in another quarter. The State, so far as the deepest spiritual concerns of the race were involved, was a thing altogether second-hand. This is the sum and the substance of the conditions under which the conception of revelation took shape. The real Church, the Church within the Church, was in process of becoming what in the Middle Ages it actually became, what the Roman Catholic Church, the lineal descendant of mediævalism still is, an out-and-out monastic Church. The reason of the Church, like the reason of the heathen world, ended by taking the veil.

Let me make the songs of my people, and I care not who makes the laws, was a profound saying; for

the song comes from the deep places of the heart, where being and purpose are one. The songs that sprang from the heart of monasticism and its splendid, impassioned mysticism, were vastly more significant than any amount of prosaic theory in praise of the Christian empire. Facts are not truly facts, facts of the mind, unless they touch the mind to the quick. The facts of the political and social order, the facts that make up the mass of history, were not real facts to the serious Christian reason. It stood aloof from them. It had no occasion for, and no vital conception of, real history.

Here is the home and workshop of the theory of infallibility. A kind of rule of thumb infallibility is practised by the great bulk of mankind. But the formulated theory of infallibility, and the systematic attempt to work the theory, go naturally and necessarily with the monastic and ascetic view of life.

The theory goes with monasticism and its attendant mysticism. On this point the mental history of the world to which the Catholic Church ministered, throws clear light. Neoplatonism, the deepest symptom of that world, was in effect a confession that reason was bankrupt; for it openly declared that the only way to reach the saving unities of reason was by an ecstasy wherein reason swooned into the vision of God. The world's reason was bankrupt, just as the world's will, the common though half-unconscious

purpose and endeavor that gives birth and breeding to political and social organization, was dead. Volitional and intellectual bankruptcy meant that the immediate objects of consciousness were empty of worth and meaning. The present had no confidence in itself, no respect for itself. It was mentally and spiritually empty. And out of the depth of conscious emptiness it cried out for an authority that should be infallible, coming from a source outside the reason and the will, and laying upon them the spell of an infallible word issuing from a sacred past.

Here, then, is the breeding-ground of that conception which makes infallibility the central and controlling characteristic of revelation. Its climate and atmosphere is a radical and destructive doubt touching the meaning and worth-while, both of the social will and the philosophic reason. The scepticism that preceded Neoplatonism is portentous on the one side, while the steady invasion of the religious consciousness by a noble and impassioned monastic ideal is equally portentous on the other. The present has no value or dignity. It turns loose upon itself a consuming doubt. The sacred past alone can save it. And that past, God's medium and prophet, speaks through a sacred, infallible book.

The practice of infallibility also goes with monasticism. The rule of thumb infallibility, the extemporaneous infallibility which is one of the natural human

equipments in the struggle for existence, has no imperial scope or sway. The Protestant or lay kind of infallibility is bungling and awkward, to say nothing of the fact that it ultimately reduces to Tom Paine's dictum—My mind is my Church! The Church that would exercise the art of infallibility with any show of lasting success, must organize herself upon a basis altogether distinct from the basis upon which the experience of the lay world is organized. The sacred deposit of authoritative opinion concerning the life to come must touch and possess the bankrupt present through the medium of a sacred tradition, guarded and administered by a priesthood standing, as far as possible, outside the world's affairs. The governing and teaching church must be monasticized and ascetic.

When once this conception of revelation is deeply rooted and firmly grounded, the conception of truth as twofold must sooner or later take possession of the mind. It may be the business of a thousand years to bring it to clear expression; and, in fact, nearly a thousand years elapsed between the establishment of the view and its explicit statement in the fourteenth century. But the almanac has nothing to do with logic; and a thousand years are as a day in the commerce of the world's life. This conception of revelation makes inevitable a broad gulf between reason and revelation. For reason is

lawfully married to the visible order of things. The trustworthiness of consciousness, the integrity of the understanding, the coherence of experience in its terrestrial stage, are its indispensable postulates. But the conception of revelation that took shape in the mind of the Catholic Church, in the course of her ministrations to the Mediterranean world, results in a sheer break across the life of reason. Things divine are on one side, things human on the other.

Moreover, if the monastic ideal that underlies this conception of revelation be thoroughly worked out, there appears in the sphere of conscience a break parallel to this break in the sphere of reason. Morality comes to recognize two distinct levels of obligation and behavior. Upon one level stands the conscience that goes into the family and the State. Upon a separate and higher level stands the conscience that is in full earnest with things divine, and has heroically forsaken the social life in order to be true to itself. Ethics become self-destructive; for consistent ethics demand an absolute coherence of conscience and a morality all of a piece. The civic and the domestic conscience are robbed of their splendor when stripped of their integrity; and there remains for them no career save to be policed by an authoritative monastical priesthood. Necessarily, then, there ensues a casu-

istry that honestly but blunderingly attempts to guide and hallow a life of which the priest is not truly a part, and which he does not and cannot know at first hand.

Thus ethics and religion part company. Not that Christian monasticism has no ethics; its ethics are impassioned. But ethics, in the sense in which the scientific student of ethics uses the term,—ethics of the kind that drive him into religion, the ethics of the personal and social will seeking the wherewithal of a coherent and unwasteful common life, ethics as the modern man must understand them,—part company with religion. The man of science, who would fain be a great-hearted citizen, desires religion to the end that his morality may discover the permanent source of admiration and devotion. Without deep and self-renewing admiration morality becomes a matter of details; conduct sinks to an etiquette, and that way madness lies. The scientist therefore seeks to find in religion springs of admiration and devotion, the secret of an impassioned and self-renewing unity within the ethical manifold. But he will not accept a religion that makes him buy unity by sacrificing the manifold which he seeks to unify. The Occidental, even when he makes a business of quietism, has never been able to match the Oriental, who slips out of all relationships as one would slip out

of an ill-fitting garment. And to this incapacity, and its resulting compromise with the social principle, the monastic Church called Roman Catholic owes a large part of her prestige and power; the lay world is not only policed by the sacerdotal world, but, by grace of a divine inconsistency, the very relationships which the monk disowns are, by the monastic priest, endowed with sacramental virtue. None the less, in principle, the social will and the ethics which hallow it are dishallowed and degraded. Religion and ethics part company.

All these faults resolve themselves into one, a faulty and half-finished idea of God. The great debate of Christianity with heathenism made the conceptions of Creation, the Incarnation, and the Trinity native to the Occident. But the battle was not wholly fought out, the Christian thought of God and man was not wholly carried through. Theology, as the Bible knows it, is inseparable from the doctrine of society. The theology of the Fathers, with all its earnestness and strength, being partly untrue to the Christian view of society, could not be wholly true to the Christian idea of God. The principle of fellowship, of a kind of individuality that can only realize itself in, and come to the knowledge of itself through society, is not carried as deep as the deepest being of God. The heathen concept of the self-identical, relation-

less One was not altogether expelled from consciousness.

In the Middle Ages a distinction was broadly drawn between God's being and His will. Patristic theology knew no such distinction. Yet it is the legitimate outcome of the ideas attending the concept of revelation shaped by the Catholic Church in the Mediterranean world. Let revelation be thought of as a mystical process whereby a body of infallible truth, out of vital relation with the historical experience of the race, was intrusted to an infallible Church out of sympathy with the dignity and spirituality of the visible order of things, and the distinction which Occam drew plainly and broadly between God's being and His will is implicit in the Church's mental process. The visible order of things rests upon God's will. There is no thought of impugning the doctrine of creation. But God's self-revelation in Scripture is made to break yoke with the logic of creation. His being and His will draw apart. And this means that God is not in full earnest with the fact and process of creation. The eagerness, the energy of God, do not go whole-heartedly into the history of the race.

What is revelation? How are the things deepest in God and dearest in His sight to come near to and become intimate with us? By what road do

the redeeming energies which issue forth from the unseen resources of the universe, in order to give unity and coherence to the purposes and labors of the ethical will, enter consciousness? How does the being of God so bring itself to bear upon the ethical will that the man who is struggling to eternize himself finds, in his relationship to the divine being, the most intimate of all his obligations? We have seen that the conception of revelation held by the Catholic Church of the first centuries was colored by a certain view of things. It is idle to ask what was the resultant loss and what was the gain. A work of infinite importance was to be done, the conquest of antiquity, the training and catechising of early modernity. The Church that did the work so well must have been fitted to do it. Now, ideas are not atomic, they are organic to each other; and the color given by the Church to the conception of revelation must have been part of the Church's divinely given equipment for her great work. But times change. The world that offers itself to the attention of apologetics to-day differs deeply from the Mediterranean world. So apologetics, while working out the same central ideas, must take a different turn.

The typical man of the Mediterranean world, upon whom the Church bent her attention, found himself forced to go outside the family and the

State in order to meet God face to face, and be made whole. To this man the Church addressed her conception of revelation. The historical nature of the Bible, if not lost sight of, was not clearly seen. The process of inspiration was, for the most part, so thought of that the man who was inspired looked down upon the earth from the clouds. The prophets, the men through whose experience the mind of God opened itself to the world, had walked in the highway of history, the main travelled road of the common life. But the men who now interpreted the prophetic word followed a path that led into asceticism. The beatific vision, that unveiling of the Supreme Good which alone can make the heart whole and the will stanch, came not near the statesman or the philosopher. It was the reward and the prerogative of the monk. Consequently, the conception of revelation, which then took shape and which has colored the thought of the Church ever since, was partly out of square with the Bible itself.

LECTURE V

PROPHECY AND HISTORY

REASON, as we have seen, must identify itself with the interests of society, in order to maintain its own integrity. The scientific reason cannot follow the mystical reason into the monastery: it cannot even go with the Greek philosophic reason into the life of the private individual, dwelling apart from political responsibilities and dangers, and disburdened, as far as possible, of social obligations. The scientific reason, being enamoured of the visible universe, must enter society with entire conviction and a resolute purpose. By all it holds dear, the conclusion that terrestrial society is capable of indefinite betterment is brought home. Science, the individual's view of the universe, is bound up with that Free State which is the individual's venture in politics, and which rests at bottom upon a solid and impassioned faith in the possibility of steadily extending the area of individuality.

Our typical modern, if he follows his thoughts down into a controlling and coördinating conception, finds himself driven, by all the energy and

prestige of the visible universe, to make human history the centre of significance, interest, and worth. Deepening self-knowledge and strengthening self-mastery are not to be attained except in communion with society in its full breadth and scope. And this fact draws after it the conclusion that history yields itself to a philosophical interpretation, that a philosophy of history is a possible and a necessary thing. The origin of the philosophy of history proves that it is the modern and scientific equivalent of the older theodicy. For, when the negative thought of the eighteenth century had ceased to be satisfying, when the individual was no longer eager to disown his past; and when, at the same time, the visions of the other world had lost much of their absorbing interest, there remained, for the man who would live nobly on the earth, no theodicy but the philosophy of history, no other means of proving or saying that the divine or purposeful element in the experience of the race does, in the long run, control the mechanical and accidental element.

The individual's knowledge of himself has a fate hidden at the bottom of it, and brings up at last in an insoluble self-contradiction unless history, the autobiography of human society, be increasingly coherent and un wasteful. For history is to society what memory is to a man; and Augustine gave

us a very deep word when he said that God hath fixed His seat in our memory. The individual can know himself and reveal himself only in and through society. As little, then, in the experience of that society as in his knowledge of himself can reason and conscience tolerate the presence of a Fate, of an unrelated and unsympathetic element. History must be the broader outlook of the individual's memory. He must be able to hold rational and intelligent conversation with the past as well as the present. There must be a philosophy of history; which means that there must be in human experience, taken in the large, a unitary purpose, through communion wherewith men may eternize themselves, ceasing to be mere gain-getting men, and becoming seekers after the eternal goods, the goods that belong by right to all. And this purpose must be able to impart itself more and more, and to carry conviction with the growing bulk of mankind.

Toward this end the lines of imagination run no less sure and straight than the lines of reason and conscience. The stars have become kinsmen to the dust. The earth has come level to all the admiration which any part of the visible universe can claim. The work of the imagination is henceforward plainly marked out. The imagination must have free play in scientific ethics, if the ethical will

is to express itself in morals and manners of a noble kind. But the stars, so far as we know them, come no higher than the earth beneath our feet. They have made the earth the heir of all their majesty. Beauty must continue to lay its refreshing and invigorating spell upon the will. Now beauty refuses to dwell in a fractional world. It demands totality. The fundamental being of the visible universe must, then, be thought of as offering itself through that purpose of the higher humanity which makes for the spread of individuality. The imagination of the modern Occidental runs with his conscience and his reason.

The Church, facing this typical man in his conditions and with his needs, finds herself forced to examine her apologetical method. First of all, she must cleanse herself of infallibleness. The dogma of infallibility has played its part, and will continue to play a part before the despairing, sceptical, brain-sick reason; but before the self-respecting reason it simply cumbers the ground. The infallibility of the Bible itself must just as emphatically be disowned, so far as the uses of apologetics are concerned. Even if the Bible were infallible, its infallibility would be a quality to be impressed upon the converted reason, through the intimate intercourse of devotion, not a quality to be displayed to and employed upon the outside reason.

But, in truth, the idea of infallibility, whether it attach itself to the Bible or to the Church, has no kinship with, and no appeal to, the reason of earnest philosophy or thorough science. For the premise, both of philosophy and science, is the sincerity and unity of reason. But the idea of infallibility took shape in an age when reason had become sceptical and despairing, when the sap had gone out of the secular life, and the glory had departed from the visible world. It has no part or lot in the permanent mental life of our own time. And whenever it is honestly and consistently used, it amounts to the coronation, in one form or another, of religious conventionalism. Apologetics condemns it as intellectual impurity, as an incapacity to see objects as they are, and to use them along the lines of their own interior meaning. Christianity stands and falls with the Bible. By her use and interpretation of the Bible, the Church makes or loses her fortune. The Bible must be seen as it is, and used along the lines of its own interior meaning. The hand must fit the weapon. And the first condition of true insight and use is a total disclaimer of infallibility, so that the Christian consciousness shall meet the scientific reason upon its own grounds of patient and fearless examination.

The long and the short of the judgment passed

upon the traditional appreciation and use of the Bible, is that the Bible was not viewed mainly as history. The ancient Church put her Book to splendid uses of devotion. But in her mind the Bible was not primarily the record and witness of an historical movement. This stands out in her principles and methods of interpretation. With slight exceptions here and there, exceptions bulking just large enough to emphasize the fact that the deepest tendencies of interpretation set overwhelmingly in the other direction, the exegesis of the ancient Church, as a whole, was boldly and systematically allegorical. Now, from the allegorical point of view, the value of a given fact is not found in its character as a fact, but in its character as a symbol. Philo's system and methods are the type and standard; and to Philo the Old Testament as a history was nothing. It was not a body of facts, of divine deeds, a display of divine energies working in time and space toward an historical goal, but a divine and canonic body of spiritual ideals, all of them looking away from the world of space and time, and leaning toward the monastery. The allegorical interpretation does not conceive revelation to be a true history.

To go deeper. The allegorical method hinges upon the distinction between a world of sense and a world of reason. On the one side it summed up

and expressed the spiritual tendencies of the heathen world, after the downfall of the Greek political ideals. On the other side, it expressed the logic of Judaism, after the Jews had been dispersed into lands where they could not enter into any wholesome relations with the social and political life of their time and place. The hinge upon which everything turned was the distinction between sense and reason. The world of sense is unreal. The world of reason is real. Consequently, the facts which combine and cohere to make an organic total called history have no value or meaning in themselves, inasmuch as they are part and parcel of the world of sense. They are valuable only as symbols. They are not true gold, but bare token money.

Now this gainsays the Bible. For in the Biblical view of things, the hinge upon which everything turns is not the contrast between a world of sense and a world of reason, but the contrast between a world marred by sin, by a wrong set and bias of the will, and a world freed from sin. While the world of the allegorical exegesis is mainly a world described in terms of reason, the world of the Bible is mainly a world described in terms of the will. And this distinction runs still deeper into the idea of God. Follow the allegorical interpretation home, take account of the ideas with

which it naturally associates, and we find that in its conception of God the divine being draws aloof from the divine will. God does not clearly express Himself in what He does. His full being does not go into His will. His self-revelation accomplishes itself, not through a real history, but rather under the form of a great idea, or body of ideas, that make use of history as a symbol.

Heresy, when its whole history is told, sometimes surprises us by its splendid genealogy. The eighteenth century broached a heresy which is the mother-heresy of our time, the assertion that nothing historical can be a matter of faith, the proclamation of an irreconcilable opposition between the spiritual and the historical. Lessing made this heresy the established way of thinking with all men of understanding. Kant gave it the full weight of his authority. The whole eighteenth century believed it and passed it on as a proverb and commonplace to the nineteenth century. Now, it is the lawfully begotten child of the allegorical system of interpretation adopted by the ancient Church. For the subconscious premise and postulate of that system is a total disproportion between idea and fact, between the spiritual and the historical.

The significance of all the changes now going on in the Church's appreciation and use of her Bible may be fairly summed up by saying that the

Church is being taught by God and forced by God, —for even Christians need sometimes the kind of teaching that Gideon gave the men of Succoth,— to recognize the historical nature of the divine self-revelation. The Church is being brought into sympathy with the Bible. That may seem a wanton and impertinent thing to say. Have not Christians in every age lived by the Word of God? Have they not canonized the Holy Writings? Have they not gone to them for inspiration and authority? Is it not, then, a wanton impertinence to say that the Church has not been in sympathy with her own Bible? But by sympathy is meant the power of instinctive, intuitive apprehension, born of similar conditions and similar needs. The Bible has been nobly used by the Church in past ages. But the Bible has not been sympathetically studied, studied along the interior lines of its own growth and meaning. And the purport of all the trials and apparent losses now befalling the Church is to bring her to standing-ground where she shall be in instinctive sympathy with her own Scriptures.

Various causes are working together to bring the Christian consciousness to this good end. Only in part is the total result one worked out through self-conscious processes. It holds true of the individual reason that the area of the self-conscious, of the things clearly apprehended and definitely

placed by the understanding, when put beside the things that are but partly apprehended, along with the body of things which touch and color feeling without rising into clear consciousness at all, is as the farm cleared in the forest to the forest itself. This applies also in large measure to the collective reason. The mind of the Church is held in the hand of the Lord of the Church; and He holds in His hand many reins of control which she but little thinks of. The processes by which she is being put into unison and harmony, into quick and eager sympathy, with the Bible, so as to see more deeply into its essential meaning, are manifold. In so far as they are in some measure clearly apprehended, they are summed up under the loose, often high-sounding, sometimes pretentious, yet necessary term, "criticism."

But the total result, the appreciation and use of Scripture along its own inner lines of tendency and purpose, is due, in considerable measure, to more or less indirect causes. The world within which the Church lives and to which she ministers is a very different world from that within which the Catholic Church first established herself. The objects of interest, the things that are substantially real, real at first hand, have widely changed. There is an order of things, challenging, provoking, inspiring, and testing experience, an order which

was not and could not be real at first hand to the Fathers; which did not, and, in the very nature of things, could not, draw out the Christian consciousness of the period, and provide it with objects whereon it should rest.

The ideal capacity of the visible order of things has been vastly enlarged. Phenomena provide a far richer field for the idea to cultivate than in the days of Plato. The accepted theory of sound and of color bring this truth before the mind in a vivid form. We do not use terrestrial beauty as the lark uses the bit of earth when he soars into heaven. Every thrill of color and sound suggests to us the infinite possibilities of sound and color, that is, the infinite capacity of phenomena. The history of the theory of knowledge carries us in the same direction. Kant's famous illustration of the dove, beating the air with laboring wing, faulting the air as an obstacle to free and unlabored flight, the symbol of the pure reason that would fain soar above the phenomena without which it could not in fact fly at all, is the fitting expression of what has befallen the theory of knowledge. The pure reason has become a loyal citizen in the world of the senses.

The history of education carries us in the same direction. The senses have successfully asserted their rightful place in the life of the soul. The

scientific spirit and the historical spirit together unfold before the eager mind the prospect of unending and ever more fruitful study of the earth's history and constitution. To use the current phrase, immanence is the order of the day. The heavenly things no longer draw apart from the sensible things, but seek communion with them. There is a marriage of the earth and sky. The capacity of phenomena to hold and satisfy the ideal has been vastly enlarged, and is continuously growing larger.

To this increase in the ideal riches of the visible order of things the State falls heir. The essence of the State is too deep for either the secularist or the ecclesiast to grasp it. Not the secularist. For the eighteenth century individual who carried the perfect within himself, and left to the State no function save to be an agency for the insurance of bread and butter, has lost his footing. Only for the moment could he discard institutions. He is now entering them anew. And he brings with him Aristotle's maxim;—the State arose indeed to insure bare existence, but it continues to be, in order that men may live nobly. There is something hidden in the soul of the State that eludes the grasp and definition of the secularist. Utilitarianism cannot explain its mystery. The leprosy of mediocrity would smite the State unless there was something deeper in it. The State could not

retain its power to tax both the purse and the heart of its citizens unless it had proved itself to be essential to the making of noble men.

But the ecclesiast can just as little pluck out its mystery. The State is an organism of justice. The sole reason for its permanent existence is that each man may be enabled to be or become himself, to know himself and to master himself, — to live himself out. The State is the trustee of the principle of individuality. It does not derive its title from God, the ultimate and fundamental good, by way of the Church. It is not as the moon, shining with borrowed light. Its holding is direct from God and the good. It is not possible to longer identify the Church with the kingdom of God or the State with the "world." The State has begun to successfully claim spiritual functions. The State of antiquity, being a non-Christian State and going into bankruptcy at the moment when the Church conquered the Mediterranean world, lost its right to be considered spiritual. The Christian State has but just succeeded in asserting its spiritual character and dignity. And its success is, perhaps, the most notable fact in the spiritual economy of our time.

The Church is compelled to recolor her master-word, "spiritual." Not, however, to recast it, for the gist of its meaning is ever the same; only the color and complexion change. The spiritual, in all

its forms, is that which has primary meaning, and so becomes an end in itself, an object upon which the mind and will rest, and beyond which they do not care to go. When, as in Athens and Rome, Church and State were identical, patriotism contained a profound spiritual element. And when a word is spoken, like Lincoln's word at Gettysburg, that ennobles the existence of a people with the thought of a calling in history, it is in the deepest sense spiritual. The difference between the statesman's vision and the mystic's ecstasy is not one of quality, but of object. The quality is one,—the transcending of the common self, outgoing the ends and interests that perish with the day and the plans that go down with the sun, living outside the vulgar and even the average self, eternizing the self by devotion to some object that has power to transmute existence into life.

The sense of beauty is a spiritual sense. The disinterested admiration of a man's or woman's beauty has in it the self-same quality that glorifies the saint's adoration of the beauty and being of God. The strenuous thought of the scholar, seeking to cleanse itself of impatience and vanity in order that it may yield itself to some historical fact as a true mirror for it to reflect itself in, is spiritual in just the same sense as the martyr's last prayer is spiritual. The steadfast attention of science to the methods and meanings of the universe is as spiritual,

in its essential nature, as the prayer of the steadfast sufferer who keeps his pains from narrowing and impoverishing him by seeing in them the working of a holy and almighty will. To so write the history of a nation that it shall come to a deeper knowledge of itself, shall have a more serious sense of a vocation on the earth, — this is as true an act of piety, as truly spiritual, in its essential nature, as to write an "Imitation of Christ" or a "Pilgrim's Progress."

In brief, the main quality of the spiritual, in all its forms, is its power to claim a disinterested attention and devotion. And the Church must recolor the master-word of the inner life, because there has arisen a new dynasty of objects possessing primary interest. The visible universe, pregnant with mysteries eager to enter into conversation with the attentive reason, is surely spiritual; else the New Jerusalem is not. The Free State, with its ennobling ideal of a common good, and its attendant condemnation of vulgarity put upon those who would seek distinction by the possession of things which their neighbors cannot possess, is certainly spiritual, else the City of God is not.

The typical modern whom apologetics seeks to bring within the Christian conception and valuation of life is a man who has been, or is to be, driven out of pantheism, forced by the ethical necessities of the present life to go outside every possible form

of it. But it is the present life he is immediately and primarily concerned with; and the future life, if he is to believe in it again, must reveal itself through, and guarantee itself by, the present life. He desires to live his life in the concrete world about him. But he would fain fill the concrete with the magnificent action of a great soul. He seeks religion in order to keep himself heart-whole in the present, to keep the concrete world, which is his own world, from losing its unity, to set his entire being in eager sympathy with his purpose, and to put all the resources of his nature at work for the betterment of society.

The present, then, must be provided for by religion. Pantheism is at fault, not because it starts with man as he stands in the midst of his terrestrial relationships; but rather because, starting with those relationships, it is unable to remain true to them, unable to follow the principle of individuality home. The bottom it gives to the social conscience turns out to be a false bottom. Christianity must do what pantheism cannot do. It must ennoble the present, filling the ethical will with the glow and fervor of religious feeling, and at the same time doing no injury to that principle of individuality which constitutes the ethical will's entire capital in the commerce of life. And so, while the good that Christianity offers to the struggling will is a transcendent good,

far outgoing the present, lying far ahead of anything history has yet reached, it must nevertheless be a good that preëmits the ground under the feet of the present. It must carry conviction with a reason and conscience resolved to live nobly within the Free State.

If the Bible can manifest itself to reason and conscience as the book of witness to the principle of individuality, and to the sanctity of history, it will surely recanonize itself. Not by an artificial or arbitrary process were the Scriptures canonized at first. The process was as natural and necessary as that by which Homer became a classic. The Scriptures were canonized because they spoke to the heart of the great period between 400 B.C. and 400 A.D. The reasons why the prophetic and apostolic books became the world's Bible lay deep in the most vital interests of humanity, as it faced the tasks of the epoch that summed up antiquity and made modernity possible. And the Scriptures are able to canonize themselves afresh, to become again the Bible of those who are now out of vital connection with the Scriptures. The reasons that are to lead to this result lie deep in the necessities of a humanity that honestly faces the task of history to-day. Society must be bottomed as deep as the being of the universe. There must be a foothold more enduring than the stars, for a law vital and organic to the

men through whom it is made. There must be a social conscience that shall bring the commonwealth constantly to judgment, searching it through and through with the pain of merciless self-examination, so long as any of its citizens lie outside the pale of full citizenship. This is the need of the period opening upon us. If the Christian Scriptures can speak home to that need, they will recanonize themselves under modern conditions.

The great question for the modern conscience to face and settle, is not,—What is the soul? but, What is history? Whence comes it? What is its meaning? and what its hope? Only religion can give an answer to the question, because religious feeling alone can establish or reveal such a relationship of solidarity with the unseen resources of the universe, and attain or manifest such a unity of purpose and being, as shall give to the social conscience the temper and authority that become it. By meeting the social conscience on its own ground, and shifting the main question from the ground where it was rightly put by the apologetics that worked upon the mind of the Mediterranean world, the Christian consciousness will make the right use of the results of criticism, and interpret the Bible to unbelievers along the lines of its own growth. For the Scriptures do not begin with the story of the soul, but with the story of the building of a nation. The law, the conscience, the

beliefs, and the judgments of a people are the staple of the Old Testament. And the Christian Scriptures were completed by joining to the story of a nation's experience the saving and refreshing story of the Christ, through whom God's belief in our race is fully revealed and authenticated. And thus the Scriptures become the book of witness to a divine faith in humanity so deep and so entire that we ourselves are enabled to believe in humanity against all odds of circumstance and fortune.

The Old Testament gives to Christian apologetics peculiar advantages in the debate of comparative religion. It is a mixed book. There is a considerable quantity of matter in it which, taken at its face value, would have driven Philo and Origen, and the patristic interpreters, almost in mass, into despair and unbelief. The customs and habits of a primitive people; the body of levitical details, natural and necessary in the training and education of a nation, as distinct from the tutoring of a few chosen spirits, lacked all sense and meaning to men who had no feeling for the historical spirit, and who could not explain them as integral parts of the career of a primitive people under divine training and discipline. Literally understood, they constituted a fatal stumbling-block. Hence the inevitableness of the allegorical method of interpretation. But these things, literally taken,

are a distinct strength and advantage in our religious estimate of the Old Testament. They go along with the nature of the Old Testament as a people's book. They fit it to mediate between Christianity and primitive religions. Accordingly, the eager interest attending Old Testament study to-day is due, not only to the fact that the most important questions of Biblical interpretation are now under discussion in that field, but also because the initial and decisive questions of comparative religion are to be stated and settled there.

In the debates with the Gnostics in the second century, the Old Testament rendered the Church a great service by helping to give her an anchorage in history from which she could not drag. Rightly appreciated and used, it will render a similar service to-day. Christianity is an historical religion, in that it commends itself to the human reason and conscience as the one valid and binding spiritual estimate and assessment of the historical career of the race. The final value of criticism, the deepest significance of the many indirect forces which conspire with criticism to make the Church view the Old Testament as a history, is that the Church is thereby enabled to interpret and to use her Bible along the inner lines of its own growth and meaning.

The Old Testament is a book of mixed nature,

such as one would look for under the circumstances. The divine method of teaching has no use for the guillotine. The eighteenth century man, trying to make a clean, sheer break between the present and the past, is not a man after God's heart. There is matter in the Old Testament that plainly bespeaks a primitive people, close akin to other Semitic peoples. But the pith and marrow of the Old Testament is prophecy. Prophecy gave Israel her undying name amongst the nations, and prophecy gave Israel her Old Testament. We are not then laying ourselves open to the charge of one-sidedness, when we take the prophet as the type of Old Testament feeling and thought. Speaking at large, we may say that the Old Testament is the prophet's look at nature and history. And just as Greek philosophy is the free look of an individual at the universe,—of an individual standing on his own feet, critical toward and independent of custom, seeking to know and speak his own mind,—so with the prophet. All the great historical religions enter history through the action of individual men, who set themselves apart from the collective action of habit and custom that sways primitive religions. If the religious interpretation of life is to attain freedom and scope, it must be brought about through the deeper self-knowledge and more perfect self-direction of the

individual who stands upon his own feet, owning no Lord save the One who speaks to him through his own heart and reason. Now, the Old Testament is the prophetic individual's look at nature and history, at God and man. The things that come to the shores of light out of the darkness of the unseen, come through the consciousness of individual ownership and responsibility.

But while the Hebrew prophet's look at the universe as regards its freedom is like the Greek philosopher's, in its methods and feeling it is more like the Greek poet's. Isaiah, so far as human genius goes is akin to Æschylus, and remote from Aristotle. The psychology of prophecy is the psychology of great poetry. And this is to be expected. For poetical feeling and religious feeling have this in common, that they demand a world free from fractions, a world where the will and the imagination may travel from border to border and take no serious hurt. The poet must deal with totals. Even so with the prophet. His world must be of one piece, dominated and mastered by a single conception. If we take Milton's description of poetry as "simple, sensuous, impassioned," and apply it to the psychology of prophecy, we shall find that every one of its terms fits the prophet, as a glove fits the hand. Prophecy is simple because it is all synthesis; the processes of analysis are hidden far within it.

Prophecy is sensuous ; its conception of spirit is the conception of a divine energy that makes free and royal use of the material provided by the visible world. Prophecy is impassioned ; the ethical will takes possession of the eye and ear, and victoriously asserts the right of way through the universe. On its human side, then, prophecy was the experience of an individual, owning himself and knowing himself, taken up into a poetic vision where all the world's roads were seen running toward a divine centre. Through this type of experience the hidden mind or will of God manifested itself.

The external history of prophecy put it upon the stage of universal history. The very geography of the Holy Land is significant here. Palestine lay between Mesopotamia and Egypt, the two centres of life and power in the world that came into the prophet's ken. The road through Palestine was one of the main thoroughfares of universal history, so that the political destiny of Israel was wrapped up with the political development of the ancient world. Now the growth and bloom of prophecy were bound up with the political fortunes of Israel. Prophetism was as remote as could well be from quietism. As a type of human experience, it shared all the storm and stress of a vigorous world. It was touched to the quick by the changes in the political outlook of Israel. Its view of life was, in essence, the phi-

losophy of the history of a people placed in a land that stood in close geographical and historical relations with the main forces of humanity. And herein the course run by Hebrew prophecy is strikingly unlike that run by the wisdom of the Hindoos. India lay sheltered behind its mountains. Now and then the invader broke in, but only to harry and disturb its borders. The land as a whole, down to the days of Mohammedanism, lived by itself, apart from the main forces of history. And within this land a chosen race of highly gifted people, organizing the system of caste, imposed heavy taxes, financial and social, upon the entire community in order to endow the institutions and support the religious life of a class of religious specialists. Here was the chosen field for the quietist. Aloof from the storm and stress of universal history, far even from the politics of his own people, he thought out or dreamed out his view of the divine and the human life. The prophet of Israel was unlike him at every point. The storms of the political history of a nation living on the highway of antiquity swept over him. The experience through which God revealed Himself to him was lived out in the broad day of the political and social interests of his people.

The Old Testament is an open-air book. The view of the divine and the human life revealed through it, the visions of conduct and duty and

glory given in it, were revealed through and conferred upon men who had no thought of living the life of specialists. The common life was to them the main staple of all life. Their race was run in the dust and heat of the common day. And it is because of this open-air nature of the Old Testament that it has won, along with the New, the right of entry into all tongues.

This result was due to the station and the breeding of the prophet. He differed from the Greek philosopher in that his chief function was synthetic feeling, not clear thought more or less analytic. Religious feeling, and the thought that interprets it, are naturally synthetic, seeing that it is the function of religion to provide human feeling with a final and enduring unity of vision. Necessarily, therefore, the prophet of Israel, as a man of religion, differed from the Greek philosopher, as a man of thought. But the Hebrew and the Greek were at one in this, that they expressed the layman's view of the divine and the human life. Renan put it well, so far as concerns the prophets, when he said that "the religious work of the laity constitutes the significance of Israel." And every one knows the truth of the saying that Greek philosophy was the layman's view of life. It does not matter at all how many of the prophets were of priestly descent. The point is that the unit

of thought and feeling in prophecy was the common man, set deep in the relationships that compose terrestrial society. That is what the word "layman" means. And herein Hebrew prophecy is at one with Greek philosophy, different as are its aims and methods. Herein, also, it is at the opposite pole from the esoteric and pantheistic monotheism which grew up within every form of polytheism that succeeded in achieving a great political and social establishment. The representative thinkers of that esoteric monotheism were religious specialists, as in Egypt, even when they were not thoroughgoing quietists, as in India. But the representative man in the history of the religious development of Israel, whether a layman by birth and breeding or not, took the layman, the common man, as his unit of thought and his objective point. His monotheism was of a kind that must popularize itself, make itself the main staple of common consciousness, or else deny and destroy itself; and, although prophecy itself did not succeed in popularizing monotheism, although that work was left for Ezra and his men to do, yet prophetism alone made the work of Ezra possible. Prophetic monotheism claimed the common consciousness as its sphere and domain.

Herein lay implicit the declaration that the common man must enjoy full suffrage in the highest things. The distinction between esoteric and ex-

oteric truth is tantamount to the denial of the capacity of the common man to know or appreciate the highest truth. Out of regard for the truth itself, lest he pervert and debase it, the divine truth must be kept from him. He must be fed on half-truths, on compromises between truth and error. But the prophet laid open to the world a kind of truth about God and the hidden life which claimed, on the one side, to be an authentic word from the depths of the divine being, and affirmed, on the other side, that its sphere and domain was the common consciousness. The prophetic interpretation of the divine and the human life was bred up in a land where the common life was treated as the holy life. In the prophet's commonwealth the common man had a divine right to know the full, complete, and entire truth concerning the heart of things. The lay world is in direct and quickening touch with the depths of the being of God.

We have seen that the traditional conception of the Bible, with its emphasis on infallibility and its lack of instinctive sympathy with history, was shaped by the Church in a period when the typical and representative man, the man who carried the spiritual suffrage of the time, was on the retreat from political and social obligations. The idea of revelation which ruled the mind under such conditions made it necessary for the man who would

clearly see God to step outside the relationships that constitute the family and the State. The beatific vision came to the monk. And along with this tendency went an intellectualistic view of truth and life. Infallibility, being looked on as the main note of revelation, must come to be looked on as being also the main note of the Church. Consequently, there was needed a monastic establishment, whose members, removed as far as possible from the conditions surrounding the lay life and mind, served to keep the common will and reason in relation with the divine will and reason. But on this ground the ethics of the common life part company with religion. Therefore the representative and typical outsider of our day has parted company with the traditional view of Christianity. He is altogether concerned with grounding the social conscience. He demands of religion that it shall give unity and strenuousness to the ethical will which seeks to put the common will in immediate connection with the best things known to men. From this point of view, the monasticized Church, with its apparatus of infallibility, divorces ethics and religion; because the beatific vision, that splendid passion for goodness and truth wherein the details of life are glorified by being made parts of a living and creative unity; that revelation of God, the supreme good, without which life degenerates into a matter

of bookkeeping, and ethics, deposed from its high estate as builder of the house eternal, becomes the keeper of a lodging-house,—the beatific vision, I say, the saving and creative unity of life is not for the man of science or the man of affairs. But the prophet, the man through whom that word of God which created the Bible first entered human consciousness, was in accord with our representative outsider in this matter. The being of the prophet was taken up into his will, and the object toward which his will carried his being forth was a glorified nation. He himself was not a monk, but a statesman. The political and social life of his people was the supreme object of interest to him, and upon it his will rested. The common social order was his inheritance and his responsibility.

It was to this prophet, rooted deep in the historical life of his nation, that the beatific vision, the saving unity of life, was given. His experience was the medium through which the heart of things opened itself. Through his will the divine will revealed itself. The grip which the will of the prophet took upon history was the expression of the bent of the divine will. For when the prophet delved down to the root of his own purpose, he found the sap and hope of it coming from the supporting and redeeming purpose of God. So, the set of his own deepest life toward and into the historical life of his people

is the revelation of the deepest tendency in God's own life. The God of the prophet does not draw aloof from history, but puts His entire being in pledge for its consummation. And thus the whole content of religious feeling, the will of God holding in hand all the unseen resources of the universe, comes to meet and unify and render masterful the ethical will in man. Ethics and religion are at one.

The vital question for scientific ethics is — What is to become of the principle of individuality? What is its inheritance in the universe? What its ground? and what its hope? In the final and authoritative use of words, the only thoroughly good thing which the visible universe knows is a human will wholly bent upon spreading and communicating the goods of individuality. To these true goods all other goods are either the economic material or the temporary machinery. Where, then, is the lasting foothold of this will? The prophetic interpretation of the divine and human being finds it in the self-revelation, the self-communication, of a creative will which underlies and underpins nature and history, and which has in store energies and purposes far outgoing the present insights and standards of contemporary society. The outgoing human will, with its heroic struggle for the Ideal, is met by the counter-thrust of the Ideal itself, — the Ideal being, not a vague

abstraction, but an infinite and hallowing energy. The attentive human reason is met by the truth, — the truth being not merely an infinite field to be explored, an infinite deep to be sounded, but an infinite meaning of things which knows itself and is sure of itself and freely imparts itself to the attentive, that is, the prayerful reason. God, the unseen and sovereign worth and good, is a holy, creative energy, not waiting afar, like a shadowy infinite, for a wooing that ends in heart-sickness and brain-sickness to the wooer, but anticipating the approaches of the human heart and reason, — an energy in deed and in truth, outgoing from itself in order to invade human consciousness.

God's revelation of Himself is thorough. The Word that comes from Him to man is fully meant. There is no hint, in the prophetic view, of the distinction between the divine nature and the divine will which belongs to that body of ideas, cohering with the conception of the Church as infallible, wherein the will of God hangs loose upon His being. On prophetic ground such a distinction is not even dreamt of. The entire divine nature is taken up into and expressed through the divine will. God's self-revelation is thorough, and His Word is fully meant; for God is a holy and creative energy.

This conception of God as an outgoing and holy energy takes the form of a belief in the creatorhood

of God. The thought that the endeavors of the human will are upheld, and explained, and filled with hope, by another will, whose stores of force and purpose contain things far beyond all existing human insight; and the other thought that this infinitely vast and transcendent force and purpose does not hold aloof from, but offers itself to and pervades the human purpose it transcends, are expressed in the dogma of creation.

The truth that was given to the prophets was not a truth given through the labors of the abstract reason. Where the commerce of human life most eagerly put itself in play, where the interests that go into politics and society were strongest and keenest, there was the thinking-place of the prophets. The truth revealed was not speculative, but practical; not given in answer to the reason's need of system and unity, but given in answer to the needs of the struggling human will, hungering and thirsting for righteousness on earth, for a coherent and un wasteful society. The dogma of creation is not, then, a speculative product, but is the platform of the earnest, the reforming will. It is part of, nay, rather, it is the very heart of, the organism of ideas that stakes all upon the earnestness of God in His dealings with the history of humanity.

The prophetic belief in the creatorhood of God was the deliverance of a consciousness and a con-

science wholly taken up with the ethical needs of the society wherein the prophets lived and moved. The prophet's consciousness of good in himself made it consist altogether in his relation to the unseen and infinite good. He felt himself to be, in himself, mere flesh, bare dust. But through his living relationship with the living energy of the Eternal he felt that he was a spirit. And once become a spirit, his lips touched and cleansed by divine fire taken from the hearth-fire of God, he felt himself divinely constrained to go upon God's errands amongst his people. The pith of the belief in creation is the conviction that God is altogether in earnest in His dealings with history. The prophet, laying hold of the earnestness of God, became himself profoundly earnest in his dealings with contemporary society.

The prophet was the typical Israelite. The staple of life with him was to be the staple of life with his people. In every part of him he was representative. Not one element was there of his real nature which could escape translation into terms of the common life. Now, the staple of life with him was the spirit within him, that which raised him above the dust. And this spirit, this self-renewing element in him, that created hope in the desert and life in the valley of dry bones, was implanted in him by the all-holy and creative

Spirit. Inasmuch as his prophetic vocation would have been, in his own eyes, a blasphemous pretence unless he trusted that some day God's spirit should be poured out upon all flesh, so that the very servants of the land would see the selfsame visions, dream the selfsame dreams as he, it followed that his trust in the creatorhood of God was the trust of the higher Israel in God's earnestness with the history of Israel, in His purpose and power to carry the processes of history toward a happy and a moral end.

The holy energy of God is the ground and base of the conscience of Israel. Upon the praises of Israel God builds His throne. His being and beauty are the safeguard and confidence of sacred history, that is, the history that acknowledges and seeks a moral end. His creative character, therefore, is an ideal rising up out of human consciousness. It speaks home to the heart of humanity with winning and compelling authority, because the spirit in humanity is made in its image and likeness. God is an infinite creative will, good in itself and entering with all its energy and earnestness into the revelation and communication of goodness. Made in the image of this holy will, the conscience of Israel is a creative and redemptive purpose, in whose sight the best things are unholy, if they be not like-minded with God, if

they do not seek to communicate themselves to all God's folk.

The dogma of creation expresses in terms of matter, of the outer world, that which the prophetic consciousness felt to be the basal certainty of the inner life. The human will, in its endeavor after the good, falls in with another will. The energy setting forth from man meets an energy setting into man. And the prophet, the man who is representative because he is deeply in earnest with the problem and mystery of a coherent inner life for himself, and a coherent social life for his people, finds, when he goes to the bottom of himself, that this in-setting energy is the ultimate source and spring of the energy that goes forth from himself. Either he knows nothing, or he knows that without the divine will, and the saving unity it gives to his aims and labors, the higher life must ever bear the tragic pain that comes upon us when our deepest affection is barred from its sole object. Not saving pain, pain that subdues and chastens and leaves the sufferer attentive to a plan that far transcends his own plan, and eager to get the bearings of a good that transcends his own best, but pain that wastes him and unmans him, leaving his will slack and his purpose decaying into an unhappy and helpless aspiration. But the discovery that his search for good ends in

the revelation of a good that is seeking him, that his offers of worth and value to God are "overbought almost by the sum he pays," gives him in his own eyes an infinite worthiness which no unfavorable circumstances can invalidate or impugn.

Thus the belief in the creative character of God is the expression, in terms of the outer world, of an inner and experimental certitude. It is the deliverance of a religious consciousness for which the integrity of conscience and the coherence of the social order are inseparable aspects of a single historical reality. The prophetic idealist will not solve his problem by recourse either to a dualism that diabolizes the visible world, and puts it outside the pale of consciousness, or to an illusionism that makes it unreal to consciousness. He sticks deep in the history of his people. He will not take the problem of giving integrity to his consciousness, apart from the problem of making society righteous and coherent. The redemption of consciousness and the redemption of society must be wrought out together, or not at all. The belief in the existence of an infinite creative good, a holy redeeming energy, setting like a tide, buoyant and cleansing, into his consciousness and into history, is the answer to both needs.

The way of the monk, of the monastic mystic, is to seek salvation, integrity of consciousness, and efficiency of conscience, by rendering history insig-

nificant, and seeking within the soul that communion with the sovereign good that shall give the ethical will its saving unity. But the way of the prophet is the way of history. The inner life has no significance that history does not share. The soul has no worth which the social and political being of the race may not claim.

The belief in the creative character of God, of the eternal good, is the alternative to the belief in Fate. There is no other alternative. The prophetic conscience, the conscience that takes history and society into consciousness as real and as significant, stands, and must by its very nature stand, in a creative attitude toward both the goods and the aims of contemporary society. It finds itself dwelling among a people of unclean lips, who use words that do not come from the heart, who entertain desires that would make the good their private property, and who pursue purposes that would turn Eden into a private estate. And he himself is a man of unclean lips. There is nothing that is bad in society for which a vigorous and unsparing self-knowledge cannot find within him something to match. But the fire of the divine ideal has touched his lips. The creative goodness of God has invaded his consciousness. And through his consciousness, the self-same energy of creative goodness invades society. His experience abhors the idea of Fate. For belief

in Fate either means nothing worth speaking of, or it means that, for the believer, the substantial and abiding core of things is indifferent to what is dearest to him. In the mind of the consistent Fatalist there is no thoroughfare between the deepest being, the abiding things of the universe, and man's own deepest and holiest desire. And if there be a moral purpose in history, it is sleepy and inert.

To the prophetic conscience the notion of a Fate is alien. But it is no less alien to the scientific, the ethical conscience. So long as for science the one thing needful is an attentive and patient look at the phenomena traditionally classified as "Nature," he may permit himself to use the word Fate to silence theological controversies, as one throws dust upon bees. Napoleon said that Jerusalem did not lie within the plan of his campaign. Science has said that the New Jerusalem does not lie within the plan of its campaign. The science, however, that spoke thus, was a science with a fine passion for the knowledge of "Nature," and nothing more. But this was in the younger days of science. Ripe and manly science turns itself to the question of ethics as the supreme question. The keeping of the ethical will is a matter of life and death. The power of attention to "Nature" is something that may slacken and weary. It must be able to steadily renew itself. But it cannot per-

petually renew itself unless the society wherein the scientist dwells is sound and progressive and free, bent upon giving the widest spread to the goods of individuality. "Nature" opens and takes in human history. The universe is sincere. It must be believed to be altogether in earnest with history. The deepest meanings of things—and "things" are no part of a universe unless they have meaning—cannot be indifferent regarding the meaning of humanity. The student of scientific ethics, if he thoroughly understands himself, stands where the prophet stood. There is no salvation, no integrity for consciousness, to be had apart from the salvation, the coherence of society. The thought of a sleepy or inefficient moral purpose is not to be tolerated. "Fate" is as abhorrent to the scientist as to the prophet.

The modern student of ethics may prefer to use the word "Nature" all through. He may think that the name Jahveh has for him no special significance. And wise and self-confident apologetics will not stickle over this, since, to its knowledge, it has never been revealed that Hebrew is the language spoken in heaven; and since, furthermore, the one aim of the Bible is to get itself happily and effectively translated into as many languages and as many dialects of feeling as possible. The scientist may even prefer the term "Nature" to

the term "God." And here, too, apologetics, though aware that to endeavor to disuse words fixed in the mother-tongue as deep as the foundation is a questionable and perhaps foolish thing to do, will not make a stand as if for an essential matter. But one thing is clear. When once the student of ethics has taken into consciousness the fact of a free society, and has brought that fact with its attendant problems into close and persistent connection with his own implicit or explicit faith in the sincerity and coherence of the universe, there is nothing for him to do but to admit that his term "Nature" is an indefinitely elastic term. The "Nature" that looks at him from the steadfast stars does not rise level to the meaning of the "Nature" that implants in and summons forth from his consciousness an ideal that spurs and challenges him to make human society coherent, to spread the holy light of freedom everywhere, to make individuality, with its self-knowledge and self-direction, coextensive with humanity. This ideal he may as little do without as he may declare independence of his lungs. It is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. And if he insists upon applying to that ideal and its authoritative sources the name "Nature," he must frankly admit and openly confess that he has upon his hands two kinds of Nature, a Nature that does not create, and a Nature that does create.

And this confession draws after it the practical belief that, relative to the apparent Nature of things, the real, the inner Nature of things is free. Over the metaphysical conception of freedom and its conditions we have no need, at this point, to busy ourselves. We may even concede that we are metaphysically unable to think our thought of freedom through. But practically and in effect it follows, from what was said above, that the student of ethics must act, in regard to his great problem, — the origin and the goal of history, the nature and the scope of the ethical will in man, — as if man were free, and as if, furthermore, Nature confirmed his freedom. The term Nature splits up. An inner Nature exalts itself above the outer or apparent Nature, and, in relation to that Nature, bears itself as though it were free. From under the heart of Nature herself there is born an ideal Nature that lays the spell of an authoritative word upon apparent Nature, bidding her share a purpose larger than her own.

The belief in freedom means, as Fouillée has well said, the belief in a maximum of action and a maximum of responsibility. The student of scientific ethics, our representative modern, is bound by all he holds dear and true to believe in a maximum of human action and a maximum of human responsibility. The freedom of thought and the freedom

of the State compel him to part forever from the belief in Fate and to shake off the dust of his feet as witness against it. The inner Nature, the ideal Nature, is practically free in relation to apparent Nature, having in store vast energies and potencies which have not yet come to the shores of light.

God is free. The heart and mystery of life has mighty forces and promises upon which the human will, self-given to the eternal good, to the good that must become common stock, or perish, may draw. The conscience, redeemed from vulgarity and fear, and living to redeem others, has no blind alley ahead of it. The student of ethics and the prophet are here on common ground. God is holy and free, and we dare not say of Him as Prometheus of Zeus: "No one is free save God." His freedom makes us free.

The stake in the great debate between monotheism and polytheism was not the abstract doctrine concerning the unity of God. There is no poetical force in abstract monotheism, as Schiller and Wordsworth have abundantly proved. No more is there any true religious force, any power to heal the heart and brace the will. The creed that God is one, set against the creed — if it can be called a creed — that the gods are many, has no capacity, so long as the bare numerical oneness of the Godhead is in question, to deeply stir humanity and organize the feelings and thoughts of mankind for enduring and

effective work in history. The doctrine touching the unity of God has never appeared save as a formula to express the quality of the divine life. The philosophical monotheism of Greece was conceived and stated as the upshot of the attempt of reason to know itself. The coherence of thought, the unity of reason, the fundamental qualities of the deepest intellectual experience, were the media through which the unity of God, the fundamental and final reason of things, was revealed to the Greeks. It was the discovery of the quality of the Godhead that necessitated the doctrine of divine unity, and not contrariwise. Even so in Israel. The stake in the debate with polytheism was the quality of the divine life, the make and tendency of the Supreme Good.

The unity of God expressed the fundamental quality of the eternal good. The idea was not given complete at the first, nor revealed at a stroke. It was revealed to the prophetic consciousness in the course of a long experience. It opened itself, in its depth and scope, in organic connection with the political and social fortunes of Israel. It did not publish its claim to universal sway until the prophets had seen the political horizon pushed far out beyond the provincial bounds which their forefathers knew. It was revealed through a long and impassioned experience. It was a vital and practical, not an

abstract, truth. And upon it as a foundation and authority was built up the working law, the social conscience, the prophetic consciousness and hope of Israel.

The prophetic consciousness took the history of its people for its main staple. The integrity and coherence of conscience were not to be achieved or maintained out of connection with the coherence and righteousness of the social law of Israel. The great word—"Hear, O Israel! the Lord thy God is one Lord!" went on into—"And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart!" and still on into—"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself!" Upon these words hang all the law and the prophets. Here lies the stake in the mighty war between monotheism and polytheism. It is the unity of religion and morality. Morality, however, is not here taken to mean any and every kind of morality. Even in morals the principle of relativity holds good. There have been many kinds and shades of morality, and there may be many more. What is meant is the conduct and behavior of a will moved by a grand passion for righteousness, and illumined by the conviction that the prophet who would reach pure and priestlike self-knowledge, and acquire royal and commanding self-masterhood, must seek it in communion with the history and hopes of his people.

Conscience cannot be integral and coherent, the individual cannot be truly saved, unless he finds in the unity of God, in the make and tendency of the eternal and common good, the ground and authority for a social law possessing real dominion, exercising real sway, and so containing the promise and possibility of a thoroughfare from the eternal goods to the lowliest man in the commonwealth.

The one and sole good is individuality. All other goods are the trimmings and trappings of this. Such must be the belief of scientific ethics, if it is consistent and thorough. To secure the principle of individuality the scientist seeks the aid of religion. And no religion can serve his turn except that of the prophets, with its impassioned faith in the unity and creatorhood of God. The God of the prophets is a jealous God. But the divine jealousy in this case is totally unlike the divine jealousy that the Greek sophists talked about and Herodotus illustrated. God is indeed jealous of His own honor and majesty. He will not compromise with the conscience. He will not be put off with a sacrifice consisting of bones wrapped up in fat. But His jealousy for Himself includes His jealousy for the honor of Israel, the ideal humanity. He does not begrudge His very best to that humanity; and He puts His whole being in pledge for its ultimate perfection. So the

divine jealousy becomes the foundation of a social conscience which will not compromise, which refuses its respect to any form of good or culture that does not seek entrance into the common life, and which calls down fire from heaven upon the State that does not strive to push home the principle of individuality.

Duty is not holy, has no enduring vitality, unless it be surrounded by the conditions of a magnificent virtue. It must have a high carriage and a sweeping outlook. Hamlet's assertion that he could content himself with the space inside a nutshell, goes along with the deeds that lose the name of action. The reason, the imagination, the will, alike require a wide field to move upon, and grand yet gracious horizons to move within. Nothing short of an impassioned belief in the unity and sincerity of the universe, nothing but a solid and enduring conviction that the whole heart and meaning of things is in solemn league and covenant with humanity's deepest and holiest desire, can give birth and breeding to a mighty common purpose waiting for, and working toward, the uplifting of the lowly. Therefore, faith in duty, when it is followed home, leads conscience into the Old Testament, into the prophetic view of the divine life as a unity, of the eternal good as creative, and of history as a sacred process, leading toward a moral goal.

LECTURE VI

THE CHRIST AND THE CREATIVE GOOD

THE staple of the prophet's view of life is the interpretation of history. His world is a world mainly in time. In this regard he stands in strong contrast with the representative Greek, who was an artist even when he thought, and whose world was mainly a world in space. To the reflective Greek, for the most part, the essential world was a finished world, standing still like a noble statue, shining with beauty. But to the prophet, the pith of things was the aggressive, creative will of the Eternal, inspiring humanity with a vision of the Ought-to-be, and through that vision pressing forward to challenge and judge the Is, forcing it either to change and better itself or lose the right to be considered divine. So, naturally, the prophet's body of thought was largely the interpretation of the experience of his people; if a philosophy at all, it was a philosophy of history. Hence the noble histories he wrote. The question whether, in all cases, they are histories of events that actually

happened or not, has no bearing upon the main point. The matter in issue is the ethical quality of the histories. The prophet viewed history in the light of an impassioned moral Ideal. And when, under the growing pressure of political misfortune and inaction, the prophetic mood changed into the apocalyptic mood, and the book of Daniel was written, there resulted, from the union of the prophetic and apocalyptic types of literature, a total view of history, running from the beginning of things to the end of things. That view drove home its ideal by the conception and picture of the Judgment Day, that is, of a divine, authoritative appreciation and assessment of history.

The vision of the Judgment Day is the assessment of society by its representative members. The man of honor represents his own narrow clique. The woman of fashion represents her own shallow set. The trading politician represents, not the people, but the ring. The self-indulgent seeker after culture represents his own pretentious coterie. These folk deal not in the things eternal; they are petty traders, not merchants of light. But the prophet is representative through and through. Every part of his being seeks, and rests not until it finds, entrance into the common experience. Its quality is universal and translatable. Now, the Judgment Day is this representative man's assessment

of society; it is accordingly the judgment passed upon humanity by humanity itself. The prophetic picture of the last things is the projection into the future of the vision that glows before the conscience of the present. It is kindled and inspired by God. It possesses divine right and authority. The Old Testament therefore is the Book of the Wars of God in behalf of the coherence and integrity of humanity. The prophetic consciousness is the social conscience of Israel, created and fed by the Eternal, summoning Society and the State to a rigid account in the interest of its neglected and disinherited members, keeping the books of society always open for a fresh auditing, and calling down the wrath of heaven against the privilege and prerogative that muddies the waters of the common spring.

How shall the divine judgment upon society, expressed through the prophet's conscience, become efficient? sharp as a two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of the joints and the marrow? Only in case God gives of His best. If the deepest part of Him be kept back, held out of relation with man's holiest desire and out of communion with his highest purpose, God shall surely find Himself driven from His place at the centre of human feeling by the heroes of humanity, men who have given their best and deepest things to men. Only he who gives can judge. Only he

who creates can be a final critic. It is God's character as creative, self-revealing goodness, and that alone, which establishes His judgment-seat in the heart of humanity.

Unless God so gives that His whole being goes into the gift, His control of the ideals of society must needs be slack. And the form in which He imparts His deepest being, the medium through which He reveals Himself is by no means a matter of indifference. Neither is it left vague and in the air. The scientific student of ethics, the typical and representative outsider of our time, does not come to religion in an attitude of passive submission. He well knows what he needs in order to be saved. His absorbing interest in the principle of individuality makes justice his sole aim. For justice, in the man and in the State, is the steadfast disposition to secure to every man what belongs to him. Now, in the scientist's view of life and mind, the core of that which belongs to every man is the right to the best and truest things that come within society's ken. This is the pith of the ideal of justice. And, if the possibility of pushing on toward this ideal be wanting, the visible universe is unspiritual, and must be commended to the attention of men and women of the second rate. The choice souls will not give it their attention.

The ideal of justice finds its coronation in the

conception of God as personal being and good. The term personality has been seriously faulted. Strauss went so far as to say that the terms "Absolute" and "Person" cannot both be applied to God; that they constitute an antinomy, an insoluble difficulty, a case where either term will overpower the other, if it be given free play. But even if he were correct, it would not follow that we must disown and disuse the term Personality. Mental difficulties may rise to a very high pitch, and yet not become irrational or a ground of offence, so long as they are necessary, not artificial, difficulties. There is such a thing as unity of difficulties or problems. And, surely, our mental salvation is accomplished when we have travelled far enough through doubts to see one great question and problem rising up out of all our questions and bringing all our difficulties to a centre. If, therefore, the ideal of justice, from which free thought and free life draw their inspiration and support, is driven to invest its gains and safeguard its future career by means of the conception and revelation of God as personal life and good, then, no matter to how high a pitch the difficulties besetting the conception may rise, they are necessary and saving difficulties. The earnest reason must accept them and prayerfully study them, in order to pay its debts to truth and to humanity.

The point is that unless we conceive God, the ultimate life and good, after the analogy of our own personal life and good, our ideal of justice is doomed. Nay, more, unless our personal life and good is discovered to be a revelation, a true word, from Him, the Heart of things, our ideal of justice is doomed. To the mere word "personality" nobody is wedded. Its associations are not wholly to our liking. But it is on the right track. Its aim is to describe God's inner life as self-knowing, self-mastered, self-imparting, and self-revealing. This is what personality means in ourselves. We are persons, true individuals, only in an incipient way. For the most part our being is our fate. But exactly in so far as we are true individuals do we know ourselves and master ourselves. And exactly in so far as we know and master ourselves do we find and realize ourselves in our fellows. Only through our relations with our fellows, and the revelation of ourselves through those relations, is it possible for us to be persons. And, in seeking to ground and bottom free society, we are forced to establish or discover a covenant between our will and the infinite energy which impinges upon and invades our will from every quarter of the universe. Unless, now, that energy, at its heart, be on the line of what is most real and most worthful in us, unless what is deepest and most significant in us

be a creation of that divine energy, thereby possessing the right to claim kith and kinship with it, the man who believes in the ideal of justice is of all men most miserable. The Digger Indian is happier than he, and the monastic mystic in the long run more efficient.

The ideal of justice draws after it the privilege and obligation of putting what is deepest in ourselves into the common stock. We are not truly individuals ourselves, unless we are creators and sustainers of individuality in others. The prophet, the one man who is thoroughly representative, loses his own footing, unless his neighbor's footing be secure. He knows no good in himself that will not spoil if he keep it to himself. He must give, must reveal himself, in order to be. But he must know himself in order to reveal himself. He must be master of himself in order to truly give. The will in him which makes for self-knowledge, self-mastery, and self-revelation, and so makes for individuality in himself and his neighbors, — thus founding and maintaining a true society, — is the only true good the visible universe offers to his sight. And seeing that by himself the prophet is dust and ashes, and that only in league and covenant with the energy of the universe can he believe himself to be a spirit, he must conclude that unless self-knowledge, self-mastery, and self-revelation are complete in God,

his ideal of justice is built on the sand. Therefore, the personality of God, His self-knowledge and self-mastery, is the foundation of free society, the explanation of its origin, the spring of its law, and the promise and potency of its realization. Consequently, even if Strauss were right in saying that we are not able to reconcile the thought of the absolute life and the thought of the personal life, we should still be compelled, in order to be true to our best selves, to accept the difficulty as resulting from the limitations of our thought in its present stage of development.

But the proposition is not sound. It resulted from a mixing of incoherent views. On the one side, Strauss took the traditional conception of the Absolute. To find its whereabouts we must go to the mystic who, stripping himself of his relations with the definite concrete life about him, set out to find the changeless unity. On the other side, Strauss entered into the world of science, a world made up of concrete and definite things. Now, the world of the mystic and the world of the scientist will not cohere. What is primary reality to the latter is secondary reality to the former. That conception of the Absolute, with which Strauss dealt, was largely shaped by thought more or less remote from the interests and pursuits that are most congenial to science. It was reached along the road of the apophatic or negative

theology, wherein it is proposed to attain the final truth about God by disclaiming, one after another, the things and relations which are real in the world of the concrete and the definite. Scientific ethics, accordingly, must needs be suspicious of a term and conception having a genealogy like this. Such an Absolute as Strauss dealt with, scientific ethics know only as an abstraction. It may have in it truth and use, but it must not be allowed to interfere with the right of way which the principle of individuality claims, as of divine right, in the scientist's own world.

That world is made up of definite and concrete things rendered coherent by a law that works in them and tells its story through them. If the scientist is forced to choose between the reality of this world and the reality of the Absolute, surely it is the latter that will have to go. For he has planted himself within the visible universe. If he uses the term Absolute, he will mean by it the divine unity that makes the visible universe coherent. He will not let his Absolute swallow up and annihilate his definite. He cannot say, with Spinoza, that all determination is negation. That were to contract a left-handed marriage with the negative absolute. On the contrary, determination, from the point of view of scientific ethics, is position and opportunity. The limitations of the individual are not negations

of his being; they are rather the relations whereby he becomes part of a true whole, a whole that realizes itself by fulfilling its parts. Accordingly, the individual's limitations are nothing but his possibilities of revelation, his revelation of himself to other individuals, their revelation of themselves to him. The very universe itself were a universe without sap, a lifeless abstraction, unless the principle of limit and restraint penetrated it to the very core. Either, then, there is no Absolute at all, or the Absolute, holding this universe of manifold restraints and relations close to its own being, finds itself in those restraints and relations and fulfils itself through them; and that, too, without injury to the purity and unity of its own being. That is to say, the absolute being and the absolute good are a personal being and a personal good; because personality is the only good we know that can make itself the indwelling unity or law within another person, without doing harm to the individuality of that other person, or suffering harm itself.

If society is to be thoroughly grounded, if the principle of individuality is to be insured, and the social conscience endowed with due authority, there must be a kind of good that is greatened by becoming common. Good of this kind must be conceived and revealed along the line of human personality. And if the revelation is to be a genuine one, if the

word that comes from the unseen heart of things is to be authentic, the supreme being and good must be a personal being and good, capable of fully expressing itself. The being of the good must be taken up wholly into the purpose of the good. In our own case this work is never anything better than an approximation. Our being goes far below and spreads far around our purpose. But as the humanity in us ripens, the suggestion of an equation between our being and our purpose is given to us. This suggestion is the promise of true personality to us; it is the likeness of the divine nature in us. And in proportion as the equation is established, we become founders and builders of a true society, a society whose goods increase by being made common, and whose law is an imperial obligation laid upon all its members to create or develop their peers. Only when we are persons, do we become a part of the living law for all other persons.

We, as founders and builders of the true society, find ourselves shut up to an impassioned faith in the sincerity of the universe and in the integrity of its fundamental being. Our religion is a deep and wide synthesis of feeling, whereby that personal will in us, which grounds society, comes into solemn league and covenant with the fundamental being. Here is the focus point of the prophetic revelation. At this point, the deep in God answers to the deep in Man.

Man is only in so far a part of true social law as his being is taken up into his purpose, passing forth through it into language and law. And God reveals Himself through this experience of man, as being in absolute degree that which in man, as we now know him, is a bare suggestion. God is the absolutely personal good. In Him infinite being is taken up wholly into eternal purpose. Through His eternal purpose, He becomes the founder and head of the true society. He reveals Himself as a living law for all personal beings. In Him there is no separation between being and will. His entire being goes into His will. All that He is He puts in pledge for the perfecting of the society He has founded.

A true word concerning the good comes forth from God. It is authenticated in the same way that any ideal thing, anything which transcends the things present and apparent, while at the same time it asserts the right of eminent domain over them, is authenticated. It enters experience as a unity entering the manifold. It gives coherence and salvation to the ethical will and purpose in the representative men. And it carries the same objective force that the messages of light and sound bring to the eye and ear. It is not a creation of the will. To say so were to make both ethics and religion a game of make-believe. Rather is it borne in upon experience precisely as the reality of the outer world is borne

in upon perception. God unifies ethics, gives integrity and sanctity to our deepest experience, by revealing and authenticating Himself as personal, creative good. Thus, and thus alone, does the ethical will discover and verify a law that is law indeed. Its word rings through conscience like a trumpet. Its commands touch the whole man to the quick. All the resources of his nature rally to obey it. God is personal and creative good. His will is the only social law. And to be like Him is to make our will serve His will as a man's right arm serves the man, to unify one's experience by rendering it the medium through which God speaks home to the heart of our neighbor in time and space, to sanctify our good by lifting it from the level of private to the level of the common, the eternal good.

Without the divine personality, ethics shipwreck upon the thought of Fate. For, in that case, the core of things is a something or other that acknowledges no relation with the one purpose that sanctifies human experience. That core of things may be clothed in all the adjectives at our command, but the adjectives cannot change the nature of the substantive. The substantive thing remains something that disdains, or is indifferent to, what is dearest and deepest in us. Consequently, the push and thrust of the universe is no longer with us. Our social conscience is a bastard in the uni-

verse. Our talk of a good which is greatened by being extended, is an impertinence. The fundamental drift of things is against us. There is no real sympathy between the substantial being of things and our programme of a true society. God, if we persist in using the name, is an infinite monad, incapable of entering deeply into relationships. His essential being, His good, has no place or currency in us.

But that is a supposition which, once seen in its nakedness, human consciousness cannot endure. Like the Gorgon's head it would turn us to stone. We must find ourselves in some sort of sincere partnership with the heart of things. If we are forced to choose between the reality and interest of the world in time and space, and the reality and interest of the impersonal Absolute, we shall, without hesitation, choose the reality of the Absolute. Our first-hand interests will go out to it. We shall infallibly follow our interests until they lead us clean outside the free thought and the free society that now absorb us. Once again, as in the Mediterranean world, society will split in two, the idealizing part of it going to the monastery, and the men and women of low degree going into business and politics and marriage.

Ranke, in the preface to his noble history of England, suggests that the object of a great his-

tory is to enable a people to know itself, to discover its calling upon the earth, to clarify and solidify its purpose, to give force and edge to its will. Such should be the motive of the men who are to write our enduring histories. They are to disentangle the substantial from the accidental, the permanent from the passing, in order to exhibit the march of the main events toward a common aim. There is a rhythm, a dramatic element, in the apparently chaotic movements of history. Nations do not live at all if they live merely to themselves. They share in a common tendency, they contribute to a common cause, even in the midst of their dissensions. And, before the tribunal of universal history, each shall be judged in the light of what it gives to the main end of history. What that main end is, so far as definite political and social forms are concerned, we may not be able to say, or even to guess. But what the increasing purpose of history is, and what the spirit of its main conclusion must be, we know. The historical process is the crown of the visible universe, the trustee of all that is spiritual or permanently interesting, of all that can persistently challenge the reason and stir the will. And the main stake in history is the strengthening of the principle of individuality, and the extension of the area over which it holds sway. The stay and

strength of the principle of individuality is the personality of God. So, without the personal being and good of God, history has no sanctity. Therefore, in case God is not a personal good, to bid nations know themselves, to bid humanity know its work and calling, is to urge Œdipus to know the pedigree that shall bring him to shame and bankruptcy. As Hamilton put it, better say to humanity, as was said to him, "Mayest thou never know the truth of what thou art."

The power of the good to effectually bring society to account, its judicial and critical capacity, is bound up with its creative capacity. God cannot judge us, His assessments and criticism of history cannot pass current as standard money, if He remains the prisoner of His own infinity. Let Him remain just the metaphysical Absolute, and He will be as the Merovingian kings. He may reign, but some mayor of the palace, some life nearer the common life, able to touch it to the quick and give it coherence and efficiency, will rule. Consequently, the thought of judgment hangs upon the thought of a creative goodness. There is no hope for the ideals which make it possible for the saint to become a whole-hearted citizen, unless God somehow reveals Himself as a creator.

Along this line of thought and feeling, the logic of Creation brings us to the thought of the Incarna-

tion. The latter conception is given to us as the full expression of the former. The creativeness of the good is the premise. The Incarnation, the complete personal outgoing of the good in and through human personality, is the conclusion. By the doctrine of the Divine Personality we mean that the Eternal Good is altogether communicable. We find that the ethical constitution of society is laid deep in the conception and revelation of the fundamental life as a self-communicating good. Nowhere else is there to be found sure footing for the social conscience. On any other ground, suspicion falls upon the sincerity of the universe in dealing with the principle of individuality. We are therefore driven into the conception of the Incarnation by the conception of Creation. The belief in Creation, and the attendant belief in an authoritative social conscience, set us in an expectant attitude regarding the fact of the Incarnation.

The New Testament commends Christ as the answer to the problem of conscience. The being and purpose of God incarnate themselves in Him. He is the revelation of the personal life of the Eternal. It is the function of all great individuals to clarify human feeling, to centralize and organize ideals and motives. It is the function of the Christ to clarify human feeling about the nature of the good. The goodness of God, incarnate in Him, reveals itself as altogether creative and outgoing,

personal and redemptive. In all other individuals there is more or less incoherence and waste. The being of the man is not wholly taken up into his purpose. But there is no waste in the sinless Christ. His whole being is a single purpose. And in His purpose dwells and energizes the creative purpose of God.

Thus He fulfils the logic of monotheism, since ethical monotheism stands, not primarily for the numerical oneness of God nor for the infinite quantity of the divine life, but for its quality. The quantity and the oneness of the divine life are notes of its quality, and its quality is forth-putting, creative, redemptive goodness. The essence of God is holy will. And in the being and life of Christ this will achieves its historical synonym. The ethical will, if it is to be saved, must have a true, authentic word from God about the nature of the good. The Christ is this word. In Him God's Word about the good became flesh. Through Him the self-revelation of the eternal good is offered to the social conscience as its ground and insurance. He is the pledge of the divine sincerity in carrying out the Messianic Ideal, the promise of human perfection. In Him is the everlasting yes to all the divine promises regarding human personality.

The Christ is that divine Word from the heart of things that makes ethics heart-whole. He is the

revelation and authentication of God's perfect sympathy with the human will. He is the pledge of God's ability to give of His deepest and best, without overwhelming the humanity He blesses. The God and Father of Jesus Christ is not the pantheistic infinite that swallows up the individual, but a holy, righteous love that knows how to give its whole self to man, without undoing man. The sinlessness of the Saviour is the medium through which the true nature of the divine sympathy makes itself known. It held true of Christ that what was real to His neighbor was real to Him. He was wholly free from the egotism that makes our neighbors' realities seem unreal to us. He entered with full mind into the heart of His neighbor, seeing him as he saw himself. And this perfect ability to take as reality the reality of His neighbors is the expression of the ability of God, the eternal neighbor of humanity, to take humanity seriously, to enter with the full divine life into humanity, without robbing humanity of the individuality which is its glory.

Thus the divine life flows into the channel of sacrifice. Sacrifice, in the only form we know it, is the fundamental assertion of self in and through another. It is self-assertion under the conditions that are essential to the existence of a true society, that is, under ethical conditions. Society, ideally conceived, is a body of interknitting purposes, of

interlocking wills. The ethical law dominating it is that each member shall know and master himself through communion and spiritual commerce with his fellows. The prime requisite in such spiritual commerce is that he shall reverence the individuality of his fellows. He must so know and master and express himself that his self-expression shall help, not hinder, the self-knowledge and self-mastery of others. Thus self-assertion, in its fundamental form, is sacrifice, being self-assertion in and through another's individuality.

Self-restraint is therefore essential to true sacrifice. To pour out one's powers and energies in a flood that sweeps the beneficiary off his feet,—this is not the pure form of sacrifice. The holier the sacrifice, the more austere the self-restraint; for only through self-restraint can my neighbor's being and purpose so secure their full right to reality, that the conditions of a purely ethical sacrifice may be laid down. This law is part and parcel of the social conscience which condemns any kind of goodness that weakens the individuality of the beneficiary. Therefore this law must be fundamental in God, if God is to succeed in commending Himself to us as the founder and the safeguard of society, the ground and guarantee of the social conscience.

Now Christ, as God's Atonement, is the revelation and discovery of the fact that sacrifice is as

deep in God as His being. He is a holy Creator. With infinite self-restraint He calls into existence beings distinct from Himself. With the selfsame infinite self-restraint He lives His life in His creatures and children, without undoing their right to be distinct from Him. And this necessitates for God the pain of the Atonement. He must either sink below the level of the men He has made, be less creative and redemptive than they, or He must assert His sovereign right to be and to reign in the hearts of those who are indifferent to Him or deny Him. He cannot permit Himself to thunder down the objector, to dragoon the disobedient by celestial lightning. With infinite self-restraint He must respect the individuality of His children. His outgoing energy and goodness are a mere ethical millinery hung upon a heathen absolute, if they undo or impair the full right of humanity to freely know and guide itself. Hence the pain of the divine forgiveness is not to be avoided. God cannot wait to be propitiated. To do that were to throw away His creative initiative, to give up His throne upon the praises of Israel. He must forgive the sinner freely. His forgiveness must go before and condition a full repentance. And if this is to be, He must in some very real way take upon Himself the shame and pain of sin. This is the Atonement, as it is wrought out in the Christ,

who is the full embodiment of the divine sympathy with man's individuality.

So the Christ, as the incarnate and atoning goodness of the Eternal, is the revelation of divine and human freedom. Time and space must be conceived as a school for freedom, unless scientific ethics is to be set down as an impertinence to the universe. And without the freedom of God, without that perfect union of infinite energy with infinite self-restraint, whereby a permanent foothold for human individuality is given to us, time and space cannot be steadily viewed and used as a school of freedom. The ethical will must have its complete synthesis of feeling. There must be a thoroughfare between the heart of the unseen universe and man's holiest purpose. That thoroughfare runs through the being and person of Christ. Through Him God gives Himself a new name in the hearing of His children. By reason of His perfect capacity for relationships, by reason of His exhaustless ability to enter, with all His being and will, into each one of those relationships, not hurting the right of humanity to be itself, but maintaining and perfecting that right, He names Himself through Christ the Almighty Servant, the Great Companion of free men.

Ranke has said, regarding Alexander, that he was one of the few men in whom biography is identi-

cal with universal history. With incomparably more truth, yea, with perfect truth do the words apply to the Christ. What is history? is the supreme question of the student of ethics. What its origin? and what its hope? Christ is the answer to that question. He is the fulfilment of the Messianic Idea, the assurance that all God is and has He pledges to the creation of men in the likeness of His own self-knowledge and self-masterhood. When we distinguish between the details and outer movement of history, and its inner, essential motive, we may say that Christ is the heart and the hope of history.

The Christ is God's standard of values set up in the thick of history. As God's perfect gift of Himself, the deepest Word God has to say regarding the nature of goodness, He is the Judge of the race. Men can be truly judged only by their peers. The man who lives by the code of honor may be condemned by the general society about him. But the words of that society have no wings to reach him; its judgment does not penetrate and persuade his world. One nation is criticised and condemned by another nation; but the criticism cannot cross the frontier. We can be truly judged only by our spiritual kith and kin, by our peers. But Christ, as the incarnate goodness of God, is a judge whom humanity cannot hope to escape. He is in our

midst. He is altogether of us. His life is the common life. Yet through it is spoken God's final word regarding goodness. The word is winged with immortal power. We cannot escape it. The Son of God judges us because He is the Son of Man. And His judgment is humanity's judgment upon itself. Up to His standard humanity must toil, or deny itself.

Because God is holy and free, His self-restraint has cleared for us in the field of universal being a space where we may grow to be ourselves. By reason of His personal life and good we do not need either to sacrifice our ethics in order to give saving unity to feeling and conscience, or to sacrifice our religion in order to be loyal to the ethical will which refuses salvation, unless the historical life of the race be the main end of religion. The very nature of God renders it needless, even impossible, for us to abandon the life of a citizen, in order to live the life of the saint. But, by reason of the selfsame divine nature, we cannot be saved unless we make a venture. God's freedom creates and sustains our freedom. The salvation of the ethical will cannot be wrought out, if our freedom be in the slightest degree hurt or hindered. God creates and puts forward the facts of the spiritual order. But we must freely open ourselves to the facts. That self-opening is faith.

Moreover, the facts of the spiritual order transcend all experience hitherto. And if this were not the case, these facts would not belong to an order of things truly spiritual; because the spiritual, being that which calls forth our attention and holds it, necessarily extends beyond our present experience. Besides, the kind of attention which salvation, as ethics interpret it, demands, makes this transcendent, outreaching quality of the facts God offers to our interests even more prominent. The core of them is an aggressive spiritual energy invading human consciousness. It stands before contemporary consciousness, and its political and social framework, as an authoritative, imperious Ought-to-be, confronting, inspiring, and condemning the Is. Necessarily, then, our answer to God's offer must be in the nature of a great venture. Being merchants of light, traders in the commerce of the ampler life, our ship may not keep in sight of land. We must freely transcend our present selves and our present experience, if we are to be capable of meeting the facts God puts forward. If, therefore, we are to be saved at all, if the ethical will is to get its due force and edge, we must be saved by faith.

Faith or trust is the creative human answer to the creative divine offer. It is not a passive acceptance of a divine favor. Our freedom were impossible

without God's freedom. But it is equally true that, without our freedom, God's freedom would undo itself, salvation sinking to the level of a process worked out by Fate. God's being and good are an altogether personal being and good. In creation He has laid down the possibility and conditions of a personal being distinct, though not separable, from His own. Through the Incarnation He makes complete the manifestation of His personal nature, which creation began. The entire divine work from creation on were as a blow under water, unless the human act, whereby God's offer of the eternal and common good is met and the good appropriated, be a true action, into which the man puts himself.

Faith is a creative act of trust in the spiritual constitution of the universe, whereby a man affirms in himself the primary reality of his own personal ethical will, in its kinship with the creative eternal good. At the same instant, by the same act, he lays the foundations of society as deep in himself as his own being. The stake between monotheism and polytheism is, on the one hand, the ethical unity of the divine life, its singleness of purpose, its power of perfect self-impartation; and, on the other hand, it is the ethical unity of humanity, the singleness of purpose in its spiritual history, the infinite capacity of humanity to receive the infinite life which the eternal offers, the perfectibility of human-

ity in God, and the necessity of making the common man heir and steward of the eternal goods. God's being and will are wholly creative and redemptive. Man is not saved, his will is not truly ethical, unless he be knit to the divine will, taking from it his own moral purpose, and his emotional color as well. When, by faith, he affirms himself to be a person in God, he by the same act disowns, as being unnatural to him, all goods that do not seek to make themselves common stock. Man is social, just in so far as he is personal. The man who is saved, whose will has been made whole and of a piece, knows of nothing in himself, apart from God and His creative good, that deserved the beatific vision, the saving unities of life. He must then give the entire credit of his salvation to the intrinsic nature of the eternal good. So, unless he exists, henceforward, to put his entire being into his relations with his fellows, he throws his own salvation away. By faith man, laying hold of the personality of God in Christ, becomes a true person. And by the selfsame faith he becomes, under God, a creator and founder of true society.

The pilgrim of scientific ethics, having gone through the debate of comparative religion, should be prepared to enter the New Testament with a sympathetic mind. He should be ready to meet God in Christ halfway. For well he knows that, unless

the principle of individuality be thoroughly cared for, his free thought is but a left-handed marriage between human reason and phenomena. He knows that, if his ideals are to make an enduring fortune, the Free State must be guaranteed by the resources of the universe. He has come to feel that the most essential part of his thinking is the duty to think. And along with the duty he owes to thought goes, as an inseparable part of one total, the duty he owes to society. He finds that he must will to believe in the sincerity of the universe, if he would keep himself from vulgar, low-pitched aims. That does not mean that he shall will to believe whatever he wants to believe; but that, finding certain central facts given to him, facts which are as truly a part of the contemporary universe as the wind and the rain, he must interpret the unseen resources of the universe in sympathy with these facts; that is, with faith and trust.

The visible universe, with all its apparent waste and blundering, furnishes him with enough material of freedom and individuality to start him on his career. But into the inner regions, the ultimate resources of the universe, he may not enter save by a religious act, by faith, by a free personal will to believe in the sincerity of the universe and of God. This is his ethical new-birth, his birth from above. And without it the ethical will, which is the pith

and marrow of his humanity, cannot be saved. He should, then, approach the Biblical view of the divine and the human life with a strong disposition and desire to accept it.

Faith is the most strenuous form of idealism. Of idealism there are many shades. Howbeit, the kinds that are near neighbors to us, as Occidentals, are the philosophic idealism of the Greeks and the faith of the prophets. In both, the central question is the relation of the ideal to the real. And in regard to that question, prophetic idealism differs from the Greek idealism, both as respects the vastly closer relation it brings about between the ideal and the historical, and the incomparably more aggressive attitude of the ideal toward social reality. Salvation through trust in the saving and creative unity of the Eternal brings to pass an equation between desire and deed. And the desire, which thus comes to be sure of its own satisfaction, takes its make and bent from the nature of its object. The object being the creative good of God, offered to humanity through the redemptive life of Christ, the desire of the man who has been born again takes its quality and color from the creative good. Hence it includes the righteousness of historical society, as being part and parcel of his own. Consequently, the equation between desire and deed includes a certitude touching the establishment of a

coherent society in history. And this ideal has the right to become real. Were the right to be denied, the universe would be unravelled. For the act of faith whereby the ethical will is saved gives eternal worth to the relations into which the will enters. The prophetic consciousness stands inside them. The process of revelation is wrought out through them. So the redeemed man may as little doubt the perfectibility of society, as he may doubt his own salvation. The ideal, therefore, rising up in his heart makes him a merciless critic of social reality, even as it makes him a merciless critic of his own sins. His judgment has both the gentleness and the severity of the divine judgment. And it never slackens; because, by reason of its community of life with the creative good, it cannot weary. The redeemed man becomes the embodied social conscience. It is self-renewing. Whatever hurt and mischief the world inflicts upon it, whatever wounds it receives, it knows itself to be walking one road with the Lord of life.

The function of religion and theology in a democracy is to so state the relation between the individual and the fundamental life of things, that the individual shall become wholly active and aggressive. Every form of polity lays a certain tax upon the will. But democracy lays the heaviest tax of all. The vital relationships into which the

individual should enter are far more numerous than under any other form. And with each one of them he must go deeper. So the tax levied upon the earnest will is exceeding heavy. It cannot be paid, year in, year out, and paid with increasing gladness, unless the individual be assured that the resources of eternal good are at his back. And this certitude only possesses and pervades him when he has been made whole by trust. The idea of God given to him is a missionary idea. The good is forth-putting, or it is nothing. God is an infinite missionary force. There is no fate in Him that hinders Him from putting forth His best. And the man who touches Christ and is touched by Him to the quick becomes like God, a missionary force, making of himself a redeeming energy that relates itself to the energy of God, as a man's right hand is related to the man. Henceforth there is no fate in him, nothing which cannot be mobilized and put in the field in the service of his fellows.

Christ is the candle of the Lord, lighted in history by God, to throw the light of the eternal upon the meaning and end of history. He is God's pledge of the unity between the ideal and the real. The issue of the great debate of comparative religion is to make Him more secure of His throne in the world's heart. No life is truly divine and no life is deeply human except the creative life.

Christ being the expression of the creative goodness of God, the man who through trust lays hold of Christ becomes creatively good. He finds in Christ the equipment for citizenship in the Free State. He recognizes his political and social relations as sacred. He joyously dooms himself to pay all the taxes which his citizenship imposes upon his conscience. The ethical will, putting itself to hard heroic labor within the Free State, cannot thrive upon difficulty without Him. He is the heart's desire and the heart's ease of a humanity bent upon enabling the lowly to live nobly.

In the field before us, so widely different from the Mediterranean world, the Church wins a new knowledge of herself. She is the body of Christ, the body of those who have, through trust, laid hold on the creative goodness, who have opened themselves, by a great act of faith and admiration, to the infinite missionary energy of God. She is the society of those who seek a perfect self-knowledge, a perfect self-mastery. She is the community of those whose creed permits them to acknowledge no good as true good, unless it be eternal good, good that belongs by right to all. Those who seek self-knowledge and self-mastery through her fellowship and sacraments and Word are well assured that, only by imparting themselves to the disinherited and the lowly, can they truly

possess themselves in the eternal. They are sure, unless their creed is a plaything, that the central reality of life is the being and beauty of God as they are offered through Christ to all mankind. They themselves, through appropriation of the divine being and beauty, have been delivered from the tyranny of fad and fashion and fate. They are now in league one with another, and all with God, to impart the selfsame being and beauty to every child of man, and to bring to the shores of light the human capacities now hidden in darkness. Unless, then, they lack the courage to draw a straight conclusion from simple premises, they must know that the Church is to test and approve herself by her power to tutor and train a social conscience that shall steadily put the commonwealth to shame, so long as some of its members have no inheritance to dwell in.

The function of the Church is to interpret to the world the nature and meaning of true society. Being the community of those who believe in ethical monotheism, she would be false to her own idea of God, did she not put forward the unity of the divine life as the secret and source of unity in the human life. She falls into heathenism, unless she commends the divine life as the one foundation of a perfect sociability. This means that the Church is a community of people who seek to be individuals,

—persons in the fullest sense,—and who know, to use Rothe's words, "that the completion of unconditional fellowship with all other human beings is the absolute condition of the normal development of the human individual." The devout life is not quietistic, but energetic. It is the harmony of religion and ethics. Man, as ethics define him, is essentially will; for there is nothing good but the good will. And the will, in so far as it is ethical, is forth-putting and creative. Hence the scope of the good will is the good of society. Therefore the love of humanity is the vital breath of all fine conduct. So the good will exists to express itself in relationships with men. And the expression is a feeble one, if a halt is made and a line drawn before the barren or unpleasing portions of the field of humanity. For there is no other rule than this—To treat every human being as a person, as possessing the infinite value of kinship to an eternal and common good. And the man who seeks the highest good,—individuality,—sells his soul, exchanges the highest good for some lesser good, if he draws back from the barren places and from the swamps. To be a real individual, he must create and develop individuality in all his fellows.

The Church will commend herself to the earnest will now at work in our democratic society, by giving it a coherent view of the creative good. The ethical

will devotes itself to the betterment of society. But the human better can only be steadily sought in case there is a Best which we may heartily believe in. Renan said, concerning Marcus Aurelius's work as a soldier: "A thing is never well done that is only done because there might be something worse." This holds good of all noble behavior. It must be done as part of a grand passion for the Best. Conduct, like poetry, to be noble, must be inevitable. The human better must be done with the whole heart, if it is to be an attainable better. And the whole-hearted search for the personal and social better implies and necessitates an impassioned belief in the Best. Without the Best the will is sure, sooner or later—and a few hundred years do not count in logic—to weary and slacken. Now the Church, being the trustee of God's saving thoughts concerning personality and society, reveals the Best, gives coherence and saving unity to the doctrine of the good, by preaching God in Christ as the heart and mystery of things, and as the ultimate word concerning things. The Christian view of life spends all its resources to ground and bottom the principle of individuality. In its version of the universe, that principle strikes its roots as deep as the deepest part of the total being. The individuality, so grounded and guaranteed, is creative, or it is nothing. The redeemed man is inherently a creative man. His story

is the story of a lover of humanity. Loving the Best, and beloved by the Best, he has within himself the springs of a permanent self-renewing interest in humanity; and this interest is the sole source of steady attention to the needs of society, and of an unflinching sense of responsibility for the satisfaction of those needs.

Beyond question, monasticism has a footing in the New Testament. There are plain suggestions of it here and there. No wonder, for the New Testament is the record of a great collective experience, not the output of a scholastic process rigidly guided and checked by a metaphysical Absolute, in the interest of an infallible Church. Howbeit, the monasticism of the New Testament is, on the whole, one of expedience rather than of principle. The New Testament, taken as an organism of ideas, is like a body without a heart, unless the idea of the kingdom of God is made the main thought, and unless Christ is interpreted as the promise and ground of a perfect fellowship. In this soil, monasticism cannot strike its roots deep.

The market-price of many things is changing. The imperial monastic Church of the Middle Ages set up a standard of ethical values which the world of our day can no longer accept. And, while the core of sainthood must ever be the same, its field of action to-day is different. The Church must free

herself from some "bed-ridden truths." And, happily, she is no longer an established Church, blinded by supremacy. She is, or must become in the fullest sense, a missionary Church, missionary to a world vaster even than St. Paul's most eager dreams, missionary also to a fearless and self-respecting reason. She has her fortune to make in a changed world. Therefore, she must be as the wise steward, bringing forth out of her treasures things old and new.

The supreme, coördinating fact in this new world is the Free State. The deepest concern of that State, when it once clearly understands its place and calling in history, is for the unprivileged and the lowly. The State is now a spiritual organism, having justice for its inspiration, and the widest spread of individuality for its good. The Free State of antiquity was content on the whole to insure the well-being of its existing citizens. But the Free State of modernity must create citizens, and extend the full privileges of citizenship. It is a spiritual organism, manifesting its spirituality in many ways, but notably in its tightening hold on the means and methods of education. Within the Free State, the layman's world has risen to the level of a full suffrage in spiritual affairs. To minister to that world, giving its views of good coherence and lasting vitality, is the function of the modern Church.

To fulfil her function, the Church must develop the doctrine of the Divine Personality. She has not always been true to it in the past. Too often, by her sacraments, by her theology, by her theory of inspiration, she has glorified the impersonal. Upon a false conception of the supernatural she has built up a false definition of the true society, making it out to be a monasticized interior Church, a world of ascetic ethics into which the lay world cannot enter, while yet the same lay world must go on existing, lest hunger and the wild beasts put an untimely end to the monastic experiment. And with the monasticized Church goes an imperfect conception of the supernatural: a distinction, similar to the false distinction drawn by asceticism between the secular and the religious, is drawn between Nature and the things above and beyond Nature. But the true supernatural is the personal, and wheresoever the personal is discovered, whether in the life of conscience or the life of reason, whether in Israel or Greece, there the supernatural is discovered. Upon this conception of the supernatural as the personal, apologetics must found the claims of Christianity. The divine and the human personality stand within "Nature," that is, within the total of being. But they both, the human as well as the divine, transcend the scope and reach of visible Nature. The represent-

ative modern who knows his own wants and the wants of the society that holds his title-deeds will not permit himself to be puzzled or stalled by the problems of knowledge. The salvation of the republic of humanity is the supreme law. Noble need will govern negative theory. Dogma is essential to magnificent virtue. For a little while, in an age of transition, men may make themselves believe that they can dispense with dogma, that dogma is even an evil. But when they seek and find their footing within permanent conditions, when the decisive question is the possibility of a magnificent human virtue, a virtue that is nobly discontented with easy duties and average responsibilities, and asks for hard things as for pleasures, then the necessity of a coherent body of dogma will become again apparent. And then the Church will have her chance.

The world will be ripe for conversion, as it was ripe, in a different way, in the second century. But to do her work, the Church must cleanse herself wholly of the idea of infallibility, lest the "hide-bound humors" of men shall, by dint of repetition, become confused with the judgments of God. The idea of infallibility goes along with an imperfect or faulty conception of personality and of the supernatural. It was at home in the world wherein it was first clearly conceived, a

world which saw the lay life lose its sap and spiritual significance. It goes along with a present that is conscious of and confesses its emptiness, needing to hark back to a sacred past in order to get into any sort of saving connection with things eternally interesting and worthful. But it is not at home, on the contrary, it is out of place and hurtful, in a lay world full of rich sap and spiritual meaning, and in a present which has the prophetic afflatus, and knows itself to be in direct connection with things divine, things permanently interesting. If the idea of infallibility is to be worked to any point and advantage, there must be an inner church of priests, detached and separate so far as that is possible, from the secular, the historical, order of things, holding the power of the keys, of the administration and judgment of spiritual things. But the laity to which the Church must now administer is a laity that has successfully claimed suffrage in things spiritual. And the power of suffrage draws after it the right of judgment.

The Church, totally disclaiming infallibility, must commend herself to this lay world by putting herself forward as the community and commonwealth of those who live by trust in the creative good. On this ground alone can she hope to win the representative man, on whom apologetics bends its

arguments. Infallibility will win to-day, as it has won before, brain-sick men and women who are born to lean on something or other. It will win many earnest souls who are confused and uncertain of their way by reason of the jarring sounds of a noisy, critical, and impatient age. But it will not and cannot win the men who represent the world that has just come above the spiritual horizon. To them the Church can speak home, winning a sane and wholesome authority, only by presenting them with a coherent view of the creative, redemptive good, that shall insure the principle of individuality, and reveal to men and in men the springs of reverence and wonder for the historical career of the race.

With infallibility and its attendant idea a false conception of mystery went along. The mystery was that which could not be understood, which held aloof from the lay reason and the common life, looking askance at history. But true mystery, mystery as the New Testament conceives it, is one aspect or another of the forthgoing energy of God, penetrating and challenging the redeemed reason, pervading the common life, fostering prophets, not monks, and pressing with full power into the channels of history. To St. Paul the supreme mystery was not the Trinity or the Incarnation, but the undoing of the division between Jew and Gentile, and the upbuilding of a true society wherein they

were at one. Into his vast emphasis we find it hard to enter. The reason may be, in part, our metaphysical training, which teaches us to seek our mysteries on the other side of phenomena, — and, in part, the fact that the division of the race into Jews and Gentiles is not a contemporary division of society. Possibly, the immense difficulties besetting social unity and peace in our own time may enable us to go a little way with St. Paul's emphasis. The easy-going, flippant, talk we hear about the necessity of America's passing through the same stages of social stratification as the Old World, — as if "America" were simply a natural opportunity now passing by — and the "social question" taken in its full reach and scope, are enough to remind us that the problem of human unity is a mystery indeed. How shall the higher humanity be kept whole-hearted and sound of wind while redeeming the slums, and creating men and women in places where now there is brutality and noisomeness? History's mortgage of brutehood and sin is vast and disheartening. To build a spiritual palace, calling it a monastery, is easy. To leave the track of history and go off with the Hindoo quietist, leaving the cheap politicians and the rattlesnakes to rule the land, is simple. But to conquer the earth while conquering conscience, to stand fast in one's place of citizenship, believing in and waiting for the mystery of social

redemption, — this is the hard and heroic way. This is God's way, and the way of free men in Christ.

But what of the life beyond? Strauss said that the belief in it was the last enemy to be destroyed. And in very deed and truth, if an earnest belief in immortality entailed absentmindedness regarding primary social obligations, we could, perhaps, find it in our hearts to agree with him. But this is not the case. On the contrary, the belief in immortality, rightly received and followed, is indispensable to a true and lasting temper of the ethical will, if that will is to doom itself to pay all its taxes, if duty is to be taken in its full depth and breadth. In the Biblical order of truth, personal immortality does not come first. It is not a premise, but a conclusion; not a fact but an inference. The fact and premise is the kingdom of God, the being and will of the eternal as a personal and creative good. But, that fact and premise clearly given, the trust, the impassioned trust in personal immortality is as essential an inference for the creative will in man, as the indestructibility of matter is for the scientist. The heart of all known good is individuality. Individuality, to be ethical, must put itself wholly into social relationship. Only a perfect individual, perfectly knowing and mastering himself, can be truly in society; and only in society can a man become a perfect individual. He alone, then, can pay in full the tax laid

upon the social conscience, who is an impassioned believer in individuality, and who, through his belief, becomes a creator of individuality in others. Such a man cannot, without self-destruction, tolerate the thought of a stuff of being in himself and others that successfully refuses to be taken up into the individual and the individuating will. That were to slip back into the idea of Fate. Nor can he make resignation a primary element in his motives for the creative life. Not resignation, but action, is his ideal, an action wherein nothing is suffered, but all is done.

When a man accepts, as his stint of work upon earth, nothing short of his making himself a medium through which the infinite missionary energy of God shall press into society, it is not possible for him to believe that, in the land beyond, the one thing which in the sight of the Eternal is worth remembering, shall be forgotten. It is true that personal immortality is not first but second; not a fact, but an inference. The kingdom of God is the fact, personal immortality the inference. But let a man once take up his full work within the kingdom, let him come to regard himself as heir and builder of the ideal society, and then the trust in immortality shall leap forth upon him as the sun leaps from the sea. Christ, the ground of a perfect fellowship, is likewise the ground of an unshakable trust in immortality.

The framework of history will not easily be

changed. The brute, the satyr, the man who sells his fellow-men for a pair of shoes, the woman who spends her soul in building ignoble aristocracies, — these folk will not soon perish from the earth. Yet this does not daunt the prophet, the freeman, who has learned to walk in the ways of the Great Companion. The springs of his interest and reverence lie deep down in his own nature and in God's being, so deep that no army of hostile circumstances, besieging his will, can stop their flow. He does not day-dream or deceive himself, when he prophesies of a time when man's whole being shall be at the call of his highest purpose, and when every detail of human life shall be pregnant with meaning and rich in worth. The sincerity of the universe, the unity of God, the beauty of Christ, teach him that the eternal being and good believe in him. He believes in that belief and so is saved, enabled to believe in himself. Out of his own nature is given to him the hope that he may become a man of attentive reason and impassioned prayer, with a conscience possessing both the gentleness and the severity of God, toiling gladly to make the earth a fit place for babes to draw their first breath in, and a gladsome place for old folk to look their last upon, making his own life a part of the joyous and refreshing story of the Son of God, who, by living amongst us and dying for us, hath given a new heart and an eternal hope to our race.

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